New England Journal of Entrepreneurship, Spring 2011 by unknown
New England Journal of
Entrepreneurship
Volume 14 | Number 1 Article 1
2011
New England Journal of Entrepreneurship, Spring
2011
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.sacredheart.edu/neje
Part of the Entrepreneurial and Small Business Operations Commons
This Full Issue is brought to you for free and open access by the Jack Welch College of Business at DigitalCommons@SHU. It has been accepted for
inclusion in New England Journal of Entrepreneurship by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@SHU. For more information, please contact
ferribyp@sacredheart.edu, lysobeyb@sacredheart.edu.
Recommended Citation
(2011) "New England Journal of Entrepreneurship, Spring 2011," New England Journal of Entrepreneurship: Vol. 14 : No. 1 , Article 1.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.sacredheart.edu/neje/vol14/iss1/1
Spring 2011 Volume 14 Number 1
From the Editors
Herbert Sherman, Joshua Shuart, Laurence Weinstein
Conceptual and Empirical Research
Understanding SME Intention to Use the Internet for Managing Supplier
Information
by Kevin Celuch, University of Southern Indiana;Anna M.Walz, Grand Valley State
University; Carl Saxby and Craig Ehlen, University of Southern Indiana 
Corporate Parents, Initial Legitimacy, and Resource Acquisition in Small and
Medium Firms: An Empirical Examination
by Gregory B. Murphy and Neil Tocher, Idaho State University  
Bootstrapping Techniques and New Venture Emergence
by John T. Perry and Gaylen N. Chandler, Wichita State University; Xin Yao, University of
Colorado at Boulder; James A.Wolff, Wichita State University
Case Research
Getting to Green: Niche-driven or Government-led Entrepreneurship and
Sustainability in the Wine Industry
by Lauretta Conklin Frederking, University of Portland
Instructional Cases
KaBloom!: Revolution in the Flower Industry
by Gina Vega, Salem State College; Colette Dumas, Beverly Kahn, and Jafar Mana,
Suffolk University
Abandoning Ship at Scandia, Inc.: Parts B and C
by Barry Armandi (deceased), SUNY-Old Westbury; Herbert Sherman and Adva Dinur,
Long Island University–Brooklyn
Book Review
Entrepreneurship in the Creative Industries:  An International Perspective, Edited
by Colette Henry
Reviewed by Lori Wagner, Pennsylvania State University
New England Journal of Entrepreneurship
SACRED HEART UNIVERSITY
1
et al.: New England Journal of Entrepreneurship, Spring 2011
Published by DigitalCommons@SHU, 2011
Miles K. Davis
Shenandoah University
Minority and Women Entrepreneurs
Joseph Levangie
Ardour Capital
Practitioner’s Corner
Daniel J. Rowley
Univ. of Northern Colorado
Practitioner Interviews
Michele Masterfano
Drexel University
Book Review
Sean M. Hackett
Drexel University
Entrepreneurial Education
Gerry W. Scheffelmaier
Middle Tennessee State Univ.
International Entrepreneurship
Alexander Brem
University of Erlangen
Nuremberg, Germany
Certified Project Management
Associate (GPM/IPMA)
Associate Editors
New England Journal of Entrepreneurship is a semi-annual publication (Fall and Spring) of the John F.Welch College of
Business, Sacred Heart University, 5151 Park Avenue, Fairfield, CT 06825-1000.
Annual subscription rate for two issues is $12.00 for individuals and $50.00 for institutions. Copies are mailed via 
second-class postage. Copyright© 2011 by Sacred Heart University.
All rights reserved under International and Pan American Copyright Conventions. Library of Congress ISSN 1550-333X.
For subscriptions or reprints of articles, call (203) 371-7854 or email: shuartj@sacredheart.edu.
See our website at www.sacredheart.edu/neje.cfm.
The facts, opinions, and conclusions set forth in the articles contained herein are those of the authors and quotations
should be so attributed.They do not necessarily represent the views and opinions of Sacred Heart University nor can the
University assume any responsibility for the accuracy or validity of any of the information contained herein.
Editorial Consultant: Miccinello Associates, Branford, CT.
Herbert Sherman 
Long Island University,  
Brooklyn Campus
Editor
Joshua Shuart
Sacred Heart University
Associate Editor and Web Master
Laurence Weinstein 
Sacred Heart University 
Editor Emeritus
New England Journal of Entrepreneurship
Editors
Reviewer Panel
Petri Ahokangas
James Bronson
Noel Campbell
Radha Chaganti
Ed Chung
Ping-Tsi Chung
Jane Crabtree
Virginia dePaula
Shahrokh Dalpour
Alain Fayolle
Kirk Heriot
MasheshKurnar 
Joshi
Jill Kickul
Joseph Levangie
University of Oulu, Finland
Univ. of Wisconsin–Whitewater
University of Central Arkansas 
Conway, Arkansas
Rider University
Elizabethtown University
Long Island University
Benedictine University
Long Island University
University of Maine, Farmington
ESC Lyon
Mercer University
George Mason University
Simmons School of Management
Ardour Capital
Robert N. Lussier
Jim Lyttle 
Theresa Madonna
Michele Masterfano
Enda McGovern
Steven McMillan
Teresa Menzies
Michael Morris
Daniel Rowley 
Matthew Roy
Matthew Rutherford 
Steve Schanz
Gina Vega 
Miriann Ben Yoseph
Springfield College
Grand Valley–Pennsylvania State 
Salve Regina University
Drexel University
Southern Connecticut State Univ.
Pennsylvania State, Abington
Brock University
Syracuse University 
University of Northern Colorado
University of Massachusetts, 
Dartmouth
Gonzaga University
North Carolina State University
Salem State College
DePaul University
2
New England Journal of Entrepreneurship, Vol. 14 [2011], No. 1, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.sacredheart.edu/neje/vol14/iss1/1
Spring 2011 Volume 14 Number 1
From the Editors
Herbert Sherman, Joshua Shuart, Laurence Weinstein  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5
Conceptual and Empirical Research
Understanding SME Intention to Use the Internet for Managing Supplier 
Information  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9
by Kevin Celuch, University of Southern Indiana;Anna M.Walz, Grand Valley State
University; Carl Saxby and Craig Ehlen, University of Southern Indiana 
Corporate Parents, Initial Legitimacy, and Resource Acquisition in Small and 
Medium Firms: An Empirical Examination  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23
by Gregory B. Murphy and Neil Tocher, Idaho State University 
Bootstrapping Techniques and New Venture Emergence  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .35
by John T. Perry and Gaylen N. Chandler, Wichita State University; Xin Yao, University of
Colorado at Boulder; James A.Wolff, Wichita State University 
Case Research
Getting to Green: Niche-driven or Government-led Entrepreneurship and
Sustainability in the Wine Industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .47
by Lauretta Conklin Frederking, University of Portland
Instructional Case
KaBloom!: Revolution in the Flower Industry  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .61
by Gina Vega, Salem State College; Colette Dumas, Beverly Kahn, and Jafar Mana,
Suffolk University
Abandoning Ship at Scandia, Inc.: Parts B and C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .79
by Barry Armandi (deceased), SUNY-Old Westbury; Herbert Sherman and Adva Dinur,
Long Island University–Brooklyn
Book Review
Entrepreneurship in the Creative Industries:  An International Perspective, 
Edited by Colette Henry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .89
Reviewed by Lori Wagner, Pennsylvania State University
New England Journal of Entrepreneurship
3
et al.: New England Journal of Entrepreneurship, Spring 2011
Published by DigitalCommons@SHU, 2011
New England Journal of Entrepreneurship
Call for Articles and Reviewers
New England Journal of Entrepreneurship (NEJE), published twice a year by Sacred Heart University’s John F.Welch College
of Business, is an invaluable forum for exchange of scholarly ideas,practices,pedagogy,and policies in the field of entrepreneur-
ship and small business management.
The Journal is currently seeking original contributions that have not been published or are under consideration elsewhere.
The scope of the articles published in NEJE range from theoretical/conceptual to empirical research, with maximum relevance
to practicing entrepreneurs.
The Journal will consider practitioner interviews, book reviews, experiential exercises, cases, and articles dealing with entre-
preneurial education.The Journal appeals to a broad audience, so articles submitted should be written in such a manner that
those outside of the academic community would be able to comprehend and appreciate the content of the material.
Format
Manuscripts submitted to NEJE should be written in Microsoft Word or saved in RTF (rich text format).
NOTE: Do not use tabs, extra spaces, hard returns except for paragraph breaks, or any other formatting within the Word file.
Indicate emphasis, non-English terms, or titles of publications by underlining. Do not use italics or bold print. Likewise, refer-
ences should be set with returns only between entries with no extra returns, tabs, or other formatting.
Accompanying each manuscript, as separate files, should be (a) an abstract of the article (100 words maximum) and five key-
words; (b) a biographical sketch of the author(s); (c) a page with manuscript title and the order of authors as well as the pri-
mary author’s name, mailing address, preferred e-mail, phone and fax numbers; and (d) files, figures, images, and tables. Indicate
location of figures and tables in the text, but attach them to the end of your document. Do not embed them in the text. Maps,
photos, and similar graphics are welcome, but authors are responsible for providing separate camera-ready files, either as tiffs,
jpegs, or PDFs. Sizes of images, tables, and figures must conform to the physical dimensions of the journal page.Width is 45p
(7.5") and depth is 57p (9.5").
Authors’ names should not appear anywhere in the manuscript including Word document properties.
Papers are to be double-spaced with one-inch margins. References should be included on separate pages at the end of the
paper. Manuscripts should be no longer than 20 pages of text and 25 pages total, including abstract, text, tables or illustrations,
notes, and works cited. Please consult APA style guidelines for all formatting details.
All papers should be submitted electronically, via e-mail attachment, to herbert.sherman@liu.edu.
Copyright
The copyright of published articles will belong to the publishers of NEJE. Authors will be granted permission to reprint or
otherwise use portions of their articles published in the Journal upon written request.
Review Process
All articles will be double-blind refereed.Authors will normally receive reviewers’ comments and the editors’ publishing deci-
sion in approximately 90 days of submission.
Submission
All snail-mail and electronic correspondence should be addressed to:
Herbert Sherman, Ph.D., Professor of Management
Long Island University, School of Business
Public Administration and Information Sciences
1 University Plaza, H700, Brooklyn, NY 11201
718-488-1150   herbert.sherman@liu.edu
Visit our web page at http://www.sacredheart.edu/neje.cfm.
Sample Copies
Sample copies of previous issues are available from Joshua Shuart,Associate Editor,on a first-come, first-served basis.Please con-
tact him via e-mail at shuartj@sacredheart.edu.
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From the Editors:
“It was the best of times; it was the worst of times.”This opening line from Charles Dickens’ 1859 classic A Tale of Two Cities
depicts the plight of the French peasantry demoralized by the French aristocracy in the years leading up to the revolution, [and]
the corresponding brutality demonstrated by the revolutionaries toward the former aristocrats in the early years of the revolu-
tion (Wikipedia).This may also be a fairly apt description of the state of small business in the United States in early 2011—lean
times with a promise of better things to come.
Scott Shanes’ discussion of the state of small business today (http://smallbiztrends. com/ 2011/01/is-small-business-prosperity-
just-around-the-corner.html, January 24,2011) questions this notion that “prosperity is just around the corner”(Herbert Hoover,
1932) in that his research indicates that as much as the press would like to see a recovery, one is not coming anytime soon.
Why? Citing research from the National Federation of Independent Business’s (NFIB) December survey of its members and
Discover Card’s Small Business Watch (a survey of business owners with less than six people on their payroll), Shanes indicat-
ed that planned capital investments and spending on business investments is going to remain low (unchanged from 2009–2010)
as small business owners take a cautionary approach to business growth.
So how could this be the best of times if small business growth (the backbone of the U.S. economy) is not in the near future?
Small businesses may have to respond to a “no growth”scenario by managing smarter (meaning with more knowledge) in lean-
er times; more specifically using technology and the Internet to increase operating efficiencies. So posits the work of Kevin
Celuch,Anna M.Walz, Carl Saxby, and Craig Ehlen in their article entitled “Understanding SME Intention to Use the Internet for
Managing Supplier Information: Normative and Strategic Conceptual Extensions,” the first article in this issue. Their study
extends the understanding of SME Internet use by exploring relationships among usefulness and ease-of-use cognitions and
intentions to use the Internet for supplier information management.They also examined the influence of behavioral norms and
two strategic perspectives—market and learning orientation—on the Internet-related cognitions.Their findings related to the
strategic orientations of SME’s paralleled previous small business literature that found strategy impacted technological scanning
activities and market orientation, in particular, and drove imitative behavior of successful innovations.
The second article deals with the issue of threshold legitimacy—the ability to be recognized by stakeholders as having a
viable business and therefore better able to gather the resources needed to survive and grow. Gregory B. Murphy and Neil
Tocher (“Corporate Parents, Initial Legitimacy,and Resource Acquisition in Small and Medium Firms:An Empirical Examination”)
studied threshold legitimacy by investigating whether the presence of a corporate parent positively influences SME resource
acquisition. Results indicated that SMEs with corporate parents, when compared to like-sized independent SMEs, had higher
credit scores,have more complete management teams,used more computers, and were more likely to be on the Internet.These
differences were most pronounced for very small firms and diminish as firm size increases.The presence of a corporate parent
likely represents a successful navigation of the legitimacy threshold, positively increasing SME resource acquisition.
In the third article “Bootstrapping Techniques and New Venture Emergence,” John T. Perry, Gaylen N. Chandler, Xin Yao, and
James A. Wolff pose the question: Are some types of bootstrapping techniques more successful than others? They compared
externally oriented and internally oriented techniques with respect to the likelihood of becoming an operational venture as
well as cash-increasing and cost-decreasing techniques with respect to becoming operational.They found evidence suggesting
that when bootstrapping a new venture, the percentage of cash-increasing and cost-decreasing externally oriented bootstrap-
ping techniques that a venture’s owners use are positive predictors of subsequent positive cash flow (one and two years later)
yet internal techniques had little impact on future cash flows.
The next article (“Getting to Green: Niche-driven or Government-led Entrepreneurship and Sustainability in the Wine
Industry”by Lauretta Conklin Frederking) is case-based research and examines whether market forces or government interven-
tion would lead to greater growth in a niche market—the “green”wine industry.Using Michael Porter’s (1980) five forces model,
Conklin Frederking denotes the differences between niche-driven (State of Oregon) and government-led (British Columbia)
green wine industry and demonstrated that the strength of the green niche industry is that innovation coming from coopera-
tion (rather than government imposition) and also evolving from the effort to articulate community values to mainstream mar-
ket values.
From case-based research we go to teaching cases derived from primary research. In “KaBloom!: Revolution in the Flower
Industry” Colette Dumas, Beverly Kahn, Jafar Mana, David Hartstein, and Gina Vega develop a field-based case that has been
designed for a graduate-level course in entrepreneurship/innovation.The case describes the successful building of brand recog-
nition for KaBloom’s garden-like shops by implementing a franchise system and adopting a decentralized business model.This
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strategy required managerial changes that resulted in an expensive and top-heavy corporate structure.A 10 and 12 percent fran-
chisees default rate drove the founder to sell the business; he was forced to watch as his creation floundered and, shortly after
the acquisition, his formal involvement in KaBloom ended.The owner reacquired the company and reentered the flower busi-
ness with a vengeance, focusing more on B2B sales than on B2C sales.
The second case is a continuation of a case published in the Fall 2010 issue of NEJE. In “Abandoning Ship at Scandia, Inc.:
Parts B & C” (Barry Armandi [deceased], Herbert Sherman, and Adva Dinur), after learning about the deep-sea shipping indus-
try in Part A, we are introduced to Scandia, Inc., a commercial vessel management company located in the New York
Metropolitan area, which is part of a family of firms. Part B describes several mishaps that the company and its President Chris
Haas have had to deal with including withdrawal of financial support by creditors, extreme variability in profits, and inter-cor-
porate firm conflict. Part C documents, through dialogue, the exit of key personnel within the firm and how management tries
to address this issue.
The last item in this issue is a book review by Lori Wagner of Entrepreneurship in the Creative Industries:An International
Perspective. Addressed to academics, entrepreneurs, support agencies, and policy makers, readers are apprised of the current
issues facing the creative industries in the 21st century.The book includes a series of essays that reflect both national and inter-
national economic concerns, that investigate both quantitative and qualitative methodologies, and which examine the nature of
entrepreneurship across varying industries, economies, and geographies.The editor’s goal is to encourage a healthy reevaluation
of what defines the ‘creative industries,’what kinds of support they will need to maximize their potential within the global econ-
omy, and how funders and funded organizations can work together to create new spaces for entrepreneurial energy within var-
ious economic and industry settings in a fast-changing digital age.
As always, we are greatly in debt to the expertise and experience of our reviewers, authors, and production staff.Without
their commitment this issue, and the journal, could not persevere.We are also grateful to Sacred Heart University for its contin-
ued financial support of the journal.
Reference
Porter, Michael. 1980. Competitive Strategy Techniques for Analyzing Industries and Competitors. New York: The Free Press.
Sincerely,
New England Journal of Entrepreneurship
Joshua Shuart
Associate Editor and Web Master
Herbert Sherman
Editor
Lorry Weinstein
Editor Emeritus
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C A L L F O R P A P E R S
JOURNAL OF BEHAVIORAL AND APPLIED MANAGEMENT
Management educators, trainers and practitioners are invited to contribute articles or cases for
possible publication in the Journal of Behavioral and Applied Management (ISSN 1930 0158),
a national refereed, online publication.
Manuscripts should be of interest to researchers, management instructors at the undergraduate
and graduate levels, and to practitioners.A more complete call including the submission 
procedure, review procedure, review information, and some suggested topics may be found at
http://www.ibam.com/pubs/jbam/callforpapers.asp.
The Journal of Behavioral and Applied Management is listed with:
• ProQuest’s ABI/Inform;
• Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ—http://www.doaj.org/);
• dmoz Open Directory Project (http://dmoz.org/);
• Informatics J-Gate (http://www.j-gate.informindia.co.in/); and
• Cabell’s Directory of Publishing Opportunities (http://www.cabells.com/).
A style guide can be found at http://www.ibam.com/pubs/jbam/styleguide.asp. Manuscripts
may not be previously published or be under consideration for publication by another journal.
Previous issues can be examined at http://www.ibam.com/pubs/jbam/toc.asp.
Dr. David D. Van Fleet, Editor
Journal of Behavioral and Applied Management
ddvf@asu.edu
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T here is strong consensus that the Internet has thepotential to positively impact firms, and SMEs inparticular; however, not all firms have realized ben-
efits from adoption. The present study extends research in
the area by addressing the need to examine the “chain” of
variables explaining Internet adoption. We do this by
exploring SME owner/manager Internet-related usefulness
and ease-of-use cognitions and intention to use the
Internet for supplier information management. We also
explore the influence of behavioral norms and two broad-
er strategic perspectives, market and learning orientation,
on the Internet-related cognitions. Findings have implica-
tions for researchers and practitioners by identifying fac-
tors that contribute to effectively leveraging the Internet in
an important area for SMEs.
Keywords: Internet use; supplier information; normative
influence, strategic issues
The Internet has changed today’s business landscape. With
compound annual growth rates for U.S.users of 5 to 6 percent
between 2005 and 2010 and growth rates for global users of
10 to 11 percent over the same time period,predictions place
the impact of the Internet as greater than the combined influ-
ence of the phone,TV, and PC over the next 10 to 15 years
(eTForecasts, 2009). As a further testament to the potential of
this business tool, 99 percent of medium to large companies
and 85 percent of small firms are connected to the Internet
(Internet retailer, 2009). Indeed, internationally, across indus-
tries,small to medium size enterprise (SME) Internet adoption
has been linked to financial benefits (Johnston et al., 2007).
With the total worldwide value of goods and services of busi-
ness-to-business (B2B) e-commerce well into the trillions of
dollars, it is procurement that is driving the vast majority of
transactions in this sector with between 80 to 90 percent of
U.S. companies expecting to purchase online (Internet retail-
er, 2009).
Research on SME adoption of IT and, by extension,
Internet adoption has been relatively clear as to the ultimate
reasons why SMEs use the Internet. For example, SMEs have
generally acknowledged the potential importance of informa-
tion sharing and relationship building in order to improve
supply chain performance (c.f., Robeiro and Love, 2003).
With respect to SME use of the Internet for supply chain
management, some evidence suggests that SMEs rely on the
Internet primarily for communication purposes while very
small firms (i.e., 10 or less employees) rely on the Internet
primarily for research purposes (Levenburg, 2005). Indeed,
some support has been found for the idea that SME Internet
use related to obtaining and communicating information can
enhance market knowledge and relationships throughout
the supply chain from suppliers to customers (Caskey et al.,
2001; Robeiro and Love, 2003; Nieto and Fernandez, 2005;
Servais et al., 2007).
Despite fairly strong convergence as to the ultimate pur-
pose of Internet usage, less clarity exists as to the specific fac-
tors that determine usage. Factors that have been identified
in the literature as significantly influencing SME IT adoption,
with particular focus on Internet adoption, include owner
perception of benefits, organizational readiness, owner inno-
vativeness, organization size, customer pressure, competitive
pressure, supplier pressure, support from IT vendors, infor-
mation intensity of products, and low business volumes
(Mehrtens et al., 2001; Belussi, 2005; Al-Qirim, 2005; 2007;
Beckinsale et al., 2006;Archer et al., 2008). However, some of
these same studies find few significant differences between
SME adopters and nonadopters (Belussi, 2005) as well as no
support for the influence of suppliers, competition, IT ven-
dor support, and size (Al-Qirim, 2007; Beckinsale et al., 2006;
Archer et al., 2008). Clearly, there is a need for continued
development of our understanding of the factors affecting
SME Internet usage.
Potential benefits of Internet adoption notwithstanding,
SMEs are left with significant questions that point to the
importance for examining Internet use. First, not all firms
have realized benefits from IT adoption (Dehning and
Richardson, 2002; Santhanam and Hartono, 2003).This is par-
ticularly critical for small firms as, relative to larger firms, they
do not possess slack resources that allow them to over invest
in technologies (Celuch et al., 2007a). Second, many SME
owner/managers have relied heavily on traditional brick-and-
mortar “mental models” in developing and maintaining sup-
plier relations. Further, SME owner/managers often engage in
“implicit strategizing” that is less formal and structured than
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managers’ decision-making in larger firms (Carson, 1993),
which makes it difficult to identify and understand issues
related to SME Internet use. As such, firms may not effective-
ly align information technology with organizational strate-
gies, thereby negating potential benefits (c.f., Khan and
Kahn, 1992; Malhotra, 1998).
The present study extends research in the area in several
ways. First, we address the need to examine the “chain” of
variables explaining IT adoption in general and Internet
adoption specifically (c.f., Bharadwaj, 2000; Ray et. al, 2005).
In doing so, we echo Bobbitt and Dabholkar’s (2001) admo-
nition related to the need for theory-based technology-
related research as a growing body of “disconnected”
research is not as likely to provide a foundation for under-
standing Internet adoption and the conditions under which
benefits are realized. To this end we examine an adaptation
of the Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) as a means of
exploring SME owner/manager Internet-related cognitions
and intention to use the Internet for supplier information
management.
In addition, we also explore the influence of behavioral
norms on Internet-related cognitions. The inclusion of this
construct is in keeping with Eagly and Chaiken’s (1993) cau-
tion regarding sufficient consideration of the social context
of intentions as well as with reviews highlighting the need
for consideration of alternative types of normative influence
in intention models (Sheppard et al., 1988; Godin and Kok,
1996). Along with normative influence, we also examine the
influence of two broader strategic perspectives, market and
learning orientation, on Internet-related cognitions. While
information technology has long been recognized for its
potential to contribute to sustained competitive advantage
for firms (Feeny and Ives, 1990; Barney, 1991; Vargas et al.,
2003; Swierczek and Shrestha, 2003), its potential is only real-
ized when IT is effectively aligned with organizational strate-
gy (Zahra and Covin, 1993; Malhotra, 1998; Chang et al.,
2002).
We further extend research in the area by examining the
above relationships for an important real-world context that
has received limited attention—SME intention to use the
Internet for supplier information management. In the con-
text of the present research, supplier information manage-
ment relates to SME use of supplier cost, order, delivery, stor-
age, and performance information. Given the importance of
information sharing as part of relationship-building activities
in the supply chain this would appear to be an important
area for SME researchers to systematically explore. Prior
research related to intention models has relied heavily on
consumer and academic settings (c.f., Eagly and Chaiken,
1993;Taylor and Todd, 1995; Dabholkar and Bagozzi, 2002).
The present research has implications for researchers and
practitioners. For researchers, the relationships explored sug-
gest the types of variables and relationships that can be
included in future studies. For practitioners, identified rela-
tionships help make explicit what factors contribute to effec-
tively leveraging the Internet in an important area for SMEs.
In the next section of the paper, we discuss how key
Internet-related cognitions influence intention to use the
Internet for supplier information management, followed by
how normative influence and market and learning orienta-
tions impact the Internet-related cognitions.We next provide
an overview of the methodology of the study and then pres-
ent the findings. The last section of the paper discusses
results and addresses research and managerial implications.
The Determinants of Intention to Use the
Internet
Frameworks for understanding information technology use
have included macroeconomic approaches (c.f., Panko,
1991), firm-level approaches examining relationships
between information technology expenditures and firm per-
formance (c.f., Banker et al., 1993), and approaches examin-
ing determinants of usage at the individual level (c.f., Davis,
1989; Davis et al., 1989; Taylor and Todd, 1995; Bobbitt and
Dabholkar, 2001; Dabholkar and Bagozzi, 2002). We believe
the latter approach is particularly relevant given the nature
and scope of the present research as this perspective recog-
nizes SME decision-making as the province of an individual
decision maker, typically the owner/manager of the firm
(Sheth et al., 1999; Carson and Gilmore, 2000).
Over the last 20 years an important stream of research has
emerged that provides understanding of individual-level
technology use.The approach employs intention-based mod-
els to identify the determinants of usage to predict behav-
ioral intention and subsequent usage. The work is grounded
in frameworks from the social psychology literature (c.f.,
Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980; Ajzen, 1985; 1991). Based on this
research, the Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) was
developed as a parsimonious approach to represent the
important antecedents of intention and use of technology
(Davis, 1989; 1993; Davis et al., 1989; 1992).The model posits
two antecedents, perceived usefulness and perceived ease of
use, as determinants of attitude and intention toward usage.
In this perspective, perceived ease of use is a determinant of
perceived usefulness. Attitude, in turn, is determined by use-
fulness and ease-of-use perceptions. Intention is viewed as
determined by perceived usefulness and attitude. Lastly, con-
sistent with longstanding social psychological theory and
research, intention is conceived as the immediate determi-
nant of usage. The strengths of the TAM are that it is specific,
easy to understand, and generalizable across various technol-
ogy contexts. Further, its components hold pragmatic impli-
cations for addressing technology usage.The model has been
found to have relatively strong explanatory power in explain-
10 NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP
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ing technology usage (e.g., R2 ranges between .4–.7; Davis et
al., 1989; Mathieson, 1991;Taylor and Todd, 1995).
Despite strong predictive power, tests of model variables
have not produced consistent results raising questions about
specific relationships.For example, the role of perceived ease
of use has been somewhat equivocal and largely mediated by
perceived usefulness. In a study of computer resource center
usage, attitude was not found to be significantly related to
intention with usefulness and ease of use explaining inten-
tion (Taylor and Todd, 1995). As noted by Davis et al. (1989),
attitude may not be an important determinant of intention in
workplace contexts when factors such as usefulness are
taken into account. Further, perceived benefits and organiza-
tional readiness, have been found to be significant in impact-
ing SME e-business adoption (c.f., Mehrtens et al., 2001).
Thus, based on work in the area that converges on the salien-
cy of perceived usefulness- and ease-of-use–related factors,
we propose that for SME owner/managers:
Hypothesis 1: The perceived usefulness of using the
Internet for managing supplier information will medi-
ate the relationship between perceived ease of using
the Internet for supplier communication and inten-
tion to increase use of the Internet for managing sup-
plier information. Perceived ease of use will be signif-
icantly positively related to usefulness which will, in
turn, be significantly positively related to intention.
The Determinants of Usefulness and
Perceived Ease of Use
Given that an objective of this study is to extend research in
the area,we now address rationales for additional antecedent
constructs that might explain usefulness and ease-of-use
Internet perceptions for SMEs. Beyond perceived benefits
and organizational readiness, SME e-business adoption
research also highlights,external pressure,as a potentially sig-
nificant factor (c.f., Mehrtens et al., 2001; Al-Qirim, 2005;
2007). Indeed, referential comparisons with others can serve
to create norms relating to particular activities (Bandura,
1997).Thus, behavioral norms, beliefs about what stakehold-
ers in one’s environment are doing, is another concept that
might contribute to our understanding of SME Internet
usage. Firm monitoring of Internet usage by its stakeholders
can help determine behavioral norms relating to Internet
usage. Research on the adoption of e-business has found evi-
dence for normative pressures from stakeholder groups such
as customers and suppliers (Wu et al., 2003). Further, norma-
tive beliefs have been featured prominently in intention-
based models in general and in models related to information
technology use in particular (c.f., Celuch et al., 2004; 2007b).
The concept of behavioral norms is particularly relevant to
understanding information technology behavior for SMEs as,
given their limited resources they are likely to look to the
behavior of others in their environment for direction.
Blank et al. (1985) argue that preferences (or beliefs that
can relate to preferences) are more likely than norms to
affect behaviors that are consumatory in nature (i.e., actions
that provide more immediate gratification such as interaction
related to information sharing and communication) whereas
norms are more likely to influence instrumental behaviors
(i.e., actions that lead to delayed gratification).While Internet
usage, like many behaviors, can include both consumatory
and instrumental aspects, with the majority of SMEs connect-
ed to the Internet we believe it is the more immediate bene-
fits such as information sharing and purchasing with suppli-
ers that are most salient in the current business environment.
By extension, we posit that, in the context of SME usage of
the Internet for supplier contact, perceived usefulness and
ease of use should be the more immediate determinants of
intention whereas normative influence (beliefs associated
with the behavior of significant stakeholders) should be an
antecedent of usefulness and ease-of-use perceptions
(Hypotheses 2 and 3).
Further support for the proposition that norms might be
significant determinants of usefulness and ease-of-use per-
ceptions can be found in literature that notes the power of
normative influence is in part linked to a reduction in risk or
uncertainty associated with decisions (cf., Bearden et al.,
1989; Cannon et al., 2000). Risk reduction associated with
normative influence has been conceived as a process consist-
ing of considering perceived benefits and developing expec-
tations (Homans, 1961; Cannon et al., 2000). The work of
Bandura (1997) has found vicarious experience, implicated
in normative influence, to be one of the most important
sources of perceived efficacy, which can be viewed as close-
ly related to perceived ease of use.Based on the above discus-
sion, we expect that the perception of a behavioral norm for
Internet usage will positively influence usefulness and ease-
of-use perceptions related to SMEs using the Internet for sup-
plier information management.
Owing to the need to examine strategic orientations in
the technology-related behavior of SMEs (Carson, 1993; Levy
and Powell,2003), two complementary yet distinct concepts,
market and learning orientation, are also examined for their
impact on usefulness and ease-of-use perceptions. One of the
most important topics in the marketing literature has been
the concept of market orientation (Deshpande, 1999).
Definitions of market orientation focus on information use
related to customers and competitors which serve to coordi-
nate firm behavior (Kohli and Jaworski, 1990; Narver and
Slater, 1990; Deshpande et al., 1993; Day, 1994). Market orien-
tation has been linked to competitive advantage and prof-
itability in large firms (Narver and Slater, 1990; Pelham and
Wilson, 1996) and product innovation and firm performance
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in both large and small firms (Jaworski and Kohli, 1993; Slater
and Narver, 1994; Barrett and Weinstein, 1998; Pelham, 2000;
Lukas and Ferrell, 2000; Becherer et al., 2003; Verhees and
Meulenberg, 2004).
How might market orientation be implicated in factors
affecting Internet use? Effective information management is
at the heart of market orientation (Narver and Slater, 1990;
Jaworski and Kohli, 1993). Day (1994) conceives of a market
orientation as the degree to which firms obtain and respond
to customer and competitor information—the so-called “out-
side-in” perspective. Similarly, Baker and Sinkula (1999) view
market orientation as an organizational characteristic that
determines the priority placed on market information pro-
cessing activity.Given the Internet’s potential for information
acquisition and use with internal and external stakeholders,
SME monitoring of the customer (e.g., needs and
product/service feedback) and the competitor (e.g., bench-
marking) is likely to positively influence perceptions related
to Internet usefulness. Particularly in the context of manag-
ing supplier information, this area holds the potential to ben-
efit SMEs by improving market competitiveness (i.e.,
improved product, service, and operational competitive-
ness).
Learning orientation focuses on an organization’s ability to
adapt and change (Argyris and Schon, 1978; Fiol and Lyles,
1985). This orientation implies organizational openness to
higher order,proactive learning,a sense of purpose that moti-
vates learning, and intraorganizational knowledge sharing
(Rattanaphaphtham and Ussahawanitchakit, 2008). Learning
orientation has also been linked to sustainable competitive
advantage and organizational performance (DeGeus, 1988;
Baker and Sinkula, 1999).
How might a learning orientation be related to factors
affecting Internet use? Baker and Sinkula (1999) implicate
learning orientation in the information processing activities
of firms. A commitment to learning combined with internal
information sharing behavior is likely to drive the develop-
ment of information system capabilities. Firms may benefit
from external learning from customers, competitors, and
sources outside their industry (Bierly and Chakrabarti, 1996).
This external learning brings information into the firm to
facilitate internal learning.Such a process is implicated in the
development of IT capabilities that better match environ-
mental demands. Indeed, learning orientation has been found
to be positively related to information system capability
(Celuch et al., 2002). Further, Rattanaphaphtham and
Ussahawanitchakit (2008) also found a positive association
between aspects of a learning orientation and IT capability.
Therefore, in contrast to market orientation, which we view
as a likely driver of Internet-related usefulness perceptions,
learning orientation with its connection to capability devel-
opment is a likely driver of Internet-related capability percep-
tions (i.e., perceived ease of use). Thus, consistent with relat-
ed literature, we view the affects of market and learning ori-
entation as complementary as both are implicated in SME
Internet perceptions that significantly impact intention and
subsequent usage. However, the orientations have distinct
effects in that they are viewed as relating to different deter-
minants of Internet intention, perceived usefulness for mar-
ket orientation and perceived ease of use for learning orien-
tation.
In summary,based on the literature related to TAM,norma-
tive influence, and market and learning orientation, we
hypothesize that for SMEs:
Hypothesis 2: Perceived ease of use, behavioral norm,
and market orientation will be significantly positively
related to the perceived usefulness of using the
Internet for managing supplier information. Learning
orientation will not be significantly related to the per-
ceived usefulness of using the Internet for managing
supplier information. 
Hypothesis 3: Behavioral norm and learning orienta-
tion will be significantly positively related to the per-
ceived ease of using the Internet for supplier commu-
nication. Market orientation will not be significantly
related to the perceived ease of using the Internet for
supplier communication.
Method
Sample and Procedure
The sample frame for this study consisted of a current list of
910 small to mid-sized (that is, less than 1,500 employees)
companies in a tri-state region of the Midwest including
Indiana, Illinois, and Kentucky. Each company was mailed a
letter explaining the purpose of the research, a question-
naire, and a postage-paid return envelope. The letter was
addressed to an individual representing top management in
each company,with an offer to send a summary of the study’s
results if requested.
One hundred and thirty-nine surveys were returned, rep-
resenting a response rate of 15 percent. Questionnaires were
received from a variety of companies with the majority rep-
resenting the retail, construction, and financial services sec-
tors. Respondents were predominantly middle-aged, male,
college educated, and, as targeted, members of upper man-
agement. Companies represented in the sample ranged in
size from 1 to 1,400 employees with a mean of 100 employ-
ees (standard deviation = 213) and a median of 25 employ-
ees.Approximately three-fourths of the firms produced annu-
al total revenues of less than $10 million. Firms with 15 or
less employees and revenues of less than $2 million account-
ed for 30 percent of responding firms and firms with
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between 16 and 300 employees and revenues between $2
and less than $10 million in revenues accounted for another
30 percent of the responding firms. Comparison of the sam-
ple statistics for number of employees (92% of responding
firms with less than 500 employees) to regional statistics
(90.5% of existing firms with less than 500 employees) show
close representation of sample firms to area firms on firm
size (SBA Statistics, 2006).
The response rate of this study is comparable to response
rates typically found in small business sector research.Dennis
(2003) reports variable results examining response rates for
surveys of small business owners with results ranging from
16.9 to more than 30 percent. He concludes that response
rates are often low and appear to be declining among small
business populations. In addition, discussion with managers
at area firms suggests that such response rates are typical for
the specific geographic area surveyed. Further, the potential
for nonresponse bias was assessed by testing for differences
between early and late respondents on the variables used in
this research. No statistically significant differences were
found between these two groups for any of the theoretical
variables, thus providing some assurance that the impact of
nonresponse bias would be minimal.
Questionnaire
Measures employed in this questionnaire consisted of scales
relevant to the constructs included in this research. The
authors relied on literature reviews as well as knowledge of
area firms in this process. Recall that supplier information
management can relate to a range of issues (e.g., cost, order,
delivery, storage, and performance) which will vary by the
nature of the industry and company. As such, respondents
were instructed to interpret supplier information within the
context of their current business.Early drafts of the question-
naire were reviewed and pretested for readability and under-
standability by area company representatives. The final ques-
tionnaire included the following measures: company market
and learning orientations and Internet-related behavioral
norms,perceived usefulness,perceived ease of use,and inten-
tions. Recall that measures are oriented toward capturing the
perceptions of top management regarding aspects of their
companies under the assumption that these cognitions
define the reality of their organizations. The concluding por-
tion of this survey consisted of individual respondent and
company descriptors.
Measures
Market Orientation. Market orientation was operationalized
via four items asking respondents their views regarding their
companies’ use of customer and competitor information, ori-
entation to customer needs,and ability to anticipate competi-
tor responses. All items utilized seven-point scales. Such
aspects of market orientation are consistent with concep-
tions that include customer and competitor focus (Day and
Nedungadi, 1994; Kohli and Jaworski, 1990).
Learning Orientation. Learning orientation was assessed
via two seven-point items related to respondent perceptions
of their company’s ability to learn and adapt to change.These
items are consistent with conceptions of organizational
learning (Senge, 1990; Shaw and Perkins, 1991; Day, 1991).
Behavioral Norms. The behavioral norms consisted of
three seven-point items, with respondents providing percep-
tions relating to use of the Internet for business communica-
tions by their companies’ important customers, suppliers/
vendors, and competitors. This approach is consistent with
the conceptualization and assessment of behavioral norms in
the intention-based literature (c.f.,Kashima and Gallois,1993;
Nucifora et al., 1993).
Perceived Usefulness. The usefulness measure consisted
of three seven-point items, with respondents providing per-
ceptions relating to their company’s likelihood of improving
its ability to share, manage, and respond to supplier informa-
tion by using the Internet. This measure is consistent with
approaches used in technology-related intention-based mod-
els (c.f.,Taylor and Todd, 1995; Ha and Stoel, 2009).
Perceived Ease of Use. Ease of use consisted of two seven-
point items, with respondents providing perceptions relating
to their companies’ difficulty using and confidence in ability
to use the Internet for supplier communications.As with per-
ceived usefulness, the measure is consistent with approaches
used in technology-related intention-based models (c.f.,
Taylor and Todd, 1995; Ha and Stoel, 2009).
Behavioral Intention. Behavioral intention measures con-
sisted of three seven-point items,with respondents providing
perceptions relating to their company’s intent to increase its
use of the Internet within the next 12 months to manage sup-
plier information. This measure was also adapted from
Celuch, et al. (2007b).
Analysis and Results
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics,correlations,and reliabil-
ities for the constructs used in this study. To test the influ-
ence of Internet usefulness and ease-of-use perceptions on
intention to use the Internet for supplier information man-
agement (a variation of the TAM), as well as examine the
impact of normative influence and strategic orientations on
usefulness and ease-of-use perceptions, we ran three sets of
regressions using ordinary least squares regression. Table 2
includes the standardized coefficients, model R2 and F value
for the tested relationships.
To determine whether perceived usefulness mediates the
effect of perceived ease of use on intention to use the
Internet for managing supplier information (H1), we ran
three regressions.To find evidence for mediation, the follow-
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ing three conditions must be met: (1) ease of use must be sig-
nificantly related to usefulness; (2) ease of use must also be
significantly related to intention; and (3) ease of use and use-
fulness are significantly related to intention, such that the
impact of ease of use on intention is significantly diminished
when usefulness is included in the regression model with
ease of use predicting intention (Baron and Kenny, 1986).
Consistent with expectations, ease of use was significant-
ly positively related to usefulness, meeting condition 1. Ease
of use was also significantly related to intention,meeting con-
dition 2. Although the influence of ease of use was dimin-
ished (with the standardized coefficient for ease of use
decreasing from .49 to .21) when usefulness was included in
the model predicting intention, the effect of ease of use was
still significant. Thus, this condition’s requirements was not
fully met, however there is evidence of partial mediation and
partial support for H1.
Consistent with predictions, ease of use and behavioral
norm were significantly positively related to perceived use-
fulness while learning orientation was not found to be signif-
icantly related.However,contrary to expectations,market ori-
entation did not have a significant effect on perceived useful-
ness for Internet usage for supplier information manage-
ment. Consequently, H2 is partially supported with three of
four variables related as anticipated.
Finally, consistent with predictions, behavioral norm and
learning orientation were significantly positively related to
perceived ease of use while market orientation was not
found to have a significant effect. Thus, H3 is supported.
Considering the findings for H2 and H3, post hoc analyses
testing for mediation were also performed. Specifically, the
strong influence for behavioral norm combined with the lack
of effects for market orientation in both models point to the
possibility that the affect of market orientation may work
through behavioral norm. As such the effects of market ori-
entation on perceived usefulness may be less direct than
hypothesized.Following the three-step approach outlined for
H1, we test whether behavioral norm mediates the effect of
market orientation on perceived usefulness and ease of use.
Table 3 reports the results of these analyses.With respect to
the prediction of usefulness, market orientation was signifi-
cantly positively related to behavioral norm, meeting condi-
tion 1. Market orientation was also significantly related to
usefulness, meeting condition 2. Further, the influence of
market orientation was significantly diminished (with the
standardized coefficient decreasing from .17 and significant
to .04 and nonsignificant) when behavioral norm was includ-
ed in the regression model predicting usefulness. Therefore,
there is support for mediation and an indirect relationship
between market orientation and usefulness.
With respect to the prediction of ease of use, market ori-
entation was significantly positively related to behavioral
norm,meeting condition 1.Market orientation was not signif-
icantly related to usefulness, failing to meet condition 2. In
addition, the influence of market orientation was not signifi-
cantly diminished (with standardized coefficients not signifi-
cantly related to ease of use) when behavioral norm was
included in the regression model predicting ease of use.
Therefore, there was no support for mediation and an indi-
rect relationship between market orientation and ease of use.
As a precaution, variance inflation factors (VIFs) were
examined to assess the effects of multicollinearity among the
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics, Correlations, and Reliabilities for Marketing Orientation, 
Learning Orientation, and Internet-Related Cognitions
Mean
Standard
Deviation
X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6
X1 Market Orientation 5.39 1.05 .68
X2 Learning Orientation 5.57 1.01 .43** .85a
X3 Behavioral Norms 4.76 1.53 .26** .12 .85
X4 Usefulness 4.85 1.68 .17* .13 .52** .93
X5 Ease of Use 5.89 1.34 .10 .24** .32** .40** .77*
X6 Intention 5.15 1.65 .19* .06 .51** .78** .49** .94
* Correlation is significant at the .05 level.
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level.
Reliabilities are shown on the diagonal.
a.These diagonal statistics represent correlations as they are two-item scales.
N = 139
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independent variables used in the regression analyses. Hair
et. al. (1998) consider high variance inflation factors to indi-
cate unacceptable levels of collinearity which can inhibit
interpretation of the contribution of independent variables.
No instances of VIFs greater than 1.4 were observed, indicat-
ing that the impact of multicollinearity was relatively small in
the present study.
In summary, one hypothesis was fully supported and two
hypotheses received partial support. As expected, SME
owner/managers’ perceptions related to Internet ease of use
and usefulness strongly influenced intention to increase use
of the Internet for supplier information management, albeit
with evidence that usefulness partially mediates the influ-
ence of ease of use. Further, as anticipated, ease of use and
behavioral norm related to Internet usage were strong pre-
dictors of perceived Internet usefulness while learning orien-
tation was not.Contrary to expectations, firm market orienta-
tion did not a have direct effect on usefulness but some evi-
dence was found for an indirect effect of market orientation
working through behavioral norm to impact usefulness per-
ceptions. Lastly, as expected, behavioral norm and learning
orientation were found to influence ease-of-use Internet per-
ceptions while market orientation was not.
Discussion
The informal nature of SME strategy, questions regarding the
benefits from Internet use, and uneven SME Internet adop-
tion have been recognized (Levy and Powell, 2003), which
points to the importance of the context of the current
research. Ultimately, efforts to enhance SME-supplier Internet
information management can pay more immediate and
longer-term dividends as suppliers can provide access to
resources and the opportunity for learning (Chung et al.,
2000;Lane and Lubatkin,1998).Suppliers as a source of infor-
mation are particularly critical for small firms given their lack
of R&D and marketing research resources. As such, suppliers
can serve in these roles as valued sources of information
regarding products, markets, industries, and competitors for
both long-term and operational decision-making (Dollinger
and Kolchin, 1986; Fann and Smeltzer, 1989; Jarillo, 1989;
Smeltzer et al., 1988).
The present study extends our understanding of SME
Internet use by exploring relationships among usefulness
and ease-of-use cognitions and intention to use the Internet
for supplier information management. We also explore the
influence of behavioral norms and two strategic perspec-
tives, market and learning orientation, on the Internet-related
cognitions. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, these rela-
tionships have not been examined together in the literature.
As noted previously, decisions that drive competitive
advantage are rooted in managers’ perceptions of their busi-
ness environment. In the context of the present study,explor-
ing the “chain” of variables explaining Internet adoption
helps identify relationships that clarify what factors con-
tribute to effectively leveraging the Internet in an important
area for SMEs.
We now summarize contributions of the research. As
expected, SME owner/managers’ perceptions related to
Internet ease of use and usefulness strongly influenced inten-
tion to increase use of the Internet for supplier information
Table 2. Regression Analyses Testing 
Hypothesized Relationships
Model 
R2
Results
F value
H1: Usefulness = (.40**) Ease of Use
Intention = (.49**) Ease of Use
Intention = (.21**) Ease of Use + 
(.69**) Usefulness
.16
.24
.64
26.67**
44.42**
116.52**
H2: Usefulness = (.25**) Ease of Use +
(.45**) Behavioral Norms +
(.01) Market Orientation +
(.03) Learning Orientation
.33 16.08**
H3: Ease of Use = (.30**) Behavioral Norms +
(-.10) Market Orientation +
(.26**) Learning Orientation
.15 7.83**
Note: Standardized coefficients appear in parentheses.
** significant at the .01 level.
Note: Standardized coefficients appear in parentheses.
* significant at the .05 level.
** significant at the .01 level.
Table 3. Post Hoc Regression Analyses Testing the
Mediating Effects of Behavioral Norms on Market
Orientation and Perceived Usefulness and Ease of Use
Model 
R2
Results 
F value
Usefulness
Behavioral Norms = (.26**) Market
Orientation
Usefulness = (.17*) Market Orientation
Usefulness = (.04) Market Orientation + 
(.51**) Behavioral Norms
.07
.03
.27
10.03**
4.12*
24.56**
Ease of Use
Behavioral Norms = (.26**) Market 
Orientation
Ease of Use = (.10) Market Orientation
Ease of Use = (.02) Market Orientation + 
(.31**) Behavioral Norms
.07
.01
.10
10.03**
1.29
7.40**
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management, with evidence that usefulness partially medi-
ates the influence of ease of use. Thus, strong support is
found for this adaptation of the TAM as ease of use and use-
fulness explained a majority of the variability in intention (R2
= .64).This magnitude of explanatory power compares favor-
ably with results reported in related research (Davis et al.,
1989; Taylor and Todd, 1995). Clearly, the use of these vari-
ables in future Internet-related research in the small business
sector is warranted.
In addition, we also explored possible determinants of the
Internet-related perceptions—usefulness and ease of use. As
predicted, in addition to ease of use, behavioral norms relat-
ed to Internet usage were also a strong predictor of per-
ceived Internet usefulness. Contrary to expectations, firm
market orientation did not a have direct effect on usefulness.
However,evidence was found for an indirect effect of market
orientation working through behavioral norm to impact use-
fulness perceptions.Future research could examine the influ-
ence of market orientation in more detail. For example,
would more direct effects be found for different Internet
applications or different technology applications? 
With respect to the determinants of ease-of-use percep-
tions, as expected, behavioral norms and learning orientation
were found to influence ease-of-use Internet perceptions.
Although highly significant, these variables accounted for the
least amount of explained variability in intention of all of the
hypothesized models (R2 = .15). Future research should con-
tinue to conceptualize and test additional variables that
might contribute to this important determinant of intention
to use the Internet.
The behavioral norm concept would appear to be partic-
ularly relevant to understanding information technology
behavior for SMEs as it was found to be significant in models
explaining perceived usefulness and ease of use. This finding
is consistent with related research that found external pres-
sure implicated in SME e-business adoption (Mehrtens et al.,
2001) as well as the significance of normative beliefs in inten-
tion-based models related to information technology use
(c.f., Celuch et al., 2004; Celuch et al., 2007b).While much of
the research utilizing intention-based models have incorpo-
rated a subjective norm (i.e., an individual’s view about what
significant others think the individual should do in a given
context), the present study used a behavioral norm (i.e., an
individual’s belief about what others are doing in a given con-
text) as an independent predictor of Internet perceptions.We
believe the behavioral norm concept may be particularly rel-
evant to understanding SME technology-related behavior as
owner/managers are likely to look to the behavior of other
SMEs in their environment for input regarding technology
adoption. Note that findings of the present study may help
explain the equivocal findings for external pressure in the
SME Internet adoption literature as normative influence
strongly explained owner cognitions which are antecedents
to intention.
Findings of the present study related to the strategic orien-
tations parallel findings in the small business literature that
found strategy impacted technological scanning activities
(Raymond et al., 2001) and market orientation, in particular,
drove imitative behavior of successful innovations (Verhees
and Meulenberg, 2004). Current findings move beyond prior
findings by adding depth to what is known about the inter-
mediate processes that translate strategic orientations into
important related outcomes—Internet-related perceptions
that strongly influence intention to use the Internet. As such
we make explicit the complementary yet distinct effects of
market and learning orientation as both impact SME Internet
perceptions yet in distinctly different ways, with market ori-
entation indirectly influencing perceived usefulness through
behavioral norm and learning orientation directly influenc-
ing perceived ease of use. As noted earlier in the article, mak-
ing these cognitive linkages explicit is particularly useful in
the small business realm given owners/managers often
engage in strategic planning that is less formal and structured
than managers’ strategizing in larger firms (Carson, 1993).
Future research could also integrate and explore other
strategy-related variables. For example, Barrett and Weinstein
(1998) found interactive effects for market orientation and
strategic flexibility such that the effect of market orientation
was stronger for firms with less flexibility. How might strate-
gic flexibility effects relate to learning orientation effects? In
addition, environmental dynamism might also moderate rela-
tionships among variables at the interface of strategy imple-
mentation and technology use (c.f., Johnson et al., 2003;
Tallon and Kraemer 2003; Murphy et al., 2007).
The present study should be viewed from the perspective
of a cross-sectional study employing small business
owner/manager self-report data. Future research could
extend findings of the present research by incorporating
actual Internet usage data rather than intention-to-use meas-
ures. While the study is multiindustry and multicompany in
nature, respondent firms are predominantly from retail, con-
struction, and financial services contexts. Would different
information requirements or different operational dynamics
associated with different industries (e.g., manufacturing
firms) alter the observed relationships? 
Findings of this research also hold managerial implications
for effectively leveraging the Internet as the strategic orienta-
tions and behavioral norms are implicated in the important
drivers of SME Internet usage. SMEs with weak market orien-
tations are likely to have a low sense of urgency regarding
Internet usage for supplier information management.
Without a strong market orientation, they fail to develop the
motivating normative influence which, in turn, negatively
affects the perceived usefulness of the Internet. Further, nor-
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mative influence and learning orientation contribute to
Internet ease-of-use perceptions which, in turn, impacts use-
fulness perceptions. Given the significance of normative
influence on Internet-related cognitions, the use of bench-
marking relative to major stakeholders could pay dividends
in terms of increasing managerial perceptions associated
with Internet ease of use and usefulness for supplier informa-
tion management.Extending the above notion throughout an
organization would suggest that top management sharing
normative information with employees could help strength-
en employees’ ease-of-use and usefulness perceptions related
to using the Internet to manage supplier information.
In addition, ease-of-use perceptions are particularly impor-
tant in that they have direct as well as indirect (through use-
fulness) effects on Internet intention.The potential similarity
between the perceived ease-of-use and perceived efficacy
constructs has been noted by researchers as both relate to
domain-specific perceptions of capabilities (c f., Taylor and
Todd,1995). Bandura (1997) details sources of an individual’s
efficacy perceptions with two of the most powerful sources
being direct and vicarious experience. Thus, the provision of
direct experience through government- or foundation-spon-
sored training programs related to Internet information man-
agement would likely enhance ease-of-use perceptions relat-
ed to Internet usage. Such programs could be aimed at
achieving the goal of enhancing SME-supplier relationships
through integrated information management. In addition,effi-
cacy development interventions focused on allowing partici-
pants to directly observe other SMEs engaging in positive
supply-side Internet-related usage could also prove beneficial
in enhancing ease-of-use and usefulness perceptions and sub-
sequent intention and behavior.
In conclusion, understanding information technology-
related motivation and behavior of SMEs will continue to be
a significant topic for researchers and practitioners. It is
hoped that this theory-driven approach related to supplier
information management will contribute to future empirical
efforts aimed at increasing our understanding of Internet
usage by SME owner/managers.
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Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) commonlystruggle to acquire needed financial, human, andtechnological resources. The above being stated,
recent scholarly research argues that SMEs that are able to
successfully navigate the legitimacy threshold are better
able to gather the resources they need to survive and grow.
This article provides an empirical test of that claim by
examining whether the presence of a corporate parent pos-
itively influences SME resource acquisition. Results of the
study show that SMEs with corporate parents, when com-
pared to like-sized independent SMEs, have higher credit
scores, have more complete management teams, use more
computers, and are more likely to be on the Internet. These
differences are most pronounced for very small firms and
diminish in significance as firm size increases. Study
implications include the notion that presence of a corpo-
rate parent likely represents a successful navigation of the
legitimacy threshold, positively increasing SME resource
acquisition.
Keywords: legitimacy threshold; parenting; new ventures;
resource acquisition
Scholars argue that before a new venture is able to gather the
resources it needs to survive and grow, it must first attain ini-
tial legitimacy from key stakeholders (Choi and Shepherd,
2005; Rutherford, Buller, and Stebbins, 2009).Thus, ventures
that are not granted legitimacy by key stakeholders (i.e.stake-
holders with the potential to provide significant and steady
resources to the venture) will likely not be able to assemble
needed resources such as financing, human capital, and tech-
nological assets, dramatically increasing their chances of fail-
ure (Aldrich and Martinez, 2001; Shepherd and Zacharakis,
2003). This study provides an empirical test of the above
notion by examining whether SMEs with corporate parents
are better able to gather resources (i.e. financing, managerial
talent, technological assets) than SMEs without corporate
parents.
What Is Initial Legitimacy? 
Initial legitimacy is “. . . a social judgment of acceptance,
appropriateness, and desirability, [that] enables organizations
to access other resources needed to survive and grow”
(Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002). In this sense, key stakehold-
ers—usually customers and financiers—grant initial legitima-
cy based on their assessment of both the entrepreneur and
the emerging venture (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; Choi and
Shepherd, 2005). Once the stakeholder has determined that
the venture is a legitimate operation, the stakeholder will typ-
ically signal such a decision by providing the venture with
resources (Shepherd and Zacharakis, 2003). Once this signal
has been sent by a key stakeholder, other stakeholders will
realize that the venture is legitimate and will also provide
resources, allowing the venture to survive and grow
(Rutherford and Buller, 2007).
Attaining initial legitimacy is perhaps best described by
the idea of a legitimacy threshold (LT), which Zimmerman
and Zeitz (2002) define as “[the point] below which the new
venture struggles for existence and probably will perish and
above which the new venture can achieve further gains in
legitimacy and resources.” More specifically, researchers have
observed that entrepreneurs tell fairly similar “made it” sto-
ries about the point at which entrepreneurs felt their firms
had become commercially stable and were no longer
engaged in a daily fight for survival (e.g. Rutherford and
Buller, 2007; Zahra and Filatotchev, 2004). Such “made it sto-
ries” told by entrepreneurs typically involve the entrepre-
neur’s firm being endorsed—or legitimized—by a resource-
providing stakeholder (e.g. Choi and Shepherd, 2005;
Rutherford et al., 2009).
Why Should the LT be Empirically Examined?
While the above indicates that emerging ventures likely
experience the LT, few empirical studies have examined the
relationship between successful navigation of the LT and
small firm resource acquisition. In this article, we attempt to
bridge this gap by examining if the presence of a corporate
parent positively influences SME resource acquisition. In this
sense, we view the presence of a corporate parent as a suc-
cessful navigation of the LT and seek to understand if suc-
cessful navigation of the LT does indeed allow ventures to
attain needed resources.
Further, while there has been considerable debate in the
strategy literature on the effectiveness of corporate parent-
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ing efforts (i.e., Chang and Singh, 2000; McGahan and Porter,
1997), such research has focused little attention on the
effects parenting has on small subsidiary ventures (Brush and
Bromily, 1997). Rather, parenting research has typically
focused on the influence the practice has on the perform-
ance of large (often multinational) parent corporations.
Hence,by assessing the possibility that the presence of a cor-
porate parent positively influences SME resource acquisition,
we contribute to the literature by providing an empirical
examination of the above knowledge gap.
To accomplish the goals of our study, we first review
research on the parenting effect, contrasting its influence to
the resource scarcity commonly faced by SMEs due to the lia-
bility of smallness (LOS). Given such liabilities, we then
explain the LT in detail, arguing that the presence of a corpo-
rate parent represents successful navigation of the LT and
will thus positively influence SME resource acquisition. We
use a comparison sample of 1,242 small subsidiaries and
2,099 independent small firms to test this notion before
reporting results and discussing implications.
The Parenting Effect 
Corporate strategy effects can be divided into two compo-
nents: industry choice and corporate parenting. Industry
choice refers to the idea that a firm may benefit from partic-
ipating in industries that are more profitable than others.
Parenting, the focus of this article, refers to the idea that sub-
sidiary firms may benefit by having a corporate “parent” or
owner. The primary benefit of corporate parenting is
increased access to both resources and managerial guidance
(Goold, Campbell, and Alexander, 1994).
The ability of corporate parenting to deliver increased
firm performance has been widely debated in the strategy
literature. Beginning with Schmalensee in 1985, scholars
have argued about the amount of positive benefits that par-
enting provides (Wernerfelt and Montgomery, 1988; Rumelt,
1991; Brush and Bromily, 1997; McGahan and Porter, 1997;
Chang and Singh, 2000). Specifically, Schmalensee (1985)
found significant parenting effects while Rumelt (1991)
found parenting effects to be trivial. Rumelt (1991) found
“no evidence of non-zero corporate [parenting] effects” (p.
178) in his first sample and a very small (2%) parenting
effect in his second sample. Subsequent research has found
that parenting effects are stronger in the wholesale and
retail sectors than in the manufacturing sector (McGahan
and Porter, 1997) and that parenting effects are stronger
when lines of business are defined more narrowly (Chang
and Singh, 2000). However, even these studies have general-
ly found a fairly modest corporate parenting/firm perform-
ance relationship for the larger firms they examined.
McGahan and Porter (1997) found, for example, that “stable
effects for corporate-parent membership account for only
about 4 percent of the variance in business segment profit”
(p. 24).
This line of research, however, has focused on large firms
that have already overcome the LOS and the LT. Having suc-
cessfully navigated the LT, the large subsidiary firms studied
in the existing literature are better able to acquire needed
resources on their own merits, reducing or eliminating the
importance of the parent as a resource provider. By compar-
ison,we would expect that parenting effects will be more sig-
nificant for emerging ventures, particularly with regard to
resource attainment.While larger subsidiaries may still bene-
fit from a corporate parent’s managerial guidance, smaller
subsidiaries will likely benefit from both a parent’s manageri-
al guidance as well as the parent’s ability to provide
resources that the SME would not likely be able to acquire on
its own.
Accordingly, while the literature as a whole suggests that
corporate parenting has a modest positive influence on firm
performance (e.g. Chang and Singh, 2000; McGahan and
Porter, 1997; Schmalensee, 1985), we argue that parenting
effects are likely to be more significant for emerging ventures
that are still subject to the LOS and have likely not yet suc-
cessfully navigated the LT. Given this, we next argue that the
presence of a corporate parent suggests successful naviga-
tion of the LT and thus helps SMEs neutralize the LOS, which
will in turn allow the subsidiary to better gather needed
resources.
Corporate Parenting and the LT 
In this article, we subscribe to the notion that most, if not all,
SMEs must navigate a legitimacy threshold before they are
able to acquire needed resources (Birley and Norburn, 1985;
Zahra and Filatotchev,2004).The central idea of the LT is that
there exists a point in the early stage of most new ventures
where the firm compiles some base level of legitimacy that
enables it to survive and possibly grow (Zimmerman and
Zeitz, 2002).Therefore, pre-legitimate ventures can be clearly
contrasted with post-legitimate ventures in that they are just
getting off the ground, financed entirely by seed money, have
few (if any) substantial customers, and possess highly unten-
able resources; whereas post-legitimate ventures have
acquired, or have access to, additional and more stable
resources due to being granted at least a base level of legiti-
macy by a key stakeholder (Rutherford and Buller, 2007;
Rutherford et al., 2009). Navigation of the LT is thus compa-
rable to overcoming the LOS, which is a condition where
emerging ventures possess limited power against market
forces due to a lack of resources (Stinchcombe, 1965). More
specifically, since emerging ventures commonly have limited
debt capacity, poor cash flows, a limited product/service
offering,and depend on niche markets, their survival and per-
formance is more susceptible to market forces such as
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aggressive competitors, demand fluctuations, and powerful
suppliers (Choi and Shepherd, 2005; Morris, 2001).
In this sense, navigating the legitimacy threshold is largely
a resource issue (e.g., Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), because
pre-legitimate ventures usually possess only the founder’s
personal resources and what the founder has been able to
raise from friends, family, and fools (Berger and Udell, 1998;
2006).Further, the pre-legitimate firm likely has few if any sig-
nificant customers. Because of this resource deficiency, dur-
ing the pre-legitimate stage, resource-providing stakeholders
(i.e., financiers and customers) are usually the most impor-
tant stakeholders from whom the firm must be granted legit-
imacy (Choi and Shepherd, 2005).Therefore, successful navi-
gation of the LT is most commonly indicated by the provision
of resources to the SME by a key stakeholder (Zimmerman
and Zeitz, 2002; Zahra and Filatotchev, 2004). For example,
post legitimacy may be indicated by events such as the SME
landing its first major sale, entering a licensing agreement
with a product distributor,or receiving financing from a busi-
ness angel (Rutherford et al., 2009). While the above are all
certainly viable, we assert that several lines of reasoning sup-
port the notion that SMEs with corporate parents have also
successfully navigated the LT.
First, it is reasonable to assert that parent firms nearly
always invest in legitimate ventures. As posited by
Burgelman (1991) corporations have limited resources and
thus managers will only invest such resources after much
analysis. Hence, a parent/subsidiary relationship suggests
that the parent has performed due diligence and concluded
that the SME is legitimate (Lange, Boivie, and Henderson,
2009). Further, research in the large firm literature indicates
that parents consistently provide subsidiary ventures with
high levels of tangible resources (e.g. McKendrick and
Carroll, 2001; McKendrick, et al., 2003; Stuart, Hoang, and
Hybels, 1999), providing evidence that SMEs with corporate
parents will have more consistent access to resources than
independent SMEs. Finally, regardless of the amount of tangi-
ble resources that the SME acquires from the parent, the par-
ent’s presence will likely signal to other potential resource
providers that the SME is more legitimate than comparable
independent ventures (Aldrich and Martinez, 2001;
Shepherd and Zacharakis, 2003).Thus, we conclude that the
presence of a corporate parent represents a successful navi-
gation of the LT and will thus enhance SME resource acqui-
sition.
Given the above, we posit the following:
Hypothesis 1: Corporate parents will positively influ-
ence SME resource acquisition such that SMEs with
corporate parents will gather more resources than
SMEs without corporate parents.
Corporate Parents and SME Resource
Acquisition 
As acknowledged above, SMEs struggle to acquire needed
resources,particularly in the areas of human capital (Hornsby
and Kuratko, 2003), financing (Berger and Udell, 2006), and
technological assets (Bernadas and Verville, 2005).
Conversely, research on the LT provides evidence that SMEs
which are granted legitimacy by a critical stakeholder will be
better able to acquire needed resources (Rutherford and
Buller, 2007; Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002). Given that the
presence of a corporate parent likely greatly increases SME
legitimacy,we argue below that SMEs with corporate parents
will have better access to technological, financial, and human
resources than similar ventures that lack parents.
Acquiring Financing
It is well documented that new and small firms struggle to
acquire needed financing and such struggles are a common
cause of SME failure (e.g., Coleman, 2004; Gregory,
Rutherford, Oswald, and Gardiner, 2005). Further, research
also documents that to acquire financing; entrepreneurs
often face additional constraints such as higher interest rates,
weekly payments, and extensive personal guarantees (Barton
and Matthews,1989;Rutherford,Coombes,and Tocher,2007).
While SMEs struggle to raise capital for a variety of reasons,
two primary causes are the fact that financiers often face
severe information opacity with regard to the SME and the
reality that SME financing is highly dependent on its
founders’ credit scores (Berger and Udell, 1998; 2006). More
specifically, since the SME has few assets and often lacks the
solid business reputation that creditors desire, the SME’s
credit score will either rely heavily or be entirely dependent
upon its founders’ credit scores (Brewer, 2007).
Therefore, we argue here that the presence of a corporate
parent will help SMEs limit their information opacity and
increase their credit score. For example, a parent will likely
have a long and hopefully sound business record, which
potential creditors will almost certainly reference when mak-
ing loan decisions regarding the parent’s subsidiaries (Lange
et al., 2009; McKendrick, et al., 2003). In other words, while
the SME may lack legitimacy and reputation, the parent will
likely possess high levels of each, which a potential financier
will most likely consider when deciding whether to provide
financing to the parent’s subsidiary. Such perceived legitima-
cy is presumed to positively influence the SME’s ability to
raise capital (Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002). Further and per-
haps more important, the presence of a parent will link the
SME’s credit score with the parent’s credit score (Berger and
Udell, 2006). Since it is almost certain that the parent’s cred-
it score will be higher and have more credence than the
SME’s credit score, a parent will likely positively influence
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SME access to capital.Given the above discussion, the follow-
ing is advanced:
Hypothesis 2: The presence of a corporate parent will
positively influence SME access to financing such that
SMEs with a parent will have higher credit scores than
comparable ventures without parents.
Acquiring Managerial Talent
The acquisition of a qualified management team is a complex
issue for SMEs. On one hand, SMEs commonly struggle to
attract and retain the qualified employees they desire, yet on
the other hand, attracting and retaining competent employ-
ees is critically important to SME survival and performance
(Cardon and Stevens, 2004; Tocher and Rutherford, 2009).
Emphasizing the above statement, research indicates that
managerial incompetence is one of the most common rea-
sons for SME failure (Dun & Bradstreet, 2001), yet emerging
ventures typically place very little emphasis on formal HRM
practices (Hornsby and Kuratko, 1990; 2003) and generally
report not being able to attract competent employees
(Williamson, 2000; Williamson, Cable, and Aldrich, 2002).
Additional research indicates that SMEs (1) rely extensively
on personal networks to find employees (e.g., Carroll,
Marchington, Earnshaw, and Taylor, 1999), (2) use few if any
formalized selection practices such as structured interviews,
reference checks, or formal job applications (e.g., Kotey and
Slade, 2005), and (3) often must compensate key employees
at below market levels (Hayton, 2003). Further, due to factors
such as a lack of training, limited promotion opportunities,
and poor or absent supervision, SMEs often are unable to
retain the few qualified employees they are able to attract
(Tocher, Shook, and Giles, 2007).
While the above indicates that SMEs struggle to attract and
select employees, research also suggests that the presence of
a parent will likely help neutralize such challenges. For
instance, the presence of a parent will significantly increase
employer legitimacy (e.g.,Williamson et al., 2002), positively
influencing such factors as applicant pool quality, perceived
promotion opportunity, and employee competence (Cardon
and Stevens, 2004). Next, parent firms will almost certainly
follow more formalized HRM practices than independent
SME ventures (Kotey and Slade, 2005), and will probably
require their subsidiaries to use similar practices. Using more
formal HRM practices will likely result in more competent
employees and better employee retention. Illustrating this
point, research indicates that the use of formal HRM prac-
tices such as strict recruiting and selection practices, formal
training programs, and employee empowerment initiatives
tend to positively influence SME performance while decreas-
ing turnover (e.g. Chandler and McEvoy, 2000; Hayton, 2003;
Tocher and Rutherford, 2009). Finally, since parents tend to
highly subsidize subsidiary ventures (McKendrick et al.,
2003), it follows that such support will allow SMEs with par-
ents to better compensate employees, neutralizing the pay
gap often faced by SME ventures (Lange et al., 2009). Hence,
the following is posited:
Hypothesis 3: The presence of a corporate parent will
positively influence SME access to managerial talent
such that SMEs with a parent will have more complete
management teams than comparable ventures without
parents. 
Acquiring Technology
The acquisition and utilization of technology is also a double-
edged sword for SME ventures in that SMEs are often techno-
logical laggards (e.g. Bernadas and Verville, 2005), yet the use
of technology is critical to establishing and maintaining the
knowledge-based competitive advantages that are critically
important in the global economy (Felin and Hesterly, 2007).
SMEs often possess less technological assets than more estab-
lished ventures for reasons such as a lack of capital to pur-
chase technology (e.g.Robeiro and Love,2003), fear that pur-
chasing such items will hurt the firm’s strategic flexibility
(e.g.Murphy,Celuch,and Callaway,2007),and a belief by SME
managers that their ventures do not have enough competent
employees to leverage the technology their firms already pos-
sess (e.g. Litz and Stewart, 2000). Given such concerns, SMEs
often choose to either outsource certain technological func-
tions or rely on strategic partnerships to accomplish such
activities (Stam and Elfring, 2008).
Given the technological challenges often faced by SMEs, it
seems that the presence of a corporate parent is a viable strategic
partnering option for emerging firms attempting to leverage tech-
nological resources.Specifically,a parent will probably provide the
SME the financing, competent employees, and training needed to
acquire and use the latest technologies (McKendrick and Carroll,
2001; McKendrick et al., 2003). Similarly, a parent will likely allow
its subsidiaries to access the technologies that the parent already
possesses (Lange et al., 2009). Integrating the subsidiary’s knowl-
edge management systems into the parent’s systems will usually
benefit the subsidiary by providing it access to the parent’s suppli-
ers,customers,and partners (Lubit,2001).Finally,the presence of a
parent will help the subsidiary convince stakeholders such as cus-
tomers and suppliers that any proprietary technologies it possess-
es are legitimate (Murphy and Smart,2000).Supporting this notion,
legitimacy scholars (e.g.,Tornikoski and Newbert, 2007; Delmar
and Shane,2004) argue that communicating an association with a
larger and better known organization such as a parent typically
leads potential stakeholders to infer greater legitimacy on the pro-
prietary resources of an emerging venture.Hence,we advance the
following:
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Hypothesis 4: The presence of a corporate parent will
positively influence SME utilization of technological
resources such that SMEs with a parent will acquire
and utilize more technological resources than compa-
rable ventures without parents. 
Method
Data for the study were gathered from Reference USA.
Reference USA claims to report data on more than 14 million
businesses in the United States. To identify a sample of small
subsidiaries, data on nongovernment, nonbranch, and non-
headquarter subsidiary retail firms with less than 500
employees were gathered. A total of 1,242 such firms were
identified. Retail firms were chosen because McGahan and
Porter (1997) noted that corporate (parenting)-level effects
are strongest in retail and wholesale industries. To identify a
comparative sample, random names were chosen and used as
street names to identify nongovernment, nonbranch, non-
headquarter, and nonsubsidiary, single location independent
retail firms with less than 500 employees.This process iden-
tified 2,099 such firms. In general, subsidiary firms were larg-
er than independent firms. Accordingly, tests for significant
mean differences were conducted for the full sample as well
as for each variable of interest by firm size (number of
employees).
Credit numeric score was used to measure the firm’s abil-
ity to access financial capital. Higher credit scores make it
easier to attain working capital and debt financing on superi-
or terms. Higher credit scores should also result in improved
ability to access equity markets on superior terms.The confi-
dence of financiers in a firm’s ability to meet its financial obli-
gations is reflected in a firm’s credit score. This increased
confidence should coincide with financiers’ perceptions of
reduced risk, thereby reducing the rate of return demanded
by equity investors. Credit numeric scores in the samples
range from 26 to 100.
Number of executives was used to measure the firm’s abil-
ity to successfully recruit and retain important human
resource talent. Reference USA lists up to 21 executives
(including the primary firm contact) for each firm. Number
of executives was measured as the total number of execu-
tives listed for each firm. The number of executives per firm
ranged from 1 to 11 in the samples.
The presence of a website and the number of PCs were
used as measures of technology use in this study. Reference
USA lists the firm’s URL if a website is available. Developing
and maintaining a website can require extensive knowledge
of computer-related technology, especially if the website has
to be frequently updated and is used to take and place
orders online. Firms with websites were coded with a 1
while firms without a website were coded with a 0.
Reference USA lists the number of PCs in a firm by catego-
ry. Firms with 0–1 PCs were coded with 1; firms with 2–9
PCs, 2; firms with 10–29 PCs, 3; and firms with 30 or more
PCs, 4. Reference USA does not report data on number of
PCs for firms with 100 or more employees. Retailers use PCs
for a variety of purposes such as inventory and customer
database management. Increased use of PCs represents a
commitment to using technology to perform functions that
may otherwise be performed manually.
Subsidiary status was coded with a 1 if the firm had a cor-
porate parent and with a 0 if the company was independent-
ly owned. Two control variables were included in the study.
First,number of employees was included as a measure of firm
size. Larger firms can be expected to have greater resources,
making controlling for firm size important. Reference USA
provides data on number of employees in size groupings:
firms with 0–4 employees were coded 1; 5–9 employees, 2;
10–19 employees, 3; 20–49 employees, 4; 50–99 employees,
5;100–249 employees,6;and 250–499 employees,7.Firm age
was the second control variable used. It is likely that older
firms, like larger firms, have better access to resources, mak-
ing controlling for firm age appropriate.The year the compa-
ny first used a yellow page ad was used as a proxy for firm
age.While an imperfect measure of firm age, retail firms have
a strong interest in being listed in local yellow pages.
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Table 1. Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations
Mean Std. 1 2 3 4 5 6
1. # Employees 3.62 1.90
2. Firm Age 1996.51 7.26 **-.18
3. Subsidiary .37 .48 **.23 -.01
4. Credit Score 88.66 11.92 **.47 **-.40 **.48
5. # Executives 2.13 1.93 **.52 **-.10 **.22 **.28
6.Website .36 .48 **.40 **-.09 **.27 **.30 **.36
7. #PCs 1.70 .71 **.67 **-.12 **.37 **.39 **.40 **.40
**=sig. at .01
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Results
Analysis proceeded in three stages. First, variable descriptive
data and correlations are presented in Table 1.Table 1 shows
that the two control variables firm size and firm age are sig-
nificantly correlated with most of the other variables in the
study, indicating the appropriateness of their inclusion. The
table also shows that subsidiary status is significantly and
positively related to all of the variables of interest, suggesting
that having a corporate parent leads to higher credit scores,
a more complete management team, and better access to
technology.
In the second stage, subsidiary status was regressed on
credit score, number of executives, presence of a website,
and the number of personal computers, using firm size and
firm age as control variables. Table 2 shows the results of the
two-step regressions. The results show that subsidiary status
significantly improves the prediction of credit scores, num-
ber of executives, the likelihood of a website, and the num-
ber of personal computers employed, given controls for firm
size and firm age. These results indicate that having a corpo-
rate parent significantly improves a small firms’ ability to
acquire important resources.
In the final stage of analysis, tests of significant mean dif-
ferences between the subsidiary sample and the independ-
ent firms sample were conducted. Differences are tested for
the seven size groupings ranging from 0–4 employees to
250–499 employees. Table 3 reports the results of the analy-
sis.These results are offered to more fully illustrate the differ-
ences between small independent and small subsidiary firms
in their ability to acquire important resources, and to assess
the extent that the legitimacy benefits of having a corporate
parent are more pronounced for smaller firms.
Table 3 reveals frequent and consistent differences in
resource levels between the subsidiary and independent
firms. Regarding credit scores, subsidiary firms had higher
credit scores than independent firms in the total sample as
well as every size group.The greatest differences were found
for smaller firms. Subsidiary firms with 0–4 employees had
credit scores 20.24 points higher, on average, than compara-
bly sized independent firms. By comparison, subsidiary firms
with 100–249 employees had credit scores only 4.03 points
higher, on average, than same-sized independent firms.
Regarding number of executives, subsidiary firms employed
more executives than independent firms in the total sample
and in each size group except the largest group of firms with
250–499 employees. The most significant difference was
again found in the smallest subsamples of firms with 0–4
employees. Regarding technology availability, subsidiary
firms were much more likely to have a website than inde-
pendent firms for the sample overall and for each size group
except the largest group of firms with 250–499 employees.
Here again, the greatest differences were observed for small-
er firms. Subsidiaries with 0–4 employees were 9 times as
likely as independent firms to have a website while sub-
sidiaries with 5–9 and 10–19 employees were respectively
almost 4 and 2 times more likely to have a website. Also, sub-
sidiary firms used more PCs than independent firms for the
overall sample and for each size group except the group with
5–9 employees.
Collectively, the results of the analyses provide strong sup-
port for the hypotheses. The general hypothesis (hypothesis
1) that SMEs with corporate parents will gather more
resources than independent businesses was well supported
by the data. The correlation data shows consistently greater
resources for subsidiaries than independent firms.The regres-
sion analysis shows that this finding remains when control-
ling for firm size and firm age. Hypothesis 2, that small sub-
sidiaries will have higher credit scores than independent
small businesses is also strongly supported by the data. Table
2 shows a large (.16) and significant improvement in percent-
age of variance explained in credit scores as a result of
including subsidiary status in the regression. Hypothesis 3,
that small subsidiaries will have more complete management
teams than independent small businesses, was also strongly
supported by the data. Firm size, as measured by number of
employees, was revealed in Table 2 to be the more significant
control variable (firm age was not a significant predictor
when firm size was included in the model). Table 3 revealed
that subsidiary firms had more complete management teams
than independent firms for the overall sample, as well as for
every size subsample except the largest with 250–499
employees. Hypothesis 4, that small subsidiaries will make
greater use of technology than independent small business-
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Table 2. Regression of Subsidiary Status on Credit
Scores, Number of Executives, Presence of a Website,
and Number of Personal Computers
Credit
Score # Executives Website # PCs
Stage 1
Number of
Employees ***.41 ***.52 ***.40 ***.68
Firm Age ***-.34 -.01 -.02 .01
Stage 2
Subsidiary
Status ***.40 ***.09 ***.18 ***.17
F ***1040.47 ***432.49 ***259.52 ***783.33
Adjusted R2 .48 .28 .19 .48
Significant
Change in R2 ***.16 ***.01 ***.03 ***.03
***=sig. at .001
Standardized regression coefficients reported
F and Adjusted R2 are for Stage 2 Models
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es, was also strongly supported by the data.These variables,
like number of executives, were strongly influenced by firm
size (and not firm age) as a control variable. Again, Table 3
illustrates that subsidiary firms were much more likely to
have a website and employ more personal computers in their
firms than their independent counterparts.
These findings support the general hypothesis that the
presence of a parent will positively influence SME resource
acquisition. Such findings lend support to the argument that
the presence of a parent represents a successful navigation of
the LT. Further, findings that the smaller subsidiaries had con-
siderably more resources than comparable independent ven-
tures and such resource differences declined as firms became
more established (see Table 3) provide support for the notion
that parenting may be most beneficial for pre-legitimate ven-
tures.
Discussion
The current study provides solid empirical support for the
notion that the presence of a parent will positively influence
resource acquisition in emerging ventures. Specifically, our
findings indicate that small subsidiary ventures typically have
better credit ratings, have more managers, have more person-
al computers, and are more likely to have a website than
comparably sized independent ventures. It should also be
noted that such resource differences are most pronounced in
very small firms and become less pronounced as firms
become more established. Such findings indicate that while
all SMEs with parents tend to be able to gather more
resources than comparable ventures, the access to resources
benefit of parenting appears to be far greater for smaller ven-
tures.
The above findings make several important contributions
to the literature. First, our article extends research on corpo-
rate parenting by examining its influence on SMEs. As previ-
ously mentioned, most research on corporate parenting
effects tends to examine large, well-established ventures and
has typically concluded that parenting benefits are generally
marginal for such firms (e.g. Chang and Singh, 2000;
McGahan and Porter, 1997). For example, recent work by
Lange et al. (2009) even found that subsidiaries of corporate
parents have higher failure rates than independently owned
ventures. However, it should be noted that since established
ventures have much better access to resources, the main ben-
efit of parenting for large subsidiary ventures is the provision
of managerial oversight from the parent to the subsidiary
(Goold et al., 1994). Conversely, considering that emerging
ventures tend to lack both legitimacy and tangible resources
(Williamson, 2000), a parent may provide emerging ventures
with additional benefits such as increasing the SME’s per-
ceived legitimacy and access to resources. Interestingly, our
data supports the above by finding both that SMEs with par-
ents tend to gather more resources than independent firms,
and that such resource differences were most pronounced
for smaller firms. Such findings suggest that parenting pro-
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Table 3. Mean Differences Between Small
Independent and Subsidiary Retail Firms
Independent Subsidiary F
Total Sample N=2099 N=1242
Credit Score 84.27 96.07 ***991.61
Number of Executives 1.80 2.67 ***164.66
Presence of Website .26 .52 ***258.37
Number of PCs 1.50 2.06 ***415.88
0–4 Employees N=674 N=82
Credit Score 76.42 95.66 ***357.45
Number of Executives 1.00 1.21 ***57.70
Presence of Website .03 .27 ***85.05
Number of PCs 1.06 1.18 ***18.20
5–9 Employees N=203 N=116
Credit Score 79.69 95.05 ***181.60
Number of Executives 1.00 1.26 ***18.54
Presence of Website .07 .27 ***23.90
Number of PCs 1.45 1.55 2.58
10–19 Employees N=170 N=180
Credit Score 81.77 95.77 ***191.96
Number of Executives 1.08 1.37 **9.16
Presence of Website .24 .47 ***21.60
Number of PCs 1.35 1.86 ***51.50
20–49 Employees N=472 N=318
Credit Score 89.33 96.85 ***158.90
Number of Executives 1.98 2.23 **7.64
Presence of Website .38 .53 ***19.54
Number of PCs 2.05 2.29 ***48.40
50–99 Employees N=121 N=217
Credit Score 90.73 96.40 ***25.11
Number of Executives 2.51 3.12 **8.29
Presence of Website .49 .67 ***11.48
Number of PCs 2.05 2.47 ***28.44
100–249 Employees N=403 N=235
Credit Score 91.88 95.91 ***28.08
Number of Executives 3.19 4.34 ***28.41
Presence of Website .49 .59 **6.63
Number of PCs N/A N/A N/A
250–499 Employees N=56 N=72
Credit Score 91.73 97.10 ***11.60
Number of Executives 3.57 4.17 1.34
Presence of Website .57 .60 .77
Number of PCs N/A N/A N/A
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vides SMEs increased access to resources and this increased
access is greatest for smaller firms. Therefore, parenting does
appear to be more beneficial for emerging ventures.
Second,our article provides needed empirical evidence to
support the legitimacy threshold (LT) concept.While recent
work provides solid evidence that the LT exists and that suc-
cessfully navigating the LT is critical to firm survival (Choi
and Shepherd, 2005; Rutherford and Buller, 2007;
Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002), empirical studies demonstrat-
ing critical differences between comparable pre-legitimate
and post-legitimate firms are rare (Rutherford et al., 2009;
Zahra and Filatotchev, 2004). Hence, by demonstrating that
SMEs that have successfully crossed the LT by bringing on a
corporate parent are better able to gather resources than
comparable ventures, we provide additional empirical sup-
port for the LT concept and suggest that attracting a corpo-
rate parent is a viable option which may help entrepreneurs
successfully navigate the LT.
Third, our study suggests that bringing on a corporate par-
ent will help entrepreneurs operating early-stage ventures
avoid the risky strategy of prioritizing stakeholder concerns.
Several studies (e.g.Danov,Smith, and Mitchell, 2003; Jawahar
and McLauphlin, 2001; Tocher and Rutherford, 2009) con-
clude that entrepreneurs operating early-stage ventures typi-
cally prioritize stakeholder concerns, paying most (if not all)
of their attention to the concerns of resource-providing
stakeholders—usually customers and financiers. At the same
time, such entrepreneurs pay little if any attention to the con-
cerns of stakeholders such as employees, suppliers, and com-
munity officials. However, such a strategy has also been
shown to be problematic as research indicates that firms
who address stakeholder concerns in a symbiotic manner
tend to experience high performance levels (e.g. Bosse,
Phillips, and Harrison, 2009; Laplume, Sonpar, and Litz, 2008).
For instance, research by Dyer and Singh (1998) found that
firms that are able to develop symbiotic relationships among
various stakeholder groups typically experience higher per-
formance levels than comparable firms who use primarily a
zero sum approach to stakeholder management. Jawahar and
Mclaughlin’s (2001) argument for stakeholder prioritization
is primarily based on the notion that emerging ventures must
gather resources before all stakeholder interests can be
aligned.However, if the presence of a parent allows emerging
firms to gather needed resources, it seems that subsidiaries
will be able to align stakeholder interests earlier in the ven-
ture’s existence and avoid the risky stakeholder prioritization
strategy.
Finally, in spite of the benefits of parenting discussed
above, our results also suggest that entrepreneurs need to be
aware of the LT when deciding to enter into a parenting sub-
sidiary relationship. While parents typically increase emerg-
ing ventures’ perceived legitimacy and access to resources, it
can be assumed that ventures which have crossed the LT are
seen as legitimate and are thus able to gather resources with
or without the help of a parent (Aldrich and Martinez, 2001;
Shepherd and Zacharakis, 2003). Therefore, similar to large
established firms, the primary benefit that post-legitimate
ventures will receive from parents is managerial guidance
(Goold et al., 1994). Given the mixed results of research
examining the parenting/firm performance relationship (e.g.
Chang and Singh, 2000), an entrepreneur operating a post-
legitimate venture should be very cautious when making the
decision to enter into a parenting subsidiary relationship. If
the entrepreneur believes that the firm could benefit sub-
stantially from the increased managerial guidance of a parent,
she should consider the subsidiary option. However, if the
entrepreneur believes that her management team can effec-
tively guide the venture, she should think twice about bring-
ing a parent on board.
Limitations and Future Research 
This study, like any, has limitations. One limitation of this
study was the unavailability of performance data.While our
results do show that small subsidiaries have better access to
important resources than independent small businesses, this
study is not able to determine if improved access to
resources, in this case, results in performance improvements
for parents or their subsidiaries. Future research should con-
sider the relationship between emerging venture legitimiza-
tion by a parent and emerging firm performance.Specifically,
do SMEs who are legitimized by corporate parents experi-
ence higher performance levels than comparably sized inde-
pendent firms? On one hand, it seems that both the increased
access to resources and the managerial oversight provided by
the parent would allow the subsidiary to perform at a higher
level. However, recent empirical research by Lange et al.
(2009) actually indicates that corporate subsidiaries experi-
ence higher failure rates than comparable ventures. Given
such findings, future research needs to examine whether sub-
sidiaries do indeed perform at lower levels.Conversely, could
it be that subsidiary ventures are more likely to fail because
parents have unrealistic expectations and tend to pull
resources from subsidiaries before they are able to fully
develop their product/service offerings? 
On a related note, it would be interesting to examine if
parental managerial oversight creates a reality where sub-
sidiary ventures are not as diversified as comparably sized
independent firms. It is certainly possible that the corporate
parent may prefer that the subsidiary focus their efforts nar-
rowly, especially if the subsidiary is a supplier or distributor
of the parent’s products or services. Studies indicating that
independent ventures that are more diversified tend to per-
form at higher levels than subsidiaries that are only allowed
to carry a narrow product line may provide some explana-
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tion for Lange et al.’s (2009) somewhat contrary findings.
Next, research should examine if performance levels vary for
SME subsidiaries across the LT. In other words, do pre-legiti-
mate SMEs that become subsidiaries experience better sur-
vival rates and higher performance levels than post-legiti-
mate SMEs who become subsidiaries after crossing the LT?
Research indicating that SMEs that used the legitimization of
a parent to navigate the LT perform at higher levels than
SMEs that became affiliated with parents after crossing the LT
would provide additional credence to the claim that entre-
preneurs operating post-legitimate ventures should be cau-
tious about entering into a parenting subsidiary relationship.
Further, it is important to note that our study suggests a
strategy for emerging firms (i.e.courting the support of a par-
ent) that will likely lead to reduced independence for entre-
preneurs. As many entrepreneurs value independence, an in-
depth study of entrepreneurs’ personal experiences with
becoming and being a subsidiary may help inform other
entrepreneurs as to their potential satisfaction with such an
arrangement.
Finally, this study was rough-grained in its approach.
Future research could adopt a more fine-grained approach
and add insight into the legitimization process and to a vari-
ety of possible differences between subsidiary and independ-
ent firms. For example, future research might consider the
extent that small subsidiaries use their websites more to
coordinate business activities, while small independent firms
use their websites primarily to create firm awareness.
Conclusion
The current examination of resource acquisition benefits of
corporate parenting in SMEs contributes to the literature by
finding that parenting is highly beneficial for smaller, less
established ventures. Using a comparison sample of 1,242
small subsidiaries and 2,099 independent small firms, we
found strong evidence that the presence of a parent allows
SMEs increased access to resources.Perhaps more important-
ly though, our findings also indicate that as firm size increas-
es, resource differences between subsidiary and comparable
independent ventures tend to steadily decrease, leading to
the conclusion that parenting is likely much more beneficial
for pre-legitimate ventures.Thus, it appears that the presence
of a parent represents a successful navigation of the LT and
supports the notion that since entrepreneurs operating sub-
sidiary ventures will be able to access needed resources, they
will be less likely to rely on the risky strategy of prioritizing
stakeholder concerns.However,given previous research find-
ings indicating that parenting’s influence on performance is
typically marginal (e.g. Chang and Singh, 2000), and possibly
even negative (e.g. Lange et al., 2009),we submit that despite
the increased resource access typically provided to SMEs by
a parent firm, entrepreneurs operating post-legitimate ven-
tures may not want to enter a parenting subsidiary relation-
ship. Given that pre-legitimate ventures lack reputation and
are typically in need of resources (Aldrich, 1999), our results
suggest that pre-legitimate ventures should consider actively
pursuing a parent. However, since post-legitimate ventures
are likely able to access resources with or without the help
of a parent, entrepreneurs operating post-legitimate ventures
should only bring a parent on board if the entrepreneur is
convinced that the parent’s managerial oversight will
increase her firm’s performance.
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Among nascent entrepreneurial ventures, are sometypes of bootstrapping techniques more successfulthan others? We compare externally oriented and
internally oriented techniques with respect to the likeli-
hood of becoming an operational venture; and we com-
pare cash-increasing and cost-decreasing techniques with
respect to becoming operational. Using data from the first
Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics, we find evi-
dence suggesting that when bootstrapping a new venture,
the percentage of cash-increasing and cost-decreasing
externally oriented bootstrapping techniques that a ven-
ture’s owners use are positive predictors of subsequent pos-
itive cash flow (one and two years later). But, internally
oriented techniques are not related to subsequent cash
flow.
Keywords: financing, bootstrapping, new ventures, PSED,
resource based view
Financial bootstrapping in new ventures refers to a variety of
techniques that business founders use to raise funds from
nontraditional business funding sources (e.g., spouses,
friends and family) and limit business expenses (e.g., by uti-
lizing used machinery, delaying salaries) (Bhide, 1992; Payne,
2007; Winborg and Landstrom, 2001). For the founders of
new ventures, bootstrapping is a particularly important
source of financing because they often do not have access to
traditional sources of business funding such as bank loans,
venture capital financing, and public equity (Stouder, 2002).
Although researchers have documented the types of boot-
strapping techniques founders use (Carter and Van Auken,
2005; Ebben and Johnson, 2006;Van Auken, 2004;Van Auken,
and Neeley, 1998), the literature is silent regarding the effec-
tiveness of different types of financial bootstrapping tech-
niques. Are certain types of bootstrapping techniques more
effective in helping a venture become operational? Are the
founders who focus on raising funds to support the venture
more successful than those who focus on limiting expenses?
Are the founders who focus on obtaining money and free
services from individuals outside the venture more success-
ful than those who focus on obtaining money and free serv-
ices from insiders? Research identifying and validating boot-
strapping techniques that facilitate new venture launch has
significant implications for nascent entrepreneurs.
In this research we provide answers to these questions.To
do so, we review and integrate the bootstrapping and organi-
zational emergence literature.We build on earlier categoriza-
tions of bootstrapping techniques to parsimoniously investi-
gate differences in effectiveness (Payne, 2007; Winborg and
Landstrom, 2001). We utilize arguments grounded in the
resource-based view of the firm and institutional theory to
develop testable hypotheses regarding the effectiveness of
different categories of bootstrapping techniques.
Subsequently we describe our sample, discuss the construc-
tion of the variables, and describe the analytical method
employed. Finally, we present the results of our analysis and
discuss our findings.
Theory Development
Our research model stipulates that different types of boot-
strapping techniques have different influence on whether a
nascent venture emerges as an operational venture. We use
institutional theory and the resource-based view to develop
hypotheses. Our arguments are founded on a belief that
acquiring resources that either increase cash or decrease
monetary costs from external sources helps build the social
legitimacy of the nascent business and leads to an increased
probability of successful emergence. In this section of the
article, we define the constructs relevant to our arguments
and develop hypotheses.
This research is designed to focus on the relationship
between bootstrapping and organizational emergence. The
creation of business organizations is a central issue in entre-
preneurship research. Hence the demarcation of organiza-
tional emergence is important in spite of significant chal-
lenges in determining the point of emergence (e.g. Gartner
and Carter, 2003). Our dependent variable, organizational
emergence, is defined as the transition point at which a nas-
cent venture becomes an operational organization (Carter,
Gartner and Reynolds, 1996; Tornikoski and Newbert, 2007).
Although it is recognized that organizational emergence is a
process, there has been significant discussion in the literature
regarding the point in time at which a new venture can be
deemed a viable venture (Carter,Gartner,and Reynolds,1996;
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Gartner and Carter, 2003). Of the researchers who have used
the first Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics (PSED I) to
study organizational emergence (Lichtenstein,Carter,Dooley,
and Gartner, 2007; Newbert, 2005;Tornikoski and Newbert,
2007), many have operationalized organizational emergence
as occurring when the venture’s revenues exceed expenses.
Although arguments for other points in time could be con-
structed, we posit that the point in time when revenues
exceed expenses provides an indicator of a successful initial
experiment and provides a base for future development.
Thus, building on this logic and previous research, we also
use positive cash flow as the indicator of when a venture
becomes operational.
The term “bootstrap”has been part of the business lexicon
for decades. However, one of the earliest uses of bootstrap in
the academic literature was in a 1992 Harvard Business
Review article titled “Bootstrap finance:The art of startups”
(Bhide, 1992). Bootstrap finance was defined in this article as
“launching ventures with modest personal funds” (Bhide,
1992:110).More recently,bootstrap finance has been defined
as “the use of methods for meeting the need for resources
without relying on long-term external finance from debt
holders and/or new owners” (Winborg and Landstrom, 2001:
235–236), and described as a method by which entrepre-
neurs can “extend the runway” from which to launch their
business (Payne, 2007). Entrepreneurs often use bootstrap-
ping techniques because they lack access to traditional
sources of capital, or because they wish to maintain full con-
trol and ownership of their ventures,or both (Stouder,2002).
Specific techniques include practices such as continued reg-
ular employment, investment of personal savings, borrowing
from family members, using personal credit cards, bartering
for needed goods and services, state and local government
grants, and making pre-agreements with suppliers and cus-
tomers. (See Payne, 2007 and Winborg and Landstrom, 2001
for a full listing of bootstrapping techniques.) 
Research on bootstrapping has been largely descriptive.
(See Table 1 for a summary.) Early work in the area examined
the types of bootstrap techniques that have been used and
the degree to which managers of companies (not just new
ventures) have used them (Van Auken and Neeley,1998).This
is a necessary first step in the examination of any important
area. Researchers must first understand the “what’ of an area
before tackling the “why” and “how.” The descriptive work
indicates that sole proprietorships and firms outside the con-
struction and manufacturing sectors are more likely to
employ bootstrapping techniques. In addition, research that
examines the degree to which entrepreneurs use bootstrap
financing versus traditional forms of capital acquisition finds
that bootstrap finance usage is related to market size, per-
ceived firm risk, recent funding search (Van Auken, 2004),
and the managers’assessment of their own ability (Carter and
Van Auken, 2005). Moreover, the use of particular bootstrap
techniques (e.g., delaying payment to suppliers, customer-
related bootstrapping) is positively related to perceived firm
risk (Van Auken, 2004) and organizational age (Ebben and
Johnson, 2006).Though some contingent relationships have
been part of the above work (e.g.Van Auken,2004;Ebben and
Johnson,2006), extension of the research from descriptive to
normative is the next step in the development of the boot-
strap finance area as it relates to entrepreneurship.
Cash-Increasing versus Cost-Decreasing
Techniques
Bootstrap finance techniques can be categorized as cash-
increasing or cost-decreasing (Payne, 2007). Cash-increasing
techniques include continuing to work for others while start-
ing a new venture; obtaining funding from spouses, friends,
family, and current employers; obtaining a second mortgage;
utilizing credit cards and personal financing; and founders
investing their own money in a venture.The assumption of
these techniques is that the money raised from using these
techniques will be used to fund the venture. Cash-increasing
techniques add value by bringing cash to a venture that can
be used for multiple purposes. Cash-increasing techniques,
therefore, are direct substitutes for traditional forms of finan-
cial capital.
Cost-decreasing techniques include delaying payments to
suppliers, deferring salaries, utilizing used machinery, and
obtaining professional services for free. Cost-decreasing tech-
niques add value to a venture by reducing the need for cash.
Cost-decreasing techniques are specific to tasks (e.g., free
advice, deferred salaries) and they are not transferable across
tasks.They are not direct substitutes for traditional forms of
financial capital. Thus, the byproducts of cash-increasing and
cost-decreasing techniques differ. The byproduct of a cash-
increasing technique is cash.The byproduct of a cost-decreas-
ing technique is a cost saving.
The resource-based view of the firm (RBV) contends that
some resources are superior to other resources and superior
resources are more likely to serve as sources of competitive
advantage (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993).Within an industry or
competitive environment (e.g., a pool of new ventures), the
resources that organizations possess are heterogeneous.
Therefore, some organizations possess marginal resources
and some organizations possess superior resources. Superior
resources allow an organization to either produce goods or
services more economically or incorporate elements that
enable premium pricing. Producing goods or services eco-
nomically or incorporating elements that enable premium
pricing allows an organization to generate superior returns.
Superior returns then allows the organization to enjoy a com-
petitive advantage (Peteraf, 1993). For new ventures, the suc-
cessful utilization of bootstrap financing techniques can pro-
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vide them with potentially important resources, namely, cash
and cost savings.
Because of the substitutability of cash, and the lack of sub-
stitutability of cost savings, we view a cash-increasing tech-
nique as a means of obtaining a more valuable resource (i.e.,
a superior resource) than a cost-decreasing technique. We
view the successful employment of cash-increasing tech-
niques as more likely to increase a venture’s likelihood of
becoming operational (e.g., an indicator of organizational
performance) than the successful employment of cost-
decreasing techniques. Therefore we believe that the
founders of new ventures who successfully employ more
cash-increasing bootstrapping techniques than cost-decreas-
ing techniques will be more likely to have their venture
become operational.
Hypothesis 1: Among nascent ventures, those whose
founders successfully employ a higher percentage of
cash-increasing bootstrap finance techniques versus
cost-decreasing techniques will be more likely to
become operational.
Internal versus External Bootstrapping
Techniques
The bootstrap financing techniques of new venture founders
can be categorized as being internally oriented (within the
direct control of the founders) or externally oriented (requir-
ing intervention from stakeholders outside the new venture).
Building on new venture research that has examined ven-
tures’ resources that derive from internal capabilities and
external networks (Lee, Lee, and Pennings, 2001), we extend
the study of internal and external resources to founders’
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Table 1. Summary of Bootstrap Financing Studies
Study Sample Data Collection
Technique
Independent
Variables
Dependent Variables Findings
Carter & Van
Auken, 2005 
84 Iowa small firms questionnaire
Perceived risk
Perceived ability
constraints 
Perceived effort
constraints 
Firm age
Use of BS techniques
- delaying payments 
- minimizing accounts
receivable
- minimizing investment 
- private owner financing 
- sharing resources with
other businesses
Perceived risk is positively relat-
ed to the use of delaying pay-
ments, minimizing investment,
private owner financing, and
sharing resources.
Perceived ability constraints are
negatively related to private
owner financing.
Ebben &
Johnson, 2006
146 retail and servic-
es firms in the
Midwest that were
between 2 and 40
years old
questionnaire Time
Change in the use of BS
techniques 
- customer-related 
- delaying payments 
- owner-related 
- joint-utilization
The use of customer-related
bootstrapping techniques
increases as a firm ages 
The use of delaying payments,
owner-related, and joint-utiliza-
tion bootstrapping techniques
decrease as a firm ages.
Van Auken,
2004
44 small technology-
based firms at two
university-based
research parks in a
Midwestern state
questionnaire
Risk 
Size of market
served 
Time devoted to
raising capital
Firm age
Capital acquired
Use of bootstrap 
financing
Risk is positively related to the
use of bootstrap financing.
The size of the market served is
negatively related to the use of
bootstrap financing.
The time devoted to raising capi-
tal is negatively related to the
use of bootstrap financing.
Van Auken &
Neeley, 1998
78 small businesses
served by the Small
Business
Development Center
in a Midwestern state
questionnaire
Type of business
ownership 
Size of communi-
ty in which
business is
located
Industry
Use of nontraditional
financing
Businesses owned as sole propri-
etorships used more nontradi-
tional financing than did other
businesses.
Businesses in the construction
and manufacturing industries
used less nontraditional financ-
ing than other businesses.
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financial bootstrapping efforts. Internal bootstrapping tech-
niques include founders’ continuing to work for others while
starting a new venture, deferring salaries to themselves,
obtaining a second mortgage, utilizing credit cards and per-
sonal financing, investing their own money in a venture, uti-
lizing used machinery, and providing free services to the ven-
ture. External techniques include obtaining funding from
friends, family, and current employers; delaying payments to
suppliers; and obtaining professional services for free from
outsiders.
Within the institutional theory-based organizational emer-
gence stream, researchers have found that ventures in which
founders undertook actions designed to legitimize their nas-
cent venture to prospective customers and suppliers (e.g.,
they developed a model or prototype, purchased materials,
bought or rented facilities and equipment, hired employees,
and began promotional efforts) were more likely to have
made a sale than those that did not engage in these activities
(Newbert, 2005).Researchers have also found that legitimiza-
tion activities undertaken with respect to a broader context
of business community institutions (e.g., marketing or pro-
motion efforts, projecting financial statements, opening a
bank account, becoming listed in a telephone book, becom-
ing listed with Dun and Bradstreet, asking for funds, and
establishing credit with suppliers) improved a venture’s like-
lihood of being perceived as an operating organization
(Tornikoski and Newbert, 2007). Neither of these research
streams, however, have addressed whether founders’ financ-
ing choices, in particular, their bootstrapping practices, have
affected their ventures’ ability to become operational.
To be successful, internal bootstrapping techniques do not
require external validation.Therefore they are not dependent
on conforming to institutional norms. On the other hand, to
be successful, external bootstrap finance techniques do
require external validation. This means that whereas the suc-
cessful employment of internal techniques include cash and
cost savings, which are valuable to a new venture, the suc-
cessful employment of external techniques include cash,cost
savings, and a greater sense of social legitimacy. Greater legit-
imacy can then help generate more resources for a venture.
Therefore, we believe that ventures that successfully employ
greater levels of externally oriented techniques will be more
institutionalized and have a greater sense of legitimacy than
the ventures that employ more internal techniques; and a
greater sense of legitimacy will provide these ventures with
a greater likelihood of becoming operational.
Institutional theory contends that stakeholders in organi-
zational fields have preferences and values that firms ignore
at their peril. Stakeholders are comfortable with these prefer-
ences and values and subtly coerce organizations to conform
to them by rewarding the conforming organizations with
resources and punishing the nonconforming organizations
by withholding resources.The resources they offer motivate
organizations to conform, and thus the preferences and val-
ues become institutionalized (Perrow, 1986). For new ven-
tures, the resources offered to conforming ventures also
include social legitimacy, which is crucial to a new venture’s
likelihood of survival (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983;Meyer and
Rowan, 1977; Tornikoski and Newbert, 2007).
The process of conforming to institutional norms (i.e.,
stakeholders’ preferences and values) implicitly involves an
externalization process, a process of conforming to and vali-
dating with external stakeholders’ preferences and values
rather than internal firm preferences and values (Perrow,
1986).Once an organization conforms to institutional norms,
external stakeholders then provide resources to the organiza-
tion, including a greater sense of organizational legitimacy
and increased capital. Institutional theory suggests the
greater sense of legitimacy and resources will improve the
organization’s likelihood of survival compared to other
organizations that do not receive external resources (Meyer
and Rowan, 1977). For new ventures, the successful utiliza-
tion of bootstrapping techniques that appeal to external
stakeholders may provide ventures with greater legitimacy
and resources.
Hypothesis 2: Among new ventures, those whose
founders successfully employ a higher percentage of
externally oriented bootstrap financing techniques
versus internally oriented bootstrap finance tech-
niques will be more likely to become operational.
Methods
To test our hypotheses,we used data from the PSED I dataset.
The PSED I dataset is composed of 830 individuals who were
in the new venture process when the study began and 431
comparison individuals. (For more information about the
PSED, see Gartner, Shaver, Carter, and Reynolds, 2004.) To
limit our sample to only new ventures, we used kscleans
(Shaver, 2006), a publicly available SPSS syntax file, to reduce
the sample. In using kscleans, we eliminated the comparison
individuals and six ventures that should have been screened
out of the dataset because they did not qualify as new ven-
tures (i.e., at the beginning of the study, these ventures had
positive cash flow). Finally, we eliminated ventures that were
spin-offs of other companies (i.e., nonpersons owned more
than 50% of the venture). This resulted in a sample of 817
new ventures. Excluding ventures with missing data further
reduced the sample size. The final sample consisted of 207
ventures at time 1 (one year after the beginning of the PSED
study) and 157 ventures at time 2 (two years after the begin-
ning of the study).Although PSED data were collected annu-
ally for three years after the beginning of the study,data were
not collected from all of the ventures in the sample for all
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three years. In particular, data were collected from ventures
started by minority groups for only two years (Gartner et al.,
2004). Therefore, in the interest of producing generalizable
results, we did not examine data from the final PSED wave.
Measures
Organizational Emergence
Items R621 and S621 from the PSED asked, does the ven-
ture’s monthly cash revenue exceed monthly expenses? If
the respondent answered yes, this variable was coded as 1.
Otherwise it was coded as 0. R621 and S621 were items col-
lected in the second and third waves of the PSED (i.e., one
and two years after the initial data collection). Following the
advice of Schaubroeck (1990), we used lagged dependent
variables as a means of showing that our independent vari-
ables, which were collected in the initial data collection
wave, were related to later organizational performance.
In terms of independent variables, the PSED dataset con-
tains information about founders’ use of 10 bootstrapping
items: continuing to work for others, employer financing,
family and friend financing, owner investing, spousal financ-
ing, using a second mortgage, using credit cards, using free
helper-provided services, using free owner-provided servic-
es, and using personal financing,
To test our hypotheses we separated bootstrapping items
into four categories represented by a 2x2 matrix.
Percentage of Techniques Used that Are Cash-
Increasing and External. This variable represents the per-
centage of all the bootstrapping techniques that a venture
used that were cash-increasing and external.These included
spousal financing, family and friend financing, and employer
financing.
Percentage of Techniques Used that Are Cash-
Increasing and Internal. This variable represents internal-
ly oriented cash-increasing techniques. It is operationalized
as the percentage of all of the bootstrapping techniques used
that fit these categories and included using a second mort-
gage, using credit cards, using personal financing, owner
investing, and continuing to work for others.
Percentage of Techniques Used that Are Cost-
Decreasing and External. This variable represents exter-
nally oriented cost-decreasing techniques. It includes using
free helper-provided services.
Percentage of Techniques Used that Are Cost-
Decreasing and Internal.This variable represents internal-
ly oriented cost-decreasing techniques and includes using
free owner-provided services.
To control for other explanations of why new ventures
become operational, we included several control variables.
Entrepreneurial Experience. Within the knowledge-
based organizational emergence stream, founders’ entrepre-
neurial experience (the number of new ventures an entre-
preneur or entrepreneurial team has helped start) and indus-
try experience has often been used as an indicator of knowl-
edge-based resources available to the firm. Entrepreneurial
experience, as measured by the number of new ventures an
entrepreneur or entrepreneurial team has helped start, has
been shown to be positively related to a new venture’s likeli-
hood of survival (Delmar and Shane, 2006; Klepper, 2001;
Stuart and Abetti, 1990; Taylor, 1999). Therefore we control
for entrepreneurial experience by using PSED item Q200 for
solo entrepreneurs and PSED item Q214 for teams.
Industry Experience. The startup team’s industry expe-
rience has been shown to be positively related to a new ven-
ture’s likelihood of survival (Bates and Sevron, 2000; Bosma,
van Praag, Thurik, and de Wit, 2004; Bruderl, Preisendorfer,
and Ziegler, 1992; Bruderl and Preisenforfer, 1998; Gimeno et
al., 1997; van Praag, 2003;Wicker and King, 1989). Therefore,
we control for industry experience (the number of cumula-
tive years of experience of all team members in the venture’s
industry) by using PSED item Q199 for solo entrepreneurs
and PSED item Q213 for teams.
Total Amount of Money Raised. Arguing from a
resource-based perspective, new venture researchers have
suggested that the amount of money provided to a startup
will relate positively to the likelihood that the venture will be
successful (Bruderl et al., 1992; Brush, Greene, and Hart,
2001; Shane and Stuart, 2002). The amount of money provid-
ed can include money raised by bootstrapping,but it can also
include money raised from traditional funding sources (i.e.,
loans and investments from parties not associated to the ven-
ture or its founders). Traditionally, the founders of new ven-
tures have experienced difficulty raising funds from tradition-
al sources (Stouder, 2002; Winborg and Landstrom, 2001).
Nevertheless, for those ventures that do receive funding from
traditional funding sources, this funding may increase their
likelihood of becoming operational.Therefore we control for
the amount of money that a venture has or will receive in
funding from traditional funding sources. This amount
includes money that a venture has or will receive from bank
loans, Small Business Administration loans, and venture capi-
talists.
Growth Propensity. New venture research has found
that the performance of a new venture, including whether a
venture successfully becomes an operational company,
depends, in part, on the threshold performance level of the
venture (i.e., the level of performance that the venture’s
founders view as acceptable; Gimeno et al., 1997).This find-
ing suggests that a lower threshold performance level would
allow a venture to exist for a longer period of time, which
may increase a venture’s likelihood of becoming an opera-
tional company.A way of capturing a founder’s threshold per-
formance is by determining his or her ambitions for the
future size of the venture. If the founder wants the venture to
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grow as large as possible, then his or her threshold perform-
ance might be low. That is, the founder may not be willing to
allow the new venture to flounder for a long period of time
without becoming operational. Conversely, if the founder
wants the venture to be a size that is manageable by a few
key employees and him or her, then the founder’s threshold
performance may be higher. That is, the founder may be will-
ing to allow the venture to grow slowly and take a while
before becoming operational. We used PSED item Q322 to
capture this variable.The item asks for the respondent’s pref-
erence for the future size of the venture.We coded this vari-
able as 0 if the respondent answered that he or she “wants a
size I can manage myself or with a few key employees,” and
we coded it as 1 if the answer was “I want it to be as large as
possible.”
Industry. Lastly, new venture research has suggested that
in some industries in which large barriers to entry exist (e.g.,
biotechnology industries), attaining successful performance
(e.g., becoming operational) may take a longer time than in
other industries (Stouder, 2002). To control for industry
effects, we coded each venture’s industry using the PSED
item SUSECT10 to identify a venture’s industry.This item cat-
egorizes a venture’s industry into 11 categories.We excluded
the industries that were not represented in the sample (i.e.,
mining and other). Eight dummy variables were then used to
represent whether the venture is in a given industry.They are
(1) agriculture, forestry, or fish industries; (2) construction;
(3) manufacturing; (4) transportation,communication,or util-
ities industries; (5) wholesale trade; (6) retail trade; (7) finan-
cial, insurance, or real estate industries; and (8) public admin-
istration. Services was the omitted industry.
Results
Descriptive statistics and correlations of the study variables
are displayed in Table 2.The correlations show that the four
independent variables, the percentages of techniques used
that are cash increasing and internal, cash increasing and
external, cost decreasing and internal, and cost decreasing
and external, are significantly and negatively correlated (r=-
.42, r=-.41, r=-.54, r=-.14, r=-.11, and r=-.28).This is expected
because the categories are interdependent in such a way that
collectively they sum to 1.00. Therefore, an increase in one
variable will often be related to decreases in other variables.
Table 3 displays the results of hypothesis testing. Because
of the binary nature of the dependent variable in the two
time periods examined, we used binary logistic regression to
test the hypotheses. Also, following the counsel of the PSED
architects (Gartner et al., 2004), we used weighted items in
our analyses.
Hypothesis 1 stated that among new ventures, those that
have founders who successfully employ a higher percentage
of cash-increasing bootstrapping techniques versus cost-
decreasing techniques will be more likely to become opera-
tional. Significant results at Time 2 indicate that the ventures
of founders who use a higher percentage of techniques that
are cash-increasing and external are more likely to become
operational than the ventures of those who use a lower per-
centage (b=3.12,Wald=5.61, p<.05).At Time 1, however, the
results do not indicate that cash-increasing techniques influ-
ence which ventures obtain positive cash flow. Taking into
account the results of both cash-increasing independent vari-
ables in both periods, it appears that the results are inconclu-
sive. Therefore, hypothesis 1 is not supported.
Hypothesis 2 stated that among new ventures, those that
have founders who successfully employ a higher percentage
of external bootstrapping techniques versus internal boot-
strapping techniques will be more likely to become opera-
tional. As noted above, significant results at Time 2 indicate
that the ventures of founders who use a higher percentage of
techniques that are cash-increasing and external are more
likely to become operational than the ventures of those who
use a lower percentage (b=3.12, Wald=5.61, p<.05).
Additionally,significant results at Time 1 indicate that the ven-
tures of founders who use a higher percentage of techniques
that are cost-decreasing and external are more likely to
become operational than the ventures of those who use a
lower percentage (b=1.53, Wald=4.03, p<.05). Taking into
account the results of all the external techniques, we find
that in both time periods, a higher percentage of external
techniques is related to a venture’s positive cash flow.
Therefore, hypothesis 2 is supported
Note that we used cumulative measures of the entrepre-
neurial experience and industry experience variables. That
is, to measure these items, we looked at the cumulative num-
ber of companies that all founders had helped start and the
cumulative number years of industry experience by all ven-
ture founders.We did so because we argued that the cumula-
tive experience of all founders would matter more to organi-
zational emergence than the mean experience of each
founder.This argument,however,suggests that founder teams
should have greater success at bringing a venture to organi-
zational emergence than solo founders, because founder
teams will generally have greater cumulative experience than
solo founders. To challenge this argument, we performed
supplementary analysis in which we recalculated entrepre-
neurial experience and industry experience to equal the
team means, and we then used these means in our analysis
instead of the cumulative items. The results did not signifi-
cantly change the results.
Discussion
Our major finding is that external bootstrapping techniques,
both cash-increasing and cost-decreasing, are positively
linked to successful organizational emergence. This study
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adds to the nascent entrepreneurship literature that is
increasingly showing that institutional forces that increase a
venture’s social legitimacy play large roles in determining
whether ventures become operational (Delmar and Shane,
2004;Tornikoski and Newbert, 2006). For new ventures seek-
ing to become operational, resources provided externally are
more valuable than resources provided internally. This may
be because external parties can provide a sense of legitima-
cy to new ventures that they do not obtain from internal
resources—and this legitimacy may contribute to a venture’s
becoming operational.
Conversely, internal bootstrapping techniques are not sig-
nificantly related to a venture’s becoming operational. The
key difference between external and internal techniques that
may allow external techniques to be significantly related to
the likelihood of a venture’s becoming operational may be
largely due to the greater sense of legitimacy that successful-
ly employed external techniques offer.
In drawing conclusions from this study, our evidence sug-
gests that the use of external bootstrapping techniques at
least partially meets the requirements of explaining causality.
That is, to try to show a causal link between bootstrapping
techniques and organizational emergence, we lagged the col-
lection of the dependent variable. In addition, we included
several control variables. The relationship between external
bootstrapping practices and organizational emergence
remain significant after control variables are entered into the
equation. However, there may be other factors that we have
not considered that might offer a competing explanation.
The study does have some limitations.First, it is somewhat
limited because the PSED collected data related to only 10
bootstrapping variables,and previous bootstrapping research
has identified 32 bootstrapping techniques (Winborg and
Landstrom, 2001). In addition, our theoretical framework is
partially derived from institutional theory, but we did not
directly examine conformity to institutional norms. Instead
we examined the successful result of external bootstrapping
(i.e., whether founders were able to obtain resources from
outside the venture).We assumed that if founders successful-
ly employed external techniques, they must have conformed
to institutional norms.
We suggest three ways in which this study could seed
future research. First, it would be useful to verify if the inter-
nal/external and cost-decreasing/cash-increasing schema we
used to categorize bootstrapping techniques is adequate
when using the 32 bootstrapping techniques previously
identified (Winborg and Landstrom, 2001). Second, future
research should include measures of legitimacy-seeking
behavior in order to confirm our argument that external
techniques are more efficacious because they conform to
institutional theory arguments. Third, the study could be
broadened to analyze other legitimacy seeking behaviors. For
example,one way that founders may attempt to gain legitima-
cy is by managing the impression of their ventures in the
eyes of important stakeholders and potential stakeholders
(Elsbach, 1994). Thus, future research could examine
whether the successful employment of certain impression
management techniques influences external stakeholders,
and consequentially, a venture’s likelihood of becoming oper-
ational.
This research has some obvious implications for practice.
Our results indicate that ventures moving toward emergence
are more likely to be successful by employing externally ori-
42 NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP
Table 3. Positive Cash Flow Regressed on
Bootstrapping Variables
Time 1 Time 2
Variable b Wald b Wald
Industry 1 -1.04 .87 .28 .09
Industry 2 .96 1.75 .98 1.02
Industry 3 -.74 1.12 -.97 .92
Industry 4 -.41 .14 -2.72 .00
Industry 5 .90 1.43 21.79 .00
Industry 6 -.86 4.89* -.14 .09
Industry 7 1.16 1.66 1.25 1.36
Industry 8 -20.79 .00 21.40 .00
Growth propensity .39 1.34 .20 .20
Entrepreneurial 
experience
-.03 .50 .04 2.17
Industry experience .04 3.97* .04 2.48
Total amount of money
raised
.00 1.21 .00 1.53
% of techniques used that
are cash increasing and
internal
.22 .31 .30 .35
% of techniques used that
are cash increasing and
external
-1.26 1.62 3.12 5.61*
% of techniques used that
are cost decreasing and
internal
.23 .05 -1.89 2.37
% of techniques used that
are cost decreasing and
external
1.53 4.03* .94 .93
Intercept -.41 .98 -1.62 10.23**
N 207 157
Chi-square 28.357 29.385
p .029 .021
-2 log likelihood 258.486 160.526
Cox & Snell R2 .128 .171
Nagelkerke R2 .171 .243
-p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
Note: The independent variables, including the bootstrapping ques-
tions,were only asked in the first wave of data collection—at Time 0
Omitted industry = the services industry
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ented bootstrapping techniques that both increase cash and
decrease costs. Reliance on internally oriented techniques is
not significantly associated with organizational emergence.
In conclusion this research makes some significant contri-
butions. First, it provides new insights into bootstrapping, an
important facet of venture emergence that has not received
a great deal of research attention. Second, it goes beyond sim-
ply describing bootstrapping by showing that external tech-
niques are more efficacious with respect to the successful
emergence of a new venture than internal techniques.Third,
it is able to provide some evidence for causality by examin-
ing relationships across multiple time periods. Finally, the
results are not likely to be influenced adversely by recall bias
because the PSED data were collected during the process of
organizational emergence at multiple time periods.
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T hrough the framework of Michael Porter’s fiveforces, this article compares sustainability in theOregon and British Columbia wine industries.After
describing the contrasting characteristics of the green
niche model and the government-led model of environ-
mental change, the article analyzes the emerging chal-
lenges for each type of change.The distinct sources for prof-
itability and future innovation suggests diversity within
the sustainability movement and two very different
processes of translating environmental values into entre-
preneurial practice.
Keywords: green niche; entrepreneurship and sustainability;
business and environmental sustainability
A growing number of entrepreneurs in Oregon’s wine indus-
try demonstrate strong commitment to sustainability. With
diversity and grassroots collaboration, winery owners are
changing practices through a network of support that fos-
ters individual creativity at the same time that it institution-
alizes cooperation and collective innovation. As a contrast-
ing case, the wine industry in British Columbia includes
some front runners of sustainability but the changes are
guided by government standards and regulations. Both of
these northwest regions enjoy reputations as a “green” state
and a “green” province relative to the other states and
provinces in their respective countries. However, the path
toward adopting sustainable practices in Oregon’s wine
industry through a grassroots green niche contrasts with the
government-oriented model in British Columbia. Through
purposive case studies, this article unpacks the entrepre-
neurial contexts and characteristics of these very different
processes of transforming environmental values into busi-
ness practices. After describing the differences of these two
types of sustainability paths, the emerging challenges are
outlined through the lens of Michael Porter’s five forces
model of industry analysis.Contrasting sources for profitabil-
ity in the respective regions and implications for future
research are explored in the conclusion.
Market, Government, and Green Niche:
Entrepreneurship Models for Environmental
Change
In 1968 Garrett Hardin predicted the “tragedy of the com-
mons” because individuals would not easily absorb addition-
al costs for the collective good. Within the more recent
trends of sustainability, one model for environmental change
suggests that marketization and privatization (which implies
the driving forces of supply and demand rather than regula-
tion) are the ideal vehicles for change (Porter and Kramer
2003, 2006; O’Neill 2004; Conklin 2010). This sustainability
path implies that entrepreneurs can earn the traditional prof-
it rewards by adopting green products, green processes, and
green marketing. In recent years, there are success stories of
green markets that affirm the possibilities of privatizing the
solutions to common pool problems (Baumol 2007). Many
entrepreneurs not only are incorporating the externality
costs into their production processes voluntarily, but also
they are benefiting from the decisions through profits
(Porter and Kramer 2003, 2006; Conklin 2010; see also
Sustainability in the Supply Chain 2007). Further, some theo-
rists have argued that not only is the market mechanism
capable of introducing innovations to support environmental
recovery, but the market may be better equipped than gov-
ernment to deal with the complexity of the environment
(O’Neill 2004).
Another model of environmental change centers on the
conceptualization of the environment as a public good and
therefore the necessary role of government to secure its pro-
tection (Ostrom 1990). Like other public goods, individual
rational practices contribute to seemingly irrational and
potentially devastating outcomes (Olson 1965). In defining
the best role for government, recent discussions have
weighed the ways in which government can be most effec-
tive along the lines of centralization/decentralization, regula-
tory/responsive, extent of participation and extent of pub-
lic/private cooperation (Dovers 2005; Paehlke and Torgerson
2005).
Both market and government models of environmentalism
carry a perception of the entrepreneur as individualistic and
motivated by cost benefit analysis of existing profit opportu-
nities, independent of “values,” community, and collective
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innovation. However, Anderson (1998) affirmed that the
entrepreneur is not (merely) a profit-seeking automaton but
he or she often brings more collective interest values into
business practices (for a concise summary of emerging
trends with Corporate Social Responsibility, see Conklin
2010). If both profit values and moral values characterize the
entrepreneur, then the puzzle becomes unleashing the
“Garden of Eden” values so as to recognize emerging oppor-
tunities. There has been modest attention to environmental
values in studies of entrepreneurship, but Carsrud and
Johnson’s (1989) seminal work placed entrepreneurship suc-
cess as a byproduct and potential beneficiary of social invest-
ments.From this perspective, several studies of entrepreneur-
ship incorporated culture and community as a potential ben-
efit for entrepreneurship (Anderson and Jack 2002;
Frederking 2004; Zhang and Wong 2008) but also as defining
a type of entrepreneurial practice distinct from an individual
oriented model (Steyaert and Hjorth 2006; Nicholls 2006;
Besser, Miller, Perkins 2006;Townsend and Hart 2008).
Johnstone and Lionais (2004) presented community as a
distinct type or stage of entrepreneurial process focused on
community benefits rather than personal profit (226). A
more recent contribution by Seyfang and Smith (2007) incor-
porated these social factors of values, community, and collec-
tive innovation as central features of an alternative model of
environmental change. In contrast to market or government
solutions, Seyfang and Smith (2007) identified the possibility
of endogenous, community-driven change around environ-
mental issues.They emphasized the importance of communi-
ty action as a source for both innovation and policy forma-
tion in sustainability. With their theoretical emphasis on
bridging the diverse literatures of innovation and communi-
ty action, through identification of the particular characteris-
tics of the community as a green niche, Seyfang and Smith
called for qualitative analysis to understand the conditions
for adoption of new practices and the process of change
(599). The Oregon case offers this type of empirical study of
a green niche, and with the contrasting case of British
Columbia, provides empirical insight into the conditions,
process, and limitations of green niches.
The concept of green niche provides a rich distinction
from the sharp dichotomy of either market or government
and it emphasizes grassroots emergence and community
focus. In this way, the Oregon case of green niche contributes
to discussions of entrepreneurship as “relationally and com-
munally constituted” (Katz and Steyaert 2004). Focusing on
entrepreneurship as a societal phenomenon, Fletcher (2006)
presented a framework identifying different relational types.
Fletcher emphasized social structure and its central role in
the entrepreneurial process and, like Seyfang and Smith,
addressed the missing piece in empirical research.While her
research included background experiences and networks,
much less attention was given “to the wider societal,econom-
ic or cultural structures or patterns that shape entrepreneur-
ship practices” (425).This article extends Fletcher’s study to
emphasize how an entrepreneur adopts opportunities, like
sustainability, and its impact on the collective possibilities for
future change.
Methodology
Both Oregon and British Columbia represent critical cases in
the study of environmental change. Precisely from their cut-
ting-edge position (Wine Spectator 2007) they are purposive
cases providing greater understanding about two different
types of processes translating values into practice.The British
Columbia case, through interviews with winery owners,
revealed the process and implications of government-orient-
ed sustainability, while the Oregon winery owners guided an
understanding of a grass-roots, green niche path toward sus-
tainability.
After five years of informal observation and discussions
with workers in the Oregon industry, the interviewees were
selected in order to understand the very different types of
practices that make up the sustainability movement for
Oregon wineries. The winery owner interviewees are self-
recognized as pioneers in terms of sustainability and they
mutually recognize each other for the differences and simi-
larities of their perceptions and practices within the com-
munity. The respondent-driven sample1 emerged from the
first two interviews with Sallie Schullinger-Krause of Oregon
Environmental Council and Susan Sokol Blosser (wine
owner identified through Wine Spectator 2007) with the
goal to understand the process (Yin 1993, 34) of adopting
sustainability practices, and in particular, the social and val-
ues context of change within the Oregon and British
Columbia wine industry. I conducted 16 interviews with
entrepreneurs in the wine industry who have shifted farm-
ing and business practices toward great sustainability. Eight
were in Oregon, of which six were with Oregon vineyard
and winery owners, including a vineyard owner and owner
of Oregon Vineyard Supply (supplier for 90% of Oregon vine-
yards), a representative from the Oregon Environmental
Council, and the executive director of the Oregon Wine
Board. In British Columbia, I conducted seven interviews
with BC vineyard and winery owners and one with a trade
representative of BC Wine Institute. Questions (Table 1)
focused on motivation, innovation, perception of relation-
ships with other winery owners, and reflections on the com-
munity in terms of industry and in terms of potential wider
communities of sustainability.
The comparative framework contrasts two very different
processes of translating environmental values into entrepre-
neurial practice. Certainly, any comprehensive explanation of
the differences between Oregon and British Columbia sus-
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tainability practices extends into differences within the soci-
etal, economic, and cultural contexts of these two regions.
Explaining the causes for these contrasting paths is deter-
mined by these broader differences in government,economy,
and society. However, the goal of this article is to probe these
information-rich cases [“information-rich cases are those
from which one can learn a great deal about issues of central
importance to the purpose of the inquiry” (Patton 2002,
173)]. This study cannot explain comprehensively why the
different models of change exist but explores “the themes
and parameters of the problem” (Moustakas 1990, 117) to
understand how these different models impact the individual
decisions about sustainability, the particular practices an
entrepreneur adopts, and the consequences of sustainability
within the industry. There are two models of transition from
environmental values into entrepreneurial practices: (1) a
grassroots-driven, green niche model, and (2) a government-
directed model. Rather than explaining why one and not the
other, this article uncovers the process of change within each
system in terms of business practices and the subsequent tra-
jectory of sustainability.
Oregon’s Wineries: Sustainability Through
Collaboration
Wine grapes reach 10 in the top 40 list of value from Oregon’s
agricultural commodities. Nevertheless, this is a relatively
small producing industry with output of a modest 1 percent
of national wine grapes produced, and a total of 13,000 acres
with a value of $68,400,000 (Oregon Department of
Agriculture). Compared to British Columbia, Oregon’s wine
grape production is approximately twice as large with BC at
7,000 acres and a value of $36,856,597 (British Columbia
Wine Institute 2007). Certainly, Oregon’s wine industry is
unique in terms of the number of wineries adopting sustain-
ability practices. Many grape growers adopt sustainability
practices without applying for formal certification, making
aggregate data and direct comparisons difficult. However, one
of the interviewees, Kevin Chambers, is a grape grower and
also an Oregon supplier of equipment, products, and advisor
to approximately 85 percent of all grape growers in the
region. He estimates that while only 25 percent adopt formal
certification, there is an excess of 40 percent of Oregon’s
grape growers practicing sustainability at some level of certi-
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Table 1. Interview Questions
1. Please share your story about the history of the winery.
2. Describe how your winery fits into the Oregon/BC wine industry?
3. How would you describe the relationship among wineries in the Oregon wine industry?
4. What are some examples to support this description?
5. Describe how the Oregon/BC wine industry is similar/different from other regions?
6. Describe your “green story.”
7. How does your “green story” compare to other wineries within Oregon/BC?
8. How do you perceive Oregon/BC wineries in terms of sustainability compared to other
regions? In particular how do you compare the sustainability efforts within your wine indus-
try with other regions?
9. What are some examples to support this description?
10. Compare Oregon/BC wine industry in terms of sustainability with other Oregon/BC indus-
tries—for example nursery industry and other agricultural products?
11. What is the relationship between wine industry and other industries in terms of sustainabili-
ty in particular? Do you have examples of cooperation? Conflict?
12. What role has government played in terms of sustainability and Oregon/BC wine industry?
13. Specific examples?
14. What is the ideal role of government in terms of sustainability and wine industry?
15. Specific examples?
16. How does the wine industry lobby government?
17. What are examples where government, nonprofit organizations have pushed sustainability
forward? Backward?
18. Do you see or have any evidence of the ways in which cooperation within the wine industry
about sustainability issues has led to cooperation over other issues or with other activities?
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fication.
Like many other agricultural crops, grape farming is com-
monly associated with herbicides, pesticides, and other
chemical products throughout the growth cycle. The shift
toward sustainability involves reducing or eliminating the
use of these chemicals in an effort to restore the ecosystem
within which the farm exists and also to restore the natural
taste and nutrients of the particular crop.Central to the story
among Oregon winery owners is the diversity in the adop-
tion of sustainability practices.
• In the 1980s Ted Casteel and Pat Dudley of Bethel
Heights were looking for nonchemical solutions to
the toughest problems of grape growing from
mildew and weeds.
• Susan Sokol Blosser of Sokol Blosser winery attend-
ed a Natural Step training session in 1999 that initi-
ated an entirely new vision for her and the life of her
business.
• When Josh Bergstrom of Bergstrom winery began
farming grapes in Oregon in 1996, salespeople
offered products to eradicate the weeds,and the her-
bicide was effective enough that the weeds died but
the chemicals also severely threatened his vines,
most curiously leaving neon orange strips on them.
• Sam Tannahill is co-owner of the newly acclaimed
largest winery in Oregon,AtoZ. His early conscious-
ness about sustainability focused on his family and
personal food consumption. In the process of culti-
vating a healthier life, he extended the values into
his workplace.
• Kevin Chambers was a student at “Berkeley North”
(University of Oregon) and in 1974 he has intro-
duced to the “Earth First!”movement. He carried the
principles of organic and sustainability into his busi-
ness.
• For Stoller winery, it was the decision to build a win-
ery in 2002 that led Bill and Cathy Stoller to hire pre-
mium architects who suggested LEED (Leadership in
Energy and Environmental Design) certification as a
possible direction.
With their sustainability practices, these Oregon winery
owners do not fit with the assumption presented in the litera-
ture described above as the ‘tragedy of the commons’phenom-
enon. Similarly, the winery owners defy the generalized claim
that profit interests drive environmentalism. Josh Bergstrom of
Bergstrom Winery figures the biodynamic process adds
approximately $3,000 per acre. In spite of real costs that often
are not returned, and far removed from the authority of gov-
ernment regulation, individual entrepreneurs in this region’s
wine industry are choosing sustainable practices.
Oregon wineries are adopting environmental initiatives
independent of government action, legislation, and regula-
tion. In fact, all of the interviews confirm that those adopting
these environmental changes in the industry don’t want gov-
ernment regulation or guidance toward sustainability.Nor are
these vineyard and winery owners actively capturing the
economic benefits of their green products.They express con-
cern for government regulations that may not be appropriate
to distinct industries, and they all share a deep suspicion of
the green market label of “greenwashing”—cultivating or
manipulating a product’s origins solely to meet the appear-
ance of green qualities for consumer, but at the expense of
sacrificing quality.
For example, while all three of the winery owners who
farm biodynamically2 affirm the value of treating the vineyard
like an ecosystem, they are wary of associating their wines
with this brand certification as opposed to the quality of the
wine. Each expressed strong concern that the consumer
might be attracted to biodynamic as a brand and then taste a
wine of less quality and forever associate biodynamic wines
with poor quality.Whether correct or not, this perception is
a driving force in their unwillingness to push the environ-
mental association in a market context. And for many Oregon
winery owners, quality of environment issues are about
themselves and their relationship with the farming process,
not so much an interest of consumers.
British Columbia Wineries: Uniform
Certification and Marketing
In British Columbia, the government has played the central
role in development of the wine region and it continues to be
a central player in the movement toward sustainability. At the
same time, the market and the effort to capture profits from
“green” is also prominent. Winery owners view the govern-
ment’s standards and stakeholder interest as relevant factors
in considering the pace and effectiveness of change in prac-
tices. From government negotiations with native populations
at the provincial level over land rights, to federal interstate
trade negotiations and agreements with subsidies to grape
growers, the British Columbia wine region is a product of
active government participation and legislation. Differences
in soil and climate conditions can account for some of the
independence evident from interviews with winery owners.
There are approximately 60 varietals and the wine region rep-
resents desert-like terrain with the Sonora desert reaching
some of the most prestigious wineries and then lush vine-
yards circling the Okanagan Lake. Also significant is the sharp
divide between very established and high-producing wineries
within the region compared to the relatively new and small-
scale wineries. This contrasts with much great equality in
Oregon in terms of size and production of its wineries.
Collaboration is very limited and in contrast to the Oregon
region,winery owners in British Columbia work within exist-
ing political and economic institutions and have adopted sus-
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tainable practices that focus on a well-recognized standard
organic certification. Those adopting new standards heavily
market them to capture profit through branding in a tradi-
tional profit model.Whereas there are many types of certifi-
cations that define Oregon wineries in terms of sustainabili-
ty, certification is limited to organic in British Columbia. In
sharp contrast with Oregon winery owners’ reluctance to
market sustainability practices, there is a rush for some to
identify with organic standards even prior to formal certifica-
tions.At least one winery was threatened with a fraud lawsuit
for advertising organic without certifications.The early adop-
tion of sustainability practices has focused on existing gov-
ernment “organic” regulation much more than informal com-
munity networks. In contrast to new certifications and grass-
roots cooperation, government in British Columbia has been
a central focus as wineries try to change sulfite standards in
order to receive organic certification for wine production
(see Table 2 for convergence around organic certification). In
January 2009, the Certified Organic Associations of British
Columbia (COABC) adopted Canada Organic standards with
amendments that include higher level of sulfites to permit
organic wine production with better longevity characteris-
tics in terms of the bottled wine (CAN/CGSB-32.311
Permitted Substances). Rather than community-defined stan-
dards that reflect existing norms or community-defined
goals, action for sustainability is being adopted unilaterally
and is the focus for significant change taking place through
government.
Directly relevant in terms of participation in sustainability
transformation, British Columbia is the first provincial gov-
ernment to legislate mandatory carbon emissions standards.
While setting the standards for the future, it is up to individ-
ual industries to provide solutions. On the one hand, there is
independence to find practices compatible within the partic-
ular diverse industries, but on the other hand, it is necessary
to figure out new practices within a constrained time period.
The government is creating the incentive for those in the
wine industry to work together. According to several winery
owners, however, it is not clear whether the environment
will be an issue to overcome existing conflicts between small
and large producers. Instead of creating community, the
issues around creating and adopting new environmental stan-
dards could exacerbate conflict and it is not clear whether
small or large producers are in a better position to adapt to
new standards.
Table 2 identifies the very different practices across
Oregon wineries; descriptions of the different certifications
are described in the sidebar.
Comparing Green Niche and Government-
led Sustainability Through Porter’s Five
Forces
In 1980, Porter described a model of competitive strategy.
Firms may adopt strategies to manipulate any one of these
five forces in order to maximize profits. Similarly, intensity of
the characteristics overall suggests the level of returns for the
industry more generally. This is a useful framework to begin
to explore the evidence and implications of adopting sustain-
ability practices in terms of rivalry among existing competi-
tors, threat of new entrants, threat of substitutes, bargaining
power of suppliers, and the bargaining power of consumers
through these two different trajectories of change—one
green niche and the other government-led (Figure 1).3
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Figure 1. Trajectories of Change
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Rivalry Among Existing Competitors:
Oregon
In terms of collaboration and innovation, the community
wineries in Oregon have become an example of experimen-
tation through collective diversity, sharing, and cultivation of
best practices. For example, members of the community
experimented with organic wine production in addition to
organic farming and an emerging consensus dismissed it is as
an unacceptable set of procedures for good wine. Regularly,
Oregon State University scientists get together with a dozen
other winery owners to discuss ways to expand the techno-
logical frontier to make sustainability viable, available, and
economical. It is the evidence of these types of spontaneous
collective groups and cooperation that define the green
niche. For the Oregon green niche, its innovation is grass-
roots driven but it is spurred by articulation and cooperation
of community practices to groups outside of the green niche
(Pat Dudley of Bethel Heights).The green niche has institu-
tionalized diversity, and individual creativity, at the same time
that it has cultivated shared values, community, and coopera-
tion.
Innovation underlies competitive strategy and it is also an
important part of the green niche paradigm (Seyfang and
Smith 2007). An interesting characteristic of the green niche
entrepreneurship is how innovation emerges from the inter-
action between the deepening values within the community
and the effort to extend those values to other groups. In the
process of building bridges of values translated to main-
stream, they are developing unique grassroots-driven certifi-
cations and centers for grassroots research.The diversity of
environmental practices fosters a community of experimen-
tation with models of alternative paths to sustainability. The
winery owners of Bethel Heights led a grassroots group gen-
erating a new certification to include the diversity of sustain-
able practices. “Oregon Certified Sustainable” is pushing
beyond the vineyard to include the winery and wine-making
processes.The emerging branding image signifies and unifies
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Description of Organic, Biodynamic, LIVE, Salmon-
Safe
Demeter Certified Biodynamic
In a word, biodynamic farming is rigorous. It means growing
grapes and making wines completely free of synthetic pesticides
and fertilizers. A step further than organic, biodynamic farming
means managing the entire farm (or vineyard) as a living organ-
ism, with a high degree of self-sufficiency.
The Demeter Association is the world’s leader in biodynamic cer-
tification and awareness. It has a long history of promoting sus-
tainability, dating back to 1928, when it was founded to support
and promoted the biodynamic agricultural methods of Rudolf
Steiner. The U.S. Demeter Association certified its first farm in
1982.
LIVE, Inc.
Low Input Viticulture & Enology, Inc. (LIVE, Inc.) is a program that
certifies vineyards for following international guidelines for envi-
ronmental stewardship, social responsibility, and economic
accountability. LIVE, Inc. also provides education and resources to
winegrowers interested in sustainable farming.
Oregon Tilth Certified Organic
Many of Oregon’s wineries are certified organic through Oregon
Tilth, which has been a leader in certification since 1974. Oregon
Tilth is an internationally recognized organization of organic farm-
ers, gardeners, and consumers who are dedicated to biologically
sound and socially equitable agriculture.Their goal is to educate
people about the need to develop and use sustainable growing
practices that promote soil health,conserve natural resources, and
prevent environmental degradation while producing a clean and
healthful food supply.
Salmon-Safe
Founded in 1995 by an Oregon-based river and native fish protec-
tion organization, Salmon-Safe has become one of the nation’s
leading regional eco-labels. Erosion and runoff from hillside vine-
yards can bring silt into streams, reducing the ability of native
salmon to survive. Salmon-Safe has partnered with LIVE, VINEA,
and Oregon Tilth to work with pioneering wine grape growers to
protect Oregon’s important salmon watersheds. Since first certify-
ing vineyards in the Willamette Valley more than a decade ago,
Salmon-Safe has certified 110 Oregon vineyards representing a
third of Oregon’s wine grape acreage.
Table 2. Sustainability Certifications 
across Samples of Oregon and BC Wineries
Oregon Wineries Sustainability Certification
AtoZ Biodynamic practices (no certification)
Organic Farming (no certification)
Bergstrom Biodynamic
Bethel Heights LIVE
Resonance Biodynamic
Sokol Blosser Natural Step
Organic Farming
Salmon Safe Certification
Stoller LEED
Salmon Safe Certification
British Columbia Wineries Sustainability Certification
Blue Mountain None (native species preservation)
Lotusland Organic Farming
Organic Wine
Mission Hill None (native species preservation)
Rollingdale Organic Farming
Organic Wine
Summerhill Organic Farming
Quails’ Gate Organic Farming (1991–1997)
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all vineyards and wineries that have adopted the practices
and performance criteria for any other sustainable certifica-
tion.There is much more marketing potential with one clear
symbol that identifies the Oregon wine industry only and
also represents a set of practices that fosters sustainability.
This new certification represents a shift from identity forma-
tion toward capturing the market benefits from these identi-
ties.Through the Oregon Certified Sustainable label, the com-
munity preserves its environmental diversity and competi-
tiveness, while articulating a vehicle for mainstream educa-
tion, and collective market potential.
Table 3 summarizes the contrasts between the two paths
toward sustainability in terms of innovation, motivation, and
relationships of bridge building and collaboration with gov-
ernment and other environmental groups.
Whereas the single “organic” certification is the focus for
change in British Columbia,Oregon continues to foster diver-
sity. Curiously, its innovation as a green niche community
emerges from the encouraged diversity of practices as well as
its effort to coordinate and articulate values to groups out-
side of the community. At the same time as the extension of
values and articulation of community pushes innovation, it is
shifting into more formalized political interests and profit-ori-
ented marketization through “Oregon certified sustainable”as
a uniform certification. In spite of the grist for innovation and
deepening cooperation within the community, the emerging
politicization and marketization also shows signs of tension
with early motivating values. How this balance can be main-
tained—a balance of deepening values within the communi-
ty and expanding influence of values beyond the communi-
ty—depends upon leaders who both initiated community
and continue to push their sustainability values in other sec-
tors. In particular, as the Oregon green niche shifts from
propagating stronger identity-oriented values within the
community toward a balance between goals—thicker envi-
ronmental values and ties within the community—it also
spreads influence through more formal interest-oriented pol-
itics and more marketable uniform certifications. Through
leadership, nonmarket principles and early environmental
decisions nurtured this green niche with a focus on the
intrinsic benefits of the transformations. As the green niche
extends the influence and relevance of these values into the
broader political and economic and cultural context, there is
a feedback effect as the green niche responds to the chang-
ing broader context that it helped to create.
Rivalry Among Existing Competitors: 
British Columbia
While each winery owner in British Columbia affirmed the
value and responsibility to shepherd the environment, many
have realized that some practices, often those pressed by
environmental groups through government,have unintended
consequences that produce much more harm than benefit.
For these wineries, decisions to adopt new practices are
more cautious than driven, more incremental than innova-
tive, less oriented around certification standards, and more
concerned with deriving measures appropriate for the par-
ticular vineyards of the winery. For example,Tony Stewart of
Quails’ Gate contributed to the diversity of sustainability
practices and also suggested the potential to “market” orien-
tation of the entire region for sustainable wines. Their com-
prehensive practices range from replacing traditional vehi-
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Table 3. Characteristics of Niche-driven and Government-oriented Sustainability
Innovation Motivation Relationship with
Government/
Environmental
Groups
Collaboration
Green Niche Diversity of 
sustainable 
practices and 
certifications
LIVE
Organic
Biodynamic
Salmon Safe
Intrinsic benefits
Collective culture
Independent from market
and profit motive
Active branding around
sustainability
absent in early stages
Fear of losing brand
around 
quality
Partnership with
government and
environmental
groups
Creating standards
together
Cross-industry 
collaboration
Government-
oriented 
sustainability
Uniformity
organic
Actively marketing even
prior to 
certification
Regulated and moti-
vated by govern-
ment standards and
regulations
Responsive to 
environmental
groups
Government regulation 
establishes uniformity 
across industries without
endogenous collaboration
within or between 
industries
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cles with more efficient models, recycling restaurant waste to
a biodiesel company, switching the irrigation system from
overhead to drip, and changing packaging materials for ship-
ping and wine bags.While they were certified from 1991 to
1997, they have continued low-impact practices but also
maintain flexibility for adopting different strategies that may
extend beyond organic recommendations.After the practices
were in place in the early 1990s, Stewart began to question
the overarching wisdom of some of them in terms of environ-
mental sensitivity. For example, instead of some pesticides
and herbicides, organic practices recommend using chicken
manure. However runoff from the chicken manure into the
lake raised questions, from his perspective, about communi-
ty health standards even more than some of the chemical
applications.Similarly, less product means more runs through
the vineyards with machines to keep up with weeds and
plants that can harm the vines. The benefits of a chemical-
free vineyard can confront the unsustainable outcome of
using tractors too much,and potentially contributing soil ero-
sion through excessive hoeing. Stewart felt his approach is in
line with the environmental movement but certification is
not a priority, and indeed, certification can become a detri-
ment if it is not accompanied by attention to the overriding
goal of meaningful and comprehensive sustainability. Unlike
the Oregon case, his decisions are independent of other
wineries and removed from a community of cooperation.
Ian Mavety, winery owner of Blue Mountain, bought land
in 1971 and grew grapes for other wineries until 1995 when
he began to make his own estate wines. His fertilizers are
either compost or organic, and since 1997, when his son
joined the business, he has continued to search for sustain-
able remedies like more mechanical means for weed control
rather than herbicides and biodynamic sprays. Close to the
Sonora Desert, there are soil and topography limits that pose
additional challenges for finding the right equipment. In
terms of sustainable solutions, Mavety looks to France much
more than the local community. The diversity of soil and cli-
mate makes it unreasonable to share information within the
wine industry community. His goals for more sustainable
practices are philosophical, and focus on the quality of wine
product as well as minimizing water use through reservoirs
filled with snow pack, for example. Like Stewart at Quails’
Gate, Mavety questions the drive of some environmental tra-
jectories without contingency thinking. In response to one
group, he willingly put in Moor gates so that the deer could
graze in his vineyard only to realize that the fence sometimes
trapped the deer inside and made them easy prey for cougars
and packs of dogs. In another instance,Nature Trust confront-
ed him when he tore down trees in the process of clearing
the path for his water pipeline. He tried to shift his path to
accommodate their demands. However, since a devastating
fire in 2003, people recognized that overpopulation of trees
without clearing could contribute to forest fire crises.Blindly
whipping up the cause of tree preservation could miss pro-
tection of the environment’s life cycle, and sometimes cause
further damage
Dan Zepponi, President of Mission Hill, admitted that the
sustainability measures in the region are largely ad hoc at this
point, but he suggested that it could become a platform for
the region. Dan perceived the marketing potential for the
wine industry, especially given Canada’s reputation as a
“purist”country, in terms of the wider picture of the environ-
ment. Recognizing the lack of cohesion compared to
Washington and Oregon in terms of varietals and coopera-
tion, the sustainability issue could be a central point for
organization and enhancing cooperation. Zepponi also artic-
ulated the complexity of the sustainable trajectory but he
was optimistic that certain areas could be a focus for work-
ing together in the future. For example, whereas water recla-
mation has taken place on a small scale, it is possible to cre-
ate regional change through cooperative efforts.
Threat of New Entrants
As a value, sustainability advocates support widespread adop-
tion,but as an industry competing with traditional wine mak-
ing, there can be advantages to more limited adoption of sus-
tainable practices. Considering Porter’s five forces, the com-
petitiveness of sustainability through either the green niche
model or government-led model fosters a competitive advan-
tage in terms of weakening the threat of new entrants. If one
assumes that the thick relationships describing Oregon’s
green niche evolve from the sustainability interest and carry
into other areas of doing business, it may serve as a barrier for
potential new entrants into the wine industry as well as the
niche itself.With the British Columbia case, government reg-
ulation in terms of sustainability can also create a barrier to
entry (Porter 1980), especially for the current wine produc-
ers.The costs of shifting practices to become sustainable may
be more prohibitive than for the potential new entrants to
the industry. Whether sustainability manifests in grassroots
green niche or government regulation, entry barriers are cre-
ated. It may be that government’s role in the industry exacer-
bates barriers to community building around the sustainabil-
ity issue as well.When government directs and sets the pace
of sustainability, it becomes the focus for incentives and deci-
sions. Rather than emerging standards from the grassroots
community, in this model standards are imposed (Sherman
1991). When there is negotiation, it is between winery and
government, and it takes the form of lobbying rather than
cooperation. Because lobbying offers an advantage to large
numbers,perhaps the wineries in British Columbia can foster
greater cooperation and community as they begin to recog-
nize solidarity of interests in response to government action.
Even so, this type of cooperation as a response to govern-
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ment decisions reinforces government’s central role in defin-
ing, legislating, and regulating sustainability. And while coop-
eration within the industry may still emerge, interviews sug-
gest much more independence, skepticism around practices
pressured by environmental groups and government, and a
market competitive focus in terms of decisions to adopt
more sustainable practices.
Threat of Substitutes
Considering nonsustainable wine as the substitute for sus-
tainable wine, the green niche model poses much more
threat in terms of substitutes. Under market pressure, one
might expect that suppliers and producers will abandon
more costly practices of sustainability for the traditional
products. However, the Oregon green niche is creating a
brand that preserves diversity of practice and flexibility to
incorporate innovation appropriate for the wine industry.
Community orientation on values suggests that change
occurs but with consultation, community pressure, and
accountability around the overarching goals of preserving
sustainability values, and secondarily, fostering a competitive
advantage for the region.The goal of the region is to preserve
quality with integrity. In contrast, British Columbia organic
suggests a trend toward brand distortion. Innovation is ori-
ented around best practices to create wine that meets gov-
ernment standards, whether or not those standards are apt
for the wine industry.
Certainly, sustainability imposed through government reg-
ulations eliminates the threat of substitution between sus-
tainable and nonsustainable wine. Nonsustainable wine
becomes viable only through illegal distribution. However,
while government regulation sets uniform standards, it also
entrenches those standards with the risk of missing opportu-
nities to develop new, more innovative ones. Also problemat-
ic is the risk of appropriate implementation. Mazmanian and
Sabatier argued that “the most damaging criticism raised
against regulatory programs is that they are often unable to
achieve their stated objectives” (1983, 351). It is not only
beyond the scope of this article to analyze all six criteria that
they identity can increase the likelihood that government
achieves its objectives, but it is also much too early to fully
recognize government regulatory success in British
Columbia.However, their analysis of the extensive challenges
suggests skepticism around government solutions to sustain-
ability.
While strong government regulation of environmental
standards prevents the possibility for substitutes of sustain-
able wine, it also establishes an incentive to change the prod-
uct to accommodate standards rather than creating standards
to fit with the innovation possibilities of the product. Among
Oregon winery owners there were expressions of disdain
and frustration with the possibility of government responsi-
bility for initiating, developing, and regulating sustainable
practices.For example, in the interviews every winery owner
praised but also lamented the organic label.On the one hand,
it sets a standard for reduced chemicals and this is good for
the end product and its education potential for the consumer
has been significant. However, at the same time that it has set
a standard for certification,Oregon wineries perceive the bar
too low: these federal regulations will continue to attract
businesses that settle and celebrate with substandard prac-
tices. They protest the weak standards, but they also oppose
the lack of flexibility or appropriateness of the standards for
wineries. In particular, while wine growers can comply with
certification for organic farming, organic principles for pro-
cessing grapes into wine can be devastating for the final
product. Organic certification for the final wine product
requires that no sulfites be used throughout the processing.
Sulfites are essential for the preservation of wine. Without
them, wine turns to fizzy pop ready to implode—certainly
not good drinking and definitely not a good cellar product. It
makes sense that no winery aspires for the organic label on
the wine bottle. British Columbia wineries adopting sustain-
able practices gravitate toward the uniform standard of
organic and lobby government to change the benchmarks of
organic.Oregon wineries have the collective action potential
to affect change through government, but it is clear that they
want to preserve diverse sustainability practices.
Uniformly and independently, Oregon winery owners
share a perspective that organic certification generally has
become diluted. For example, one winery owner asserted
that the goodness of organic certification becomes especial-
ly weakened when consumers buy organic produce from dis-
tant places. The cooling systems for preservation and the
transportation systems that allow the organic product to be
sold to the U.S. consumer may cause more environmental
destruction than any wider collective environmental benefit
from the farming practice. So while organic may provide a
good benchmark for sustainability practices, Oregon winer-
ies will continue to benefit from ongoing diversity and com-
petition around sustainability practices. In contrast, the gov-
ernment orientation around organic guides British Columbia
wineries to focus on this sustainability measure and practice.
Bargaining Power of Suppliers
Another challenge of the transformation from niche into
mainstream comes from the entrepreneurial leadership and
the relationship between the grape growers and wine pro-
duction. In Oregon, Bergstrom winery owns its own acreage
but the winery has also purchased grapes from local grow-
ers. Over the years Josh Bergstrom has encouraged growers
to consider more biodynamic farming techniques but the
resistance has been significant. They have ended relation-
ships with some of those growers and established new long-
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term contracts with growers to farm new acreage along the
guidelines set by biodynamics. Similarly, as the largest winery
in Oregon, AtoZ purchases grapes from many growers
throughout the area. Part of its five-year strategic plan
includes ultimatums to these growers to adopt more sustain-
able practices or risk losing their annual buyer. It is clear that
these winery owners will make a difference in fundamental-
ly shifting the industry paradigm in Oregon to adopt more
sustainable practices. From an environmental perspective,
this particular outcome is ideal and the process of power and
influence may be comfortable and entirely expected as those
within the community become more certain of the impor-
tance of change, and as they wield more strength within the
industry. However, it is unclear whether the more clearly
defined “power” approach eventually undermines the com-
munity characteristics that drive sustainability creativity and
possibilities.
In contrast, the uniformity of government regulation
affects practices of all grape growers and does not require
pressure from individual wine makers.Within this trajectory
of sustainability, suppliers of grapes gain some bargaining
power in relation to the wine producers. They can pass on
the costs of transitioning their crops at the same time that
they reap the benefits of any tax breaks or incentives that
come through government regulation.
Bargaining Power of Consumers
The brand “Oregon Certified Sustainable”translates the diver-
sity of good sustainability practices into a uniform brand for
consumer education and recognition. The adoption of
Oregon Certified Sustainable as a marketing label carries the
possibility of enhancing the viability of Oregon wineries’ sus-
tainable practices. In particular, as the brand identification
becomes a profit mechanism, the numbers and commitment
of other wineries likely will increase. As a brand it identifies
independent certification (LIVE, organic, biodynamic certifi-
cations qualify), responsible agriculture, and responsible
winemaking. Ted Farthing, executive director of the Oregon
Wine Board, emphasized the importance of bringing togeth-
er all the diverse practices into identifiable brand recogni-
tion. Although at this point no wine region has captured a
market-oriented environmental niche, given the increasing
number of Oregon wineries adopting these practices,sustain-
ability seems a very promising area for regional recognition
and association for consumers. With the bargaining power
currently residing with consumers, there is a critical need to
educate them about the meaning of sustainability in terms of
wine.The 2007 Final Full Glass Research Oregon Wine Board
Study revealed that many consumers are not sure what sus-
tainable wine is, and that although wine consumers tend to
be more oriented toward sustainability purchases, this does
not translate into the purchase of sustainable wine as a prior-
ity consideration. The creation of a uniform brand, even
while environmental practices remain diverse, is a significant
bridge moving from the community green niche of some
Oregon wineries to more mainstream identification of
greater numbers within the industry.
Government regulation eliminates the choice that gives
consumers bargaining power in the green niche model.
However, as much as government guides sustainability prac-
tices, consumers remain powerful in terms of lobbying and
voting. Oregon winery relationships with environmental
groups can be characterized as much more of a partnership
than adversarial relationship. This kind of alliance is unique
compared to other regions. An interview with the Oregon
Environmental Council confirmed the ways in which a signif-
icant state environmental lobbying group perceives the wine
industry as a potential leader in adopting best practices. The
council identified a sharp divide within the industry that
puts Oregon’s wine industry on the right side of the environ-
mental effort. Oregonians for Food and Shelter, Rural Coop
utilities, Oregon’s Cattleman Association, and Dairy Farmers
of Oregon represent traditional farming in contrast to wine
representing a new direction and potential partner for sus-
tainability. Through emerging initiatives described below,
Oregon brings together entrepreneurs across sectors and
industries,environmental groups,and government in partner-
ship toward the goal of enhancing sustainability. In terms of
a bridge from community green niche to mainstream recog-
nition and influence, this model of partnership is critical for
ongoing successful transformation in the wider state commu-
nity. While there are obvious possibilities for extending the
relevance and influence of Oregon wineries as a model for
sustainability, there are also challenges that constrain the
transformation from community niche to mainstream. Some
of these challenges are intrinsic to the competing values of
community and market or community and mainstream, and
some of these challenges emerge from the encroaching role
of other stakeholders including government.
Government regulation can lead to uniform and compre-
hensive change. It removes the backdrop of consumer choice
that prevents many wine growers from bearing the addition-
al cost of sustainable crops. At the same time, government
becomes a permanent direct influence on the practices of
sustainability within the industry and this can prevent the
innovative shifts that come from a diversity practices frame-
work of the green niche.
Conclusion
The study of environmental values and the transformation
toward sustainability practices offers a rich set of cases to
emphasize social processes underlying entrepreneurship
more generally. The communities of Oregon and British
Columbia wineries present contrasting social processes and
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moves toward understanding how people enact sustainabili-
ty practices the way they do in relation to broader societal,
economic, and political processes (Fletcher 2006).
While the profitability of sustainability has not been the
focus of this article, several relevant observations contribute
to understanding the contrasting sources for profitability. In
Oregon, the green niche maximizes flexibility in terms of
experimental farming,collaborative decision-making,and cul-
tivating consumer demand toward sustainability while pre-
serving the opportunities from traditional farming as well.
The thick social relations characterizing the green niche,
social capital cannot be measured precisely but some studies
confirm that social capital gives business an edge in terms of
investment opportunities and cost savings (see Frederking
2007, 2004). Finally, the culture of innovation surrounding
the green niche continually pushes the production possibili-
ty curve and forwards cost cutting possibilities to maximize
the profitability of sustainability practices.The likely winners
within this industry are those producers who are able to dif-
ferentiate with both traditional and sustainability practices.
In this way, they are able to minimize risk while they culti-
vate consumer preferences for sustainable wines. Potential
losers within the Oregon industry include the new entrants
who are outside the niche, and also specialists in either sus-
tainable or traditional wines who may suffer from the
vagaries of market shifts.
In British Columbia, as government regulations prioritize
environmentalism, they can entrench consumer values and
decisively eliminate competition between firms in terms of
this strategy of sustainability. The government and wine pro-
ducers can promote profitability of the entire BC industry as
a specialized style within the global market. However, as long
as the costs for transition to sustainability are realized
through price, consumers end up losing the most in the tran-
sition. Where choice is already limited in British Columbia
through provincial regulations on supply from other
provinces as well as other countries, consumers may be
caught paying for more expensive and less desirable wines.
The most likely winners are the large producers who are in
a better position to influence provincial and national govern-
ment in terms of regulations, pace, and standards that benefit
them. These interests may benefit small producers. Certainly
low-cost, specialized wine producers who are not practicing
sustainably will likely lose in the transition as will high-cost
producers who want to experiment with practices that don’t
fit new regulations.
Table 4 summarizes the challenges between green niche
entrepreneurship and government-oriented sustainability.
For many Oregon entrepreneurs, sustainability is an
emerging issue of identity as much as interest. They reject
government intervention as the solution to environmental
degradation and as the foundation for rejuvenation.However,
they also reject the market drive for sustainability and they
are reluctant to participate in the wave of green profits. Over
time, however, ecopreneurs are organizing collectively in
ways that transform small communities focused on intrinsic
environmental values to more mainstream recognition and
identification. On the one hand, this transformation shifts
cooperative values and diverse practices into profitable and
institutionalized, therefore viable, enduring sustainability. On
the other hand, this transformation presents challenges in
terms of introducing power and profit to community-guided
values of sustainability.
The strength of the green niche is the innovation coming
from cooperation and evolving from the strategy to articulate
and “create value systems” (Sherman 1991). Power and profit
reflect these mainstream efforts and while they can generate
the next stage of sustainability, it may be at the expense of
the next round of creativity and cooperation. As the green
niche intersects with the wider public domain, it extends its
influence at the risk of compromising some of its core values
of community and informal communication. Anderson and
Smith (2007) articulated that the space of public and private
intersection can be a place of tension and, in accordance
with the characteristics identified by Seyfang and Smith, a
green niche can generate value change for the wider commu-
nities. As the case of Oregon wineries reveals, there is poten-
tial in the public and private intersection for innovation that
affects both the green niche and the values of the wider com-
munities. Cooperation with diversity of sustainability prac-
tices also maintains interfirm rivalry while orienting around
a regional competitive advantage. This win-win possibility
carries innovative possibilities that are not so present in the
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Table 4. Challenges of Niche-driven
Entrepreneurship and Government-oriented
Sustainability
Intrinsic Values and Diffusion
Challenges
Green Niche Diffusion through market and cross-sector
collaboration compromises intrinsic values
and core relationships.
Grassroots transformation shifts to power
transformation.
Government participation invites govern-
ment regulation.
Government-
oriented 
sustainability
Government practices are not likely to be
best practices.
Rather than value transformation entrepre-
neurial sustainability remains “greenwash-
ing.”
Inequality limits cooperation and limits abili-
ty to adapt creatively to government stan-
dards.
Compliance rather than values change.
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government-directed model. Where government regulates
and enforces, there is the possibility that firms lobby govern-
ment rather than innovate.
Another path of sustainability is government oriented.Not
surprisingly, the role of government in directing sustainable
entrepreneurship likely follows from a central role of govern-
ment in the industry prior to environmental expectations
and changes in sustainability practices. An existing frame-
work of regulatory policies and government directives mere-
ly incorporate the environmental needs of sustainability. In
this type of externally imposed context, industries respond
or adopt a strategy of adaptation (Sherman 1991) to govern-
ment standards more than creating innovative options to
environmental challenges. In effect, innovation among entre-
preneurs and around policy formation issues carries more
risk in settings such as Canada and in contrast to the United
States for example. There is an expectation that ultimately
government will determine its own standards with the
enforcement mechanism to ensure adaptation.While there is
less community and endogenous development of innovative
solutions to environmental problems and opportunities,
there are benefits from the government-led uniformity in
terms of standardization across industries and across coun-
tries. Studies of these two distinct types of social processes
underlying entrepreneurship suggests that transition from
government-led environmentalism to green niche is not like-
ly. At the same time, by Anderson and Smith’s conceptualiza-
tion of legitimizing entrepreneurship, the contrasting paths
of sustainable entrepreneurship may be a good fit for the
respective political and social contexts.
Future Research
It will be important to study the wine industry, specifically
the market viability of more sustainable wine, over time. By
measuring the change in national and international market
share of sustainable wines, it will become clear if sustainabil-
ity is a luxury interest that responds sensitively to recession-
ary market conditions. Comparing regions within each coun-
try provides additional insight about the relevance of nation-
al political and socioeconomic cues such as the history and
density of government intervention. In terms of future
research on sustainable entrepreneurship, it is essential to
incorporate contrasting paths toward the goals of sustainabil-
ity and environmental protection. To some extent there is a
path dependency and underlying affinity for government
intervention contributing to the government-led model in
British Columbia compared to the green niche model in
Oregon.
Whether managing a multinational company or a winery
start-up, these contrasting paths affect costs as well as the
culture of running a business. In Oregon, the potential as well
as increasing expectation for experimental farming and col-
laborative decision making is much higher. However, there is
also a layer of informality that lacks transparency for new-
comers, and carries relevance in terms of the investment
decisions and costs relevant for incorporating successful sus-
tainable practices. In British Columbia, the rules and expecta-
tions can be uniform and transparent, and the expectation to
utilize formal lobbying channels to influence sustainability is
more important and more likely to be a focus. In terms of sus-
tainability, it is government officials who are leading and set-
ting standards in British Columbia, whereas government offi-
cials in Oregon participate but follow the lead of green niche
outcomes with financial support, not so much regulatory
directives.
In 1776 Adam Smith developed the theory of the invisible
hand emphasizing the efficiency and effectiveness of the
marketplace for creating and managing change. Certainly, in
terms of self-regulation the Oregon wineries manifest this
principle more clearly than the British Columbia wineries.
However, while Adam Smith developed his theory of the
invisible hand in The Wealth of Nations (1776), he explored
the invisible hand concept in his earlier The Theory of Moral
Sentiments (1759). It is in this earlier opus that Smith articu-
lated the importance of community and social relations as a
foundation crucial for efficient and effective market rela-
tions. Here also, the Oregon wineries in this green niche cap-
italize on the moral sentiments as well as the market mecha-
nism to drive competitiveness. Smith’s emphasis on the
social fabric of economic exchange is often overlooked but
this case of sustainability affirms that informal relationships
may be as important as the formal market principles in terms
of maximizing long- run profitability and maximizing innova-
tion around more sustainable practices.
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Notes
1. Informal observations guided an initial selection and then these two interviews confirmed the sample as best representa-
tives of sustainability practices.
2. The three wineries from my sample that farm biodynamically are AtoZ (Sam Tannahill), Bergstrom (Josh Bergstrom), and
Resonance (Kevin Chambers).
3. According to Porter,“it is usually more illuminating to consider how government affects competition through the five com-
petitive forces than to consider it as a force in and of itself” (1980, 29).
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David Hartstein started KaBloom in 1998 with thegoal of creating “the Starbucks of Flowers.” He suc-cessfully built brand recognition for the garden-
like shops, but problems plagued the young organization.
Nearly three years and one recession later, KaBloom failed
to live up to Hartstein’s forecast of exponential growth.This
case has been designed for a graduate-level course in entre-
preneurship/innovation. Students can compare franchis-
ing with other business models, examine the impact of
organizational structure and leadership styles on business
effectiveness, relate issues of supply chain management
and logistics to environmental changes, and recognize the
impact of innovation on business sustainability.
Keywords: entrepreneurship, franchising, supply chain man-
agement, innovation, leadership style
“There are questions that arise from my experience,” said
David Hartstein, founder of KaBloom, as he ticked them off
on his fingers. “These are things I should have known, but
somehow I did not. Number one: When you’re under pres-
sure to expand, what is the best way to grow the organiza-
tion? Number two: How do you select franchisees? Number
three:Why did so many things go wrong? It should have all
worked. Number four: Which lessons from the fast-food
industry actually transfer well into the flower industry? And
the most important question I ask myself,”he said,pointing to
his pinky finger,“is how can I make money from the flower
business?”
The Flower Industry in the United States
The flower industry was one of the largest agricultural indus-
tries in the United States, ranked third after corn and soy-
beans by the U.S. Census of Agriculture. The Bureau of
Economic Analysis, estimated the total floriculture item sales
at retail outlets at about $19.2 billion in 2005. Per capita
spending at the retail level on floral products in the same
year was about $55. The 2007 analysis by the Bureau of
Economic Analysis 2007 showed an increase in sales of floral
products to $20.1 billion.
The floriculture industry was divided into five major sec-
tors: cut flowers, potted flowering plants, foliage plants, bed-
ding and garden plants, and cut cultivated greens. These
industry segments were different in terms of the number of
outlets: an estimate of 22,753 retail florist shops, 21,783
supermarkets selling flowers, 16,432 plant nurseries and gar-
den centers,900 floral wholesalers,and 11,000 domestic pro-
ducers (www.aboutflowers.com/press_b1.html). The tradi-
tional market channels of the flower industry were growers,
importers, and the wholesalers or retailers (http://www
.safnow.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id
=6263&Itemid=149).
More than 80 percent of the flowers sold in the United
States were imported from several countries in South
America and Europe.The major sources of imported flowers
were Colombia, Ecuador, Netherlands, Costa Rica, Mexico,
and Canada as shown in Table 1. There were two major U.S.
border hubs for imported flowers: Miami International
Airport in Florida with a capability to handle 85 percent of
the 65,000 tons of fresh flowers imported each year, and
Memphis, Tennessee, which handled a small percent of
imported flowers. These two hubs were equipped with all
necessary facilities to handle fresh flowers, in addition to a
sufficient number of U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)
officers for daily inspection of the large flower shipments
(http://southeastagnet.com/2008/01/23/usda-breaks-ground-
on-new-inspection-facility-in-miami/).
The major outlets where the flowers were sold differ in
size and location.The most popular outlets were supermar-
kets, with an estimated 29 percent of total sales. Less popular
outlets included mass merchandisers with 21 percent of the
total sales, home centers with 16 percent of the total sales,
garden centers with 15 percent of the total sales, and whole-
sale clubs with 3 percent of the total sales. Retail florists
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Table 1. Sources of Flowers—Top 6 
Import Countries by Value (2007)
Country Colombia Ecuador Netherlands Costa
Rica
Mexico Canada
Percent
of Total
Import
61% 17% 8% 4% 3% 2%
Source: Society of American Florists (SAF).
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accounted for only 14 percent of the total sales.The Internet
accounted for 2.4 percent of all flower and plant purchases
in 2005. Internet transactions made up 9.1 percent of pur-
chases and 12.3 percent of spending on floral arrangements
(Ipsos/AFE Consumer Tracking Study, 2005 CONSUMER).
The flower industry was among the most sensitive-to-
change industries in the market for two reasons. First, flow-
ers were a very delicate commodity.The life span of flowers
was relatively short, making the flower industry one of the
fastest turnover businesses in the economy. Second, industry
performance was sensitive to several factors such as weath-
er, high energy prices impacting delivery costs, and fluctua-
tions in currency exchange rates (especially when the dollar
value was decreasing).Changes in supply channels could cre-
ate volatility in prices and availability. Most importantly, the
U.S. trade agreements, particularly with South American
countries where most of flowers were imported from, could
have a significant impact on the industry.
In 1989, Ruth Owades launched Calyx & Corolla, a high-
end florist that shipped direct from the farm to the customer.
Calyx & Corolla originally sold its flower by catalog/direct
mail and later expanded to include a website, becoming the
first “virtual”company in the flower industry.Calyx & Corolla
extended vase life by eliminating middlemen in the distribu-
tion process and shipped its orders next-day delivery via
FedEx in custom-designed packages. By 1998, its catalog was
the most widely circulated floral catalog, with more than 12
million copies distributed. In 1998, Calyx & Corolla generat-
ed sales of more than $20 million (Business Wire, 1999).
Flowers could clearly become big business.
A new and effective e-business model that used
Information Technology and Internet tools for reaching cus-
tomers, providing better customer services for less cost, and
utilizing supply chain process was added to the flower indus-
try post 2001. The e-Business model granted a competitive
advantage by providing customers with easy and convenient
access to flowers with low cost for retailers,wholesalers, and
distributers alike through user-friendly websites supported
by good delivery systems.
The History of KaBloom
While traveling overseas, David Hartstein (former Staples
executive, and cofounder of Super Office, the first office sup-
plies superstore chain in Israel) and Thomas Stemberg (for-
mer chairman and CEO of Staples Inc.) observed that
Europeans purchased fresh flowers not only for special occa-
sions but also as an everyday item for personal pleasure.
Hartstein speculated, “Would it be possible to reinvent the
U.S. floral industry along the European model?”
The question was a timely one as Hartstein had been
“looking at retail chains to consolidate and [Stemberg] said
the flower industry would be perfect” (Forbes Online,
2000).He discarded early thoughts of launching a fast-food
restaurant with a health food menu (Reidy, 1998) and in July
1997, Hartstein returned to Boston to build KaBloom.
Optimism and success were in Hartstein’s blood. A 1986
Suffolk University MBA alumnus, his history included a stint
in the Israeli army and diplomatic corps as well as increasing-
ly responsible positions in industry that culminated in his
founding Super Office and, subsequently, serving as president
and CEO of an international consulting firm established by
the director of the Institute for Social and Economic Policy in
the Middle East at the JFK School of Government. But a new
challenge was calling him.
Hartstein and Stemberg wanted to promote the vision of
buying flowers for personal enjoyment at any time.To accom-
plish this they had to offer a shopping experience that pro-
moted this kind of enjoyment by making it easy for the con-
sumer to get a wide choice of high-quality flowers at conven-
ient locations.Their goal was to increase flower consumption
in the United States. Hartstein described this concept as “the
Starbucks of Flowers”—a company that would change the
way Americans thought about flowers just as Starbucks
changed the concept of a morning cup of coffee.They want-
ed to encourage shoppers to buy flowers as often as they
bought bread or milk by making them available on shelves in
every kind of retail location.
Hartstein and Stemberg had done their homework and
they believed that the market opportunity existed. Their
research revealed the following:
• In 1996, the U.S. retail market for fresh cut flowers and
potted plants totaled $12.9 billion. In addition, the bed-
ding and garden segment garnered $2.6 billion, for total
floriculture sales of $15.5 billion.The domestic retail flo-
ral market was extremely fragmented with more than
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Table 2. Distribution Channels
Traditional Florists Supermarkets
Limited hours Extended hours
Limited on-hand inventory Limited assortmenta
Individualized service Irregular service (if at all)
High pricing Competitive pricing for avail-
able stock
Bad Locations Convenient locations,“Where
People Shop Everyday”
Bad ambiance (typically not
clean)
No ambiance
Questionable quality Poor quality
a. In January 1998, a typical Stop and Shop store in the Northeast had only
19 SKUs for flowers. Star Market had 18 SKUs (IAMCO, 1996).
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14,350 supermarket floral departments and 36,000
retail florists. Fewer than 2 percent of specialty florists
belonged to a chain.
• Sales through specialty channels, including retail florists,
garden centers, toll-free call centers, street vendors, and
mail catalogs totaled 57 percent of sales or $8.8 billion.
The specialty market suffered from poor customer per-
ception of quality, assortment, and service.
• Sales through mass market channels, including super-
markets, discount stores, do-it-yourself (DIY)/hardware
stores, convenience, department, and drug stores totaled
33 percent of industry-wide sales or $5.1 billion.Despite
poor customer perceptions, this channel had grown sig-
nificantly over the previous decade (IAMCO, 1996).
Thus, they concluded that KaBloom could enter the high-
ly fragmented $15.5 billion U.S. retail floriculture industry
and fill a unique market niche. They intended to create a
strong and efficient supply chain by remaining close to the
source of flowers, the growers. KaBloom offered an exciting
new distribution opportunity that would increase their sales
and help offset the seasonality of wholesalers’ business.
Wholesalers were willing to accept a gross margin on their
key accounts of 12 percent, down from 35 percent on stan-
dard business (IAMCO, 1996, 57). KaBloom was therefore
confident in its ability to source fresh cut, high-quality flow-
ers and plants through these distributors at an advantageous
cost structure.KaBloom even planned eventually to purchase
directly from growers in Ecuador and Colombia, providing a
large degree of inventory and quality control.
In addition, KaBloom could provide its customers with a
wide assortment of high-quality, fresh-cut flowers and plants
at discount prices.At that time, high-quality and competitive
pricing were mutually exclusive. While florists generally
attempted to provide consumers with a selection of high-
quality fresh cut flowers,neither their prices nor their on-site
assortment were comparable. Some supermarkets sold flow-
ers at a lower price, but quality, freshness, and selection were
inconsistent. With its simplified and efficient distribution
chain, Hartstein believed his company would have vastly
improved logistics that would support better pricing and bet-
ter inventory management.
The retail flower industry was served by two primary dis-
tribution channels, traditional florists and supermarkets,with
different characteristics (KaBloom’s Business Plan).
Hartstein believed he could compete on all of the merits
of both channels and thus develop an underserved market of
customers who wanted the benefits of cash and carry, (every-
day low pricing, large assortment, cleanliness, and long
hours), with strong, user-friendly service. With its pricing
lower than both supermarkets and retail outlets, KaBloom
offered an ease of shopping contrary to existing, intimidating
shopping environments.
KaBloom identified four industry trends, the opportunities
they posed, and unique ways to execute them, as indicated
Table 3 (KaBloom’s Business Plan).
In addition, most specialty florists and mass market retail-
ers did not carry a diverse inventory, concentrating instead
on mainstream flowers. However, by not carrying 46 percent
of what was being demanded by consumers, these retailers
were losing sales. KaBloom offered a wide selection of flow-
ers, ranging from mainstream to more exotic, tropical flow-
ers. In 1996, roses, carnations, and chrysanthemums account-
ed for 54 percent of the flowers sold in the United States.The
remaining 46 percent,up from 38 percent in 1989, represent-
ed an opportunity to a full-selection chain like KaBloom
(http://www.ers.usda.gov/Publications/Flo/2007/09Sep/FLO
2007.pdf page 64).
Finally, foreign flower growers were diversifying their
range of products. Besides growing roses, carnations, and
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Table 3. Industry Trends
Trend Opportunity Execution
Sources of supply shift offshore. Reduced cost of wider assortment of flowers. With 150 stores and central purchasing,
KaBloom would buy directly from the 
growers.
Consumers have higher expectations. No one was currently meeting all of their
needs, particularly for low-cost specialty 
flowers.
KaBloom would meet customers’ needs
through high assortment, high-quality, low-
cost flowers that could be easily accessed.
Growers were attempting to become more
sophisticated and add more value.
Growers were willing and more able than
ever before to work with downstream 
partners.
KaBloom would buy directly from the 
growers.
Management information systems (MIS) 
had advanced and offered extensive
capabilities.
MIS could be used to control and track inven-
tory, to forecast sales, and to communicate
between stores and headquarters. Flower
stores were not using MIS effectively, particu-
larly with respect to inventory control.
KaBloom would implement a state-of-the-art
MIS system at a cost of approximately
$15,000 per store.
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chrysanthemums, they were producing more exotic tropical
flowers that yield higher margins. KaBloom planned to lever-
age its position with growers by the nature of its size and
relationships, and therefore realize advantageous cost struc-
tures. With more than 150 stores, KaBloom would be the
highest retail purchaser of fresh cut flowers in the United
States.
Hartstein knew it was important to choose the first store
locations strategically. He looked for locations and communi-
ties where “income per capita was over $50,000, with a pop-
ulation of more than 100,000, with over 30,000 cars driving
very slowly by.” His research had revealed that consumers
who bought the most floral products were likely to be afflu-
ent and purchase them for their own enjoyment as well as for
more traditional gift uses. The two highest income groups,
($50,000–$74,999 and $75,000 and above) represented 31.9
percent of the total U.S. households and purchased 41.5 per-
cent of all fresh cut flowers. In addition,as household income
rose, the percent of households purchasing flowers also rose
(Behe and Wolnick, 1991).
KaBloom targeted locations in high-density, high-visibility,
high-income, white-collar, metropolitan areas with high foot
and/or vehicular traffic. The first proposed site was on
Needham Street in Newton, Massachusetts, where, within a
three-mile radius, the average income was more than $70,000
(Newton-Needham Chamber of Commerce). Spending per
capita there was approximately 35 percent higher than the
national average or about 20 percent higher than the
Northeast average.Thus, the average spending per capita in
Newton was estimated at $68.Table 4 illustrates the volume
potential for a retail flower store on Needham Street in
Newton, Massachusetts (KaBloom’s Business Plan).
KaBloom store volume was projected at $483,000 for the
first year of operation, growing to $798,000 in the fifth year.
A total of $483,000 per year represented 95 transactions per
day at an average transaction of $13.95. While sales predic-
tions for stores increased as they matured, average KaBloom
store volume was predicted to be $645,000 in year five when
150 stores were open.
The second store location was Harvard Square. Hartstein
gave the example of the Brattle Square Florist at Harvard
Square, which had sales of $1.9 million a year.The size of the
store was 1500 square feet, which translated to $1,266.67 of
sales per square foot.“Despite these impressive sales figures,
Brattle Square Florist was unsophisticated in its systems and
operations, and the owners clearly understood that their
advantage lay in their location.While 90 percent of the tradi-
tional florist’s sales were derived from deliveries, this store
achieved 60 to 70 percent of its sales volume through walk-
ins” (KaBloom’s Business Plan).
By comparison, KaBloom projected store sales at $483.33
per square foot in a store’s first year, increasing to $798.00 in
its fifth year.“KaBloom,”Hartstein explained,“would have the
same advantage of Brattle Square as far as premium location.
However, it would have attractive and easy-to-shop stores,
sophisticated systems and operations, a talented manage-
ment team, and superior customer service.”
By the end of 1998, KaBloom had opened two stores.
Customers could also buy KaBloom flowers at
www.KaBloom.com and by telephone at 1-800-KaBloom.The
eye-catching stores, located in high-vehicle/foot traffic areas,
were adorned with bright purple awnings and stocked a
huge variety of flowers in gardenlike settings, encouraging
impulse purchases by passersby. Hartstein said,“We saw our-
selves as a flower shop, not a florist.We were in the business
of flowers. I became passionate about the business of flow-
ers. I fell in love with it.”
KaBloom’s strategy was to open company-owned stores
and appoint store managers,hiring only service-oriented asso-
ciates who would demonstrate a real interest in flowers and
plants.“A walk in our store is like a walk in a garden,”claimed
Hartstein.The KaBloom garden made flowers affordable to all
and included 200 varieties of fresh cut flowers, compared
with an average of 40 at the largest supermarkets and 20 at
most florists. KaBloom kept their prices low—about half the
industry norm—by buying directly from growers and distrib-
utors, as opposed to purchasing from wholesalers.
Instead of the impersonal, low-contact environment that
was traditional in florist shops, KaBloom’s well-trained asso-
ciates were advised to greet customers as soon as they
entered the store,and to make the store as much a part of the
street scene as could be possible. Open doors and flowers
appearing to tumble onto the sidewalk enhanced the sensa-
tion of entering a garden.“We created a common look for our
stores, in design, lighting, layout and signage.We visually dif-
ferentiated ourselves from existing florists.We created brand
recognition, similar to what Starbucks had achieved,”
explained Hartstein.
Problems Arose
The Valentine’s Day Debacle
Taking orders on the Internet had proven to be a successful
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Table 4. Potential Volume for Retail Flower Store on
Needham Street, Newton, Massachusetts
Total population within 3-mile radius 115,000
Per capita spending $68.00
Current total retail sales $7,820,000
COGS @ 40% $3,128,000
Total retail @ 50% gross margin $6,256,000
10% market share $625,600
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method of doing business for KaBloom. Due to the large
number of orders to deliver on Valentine’s Day 2001, 70 driv-
ers had been contracted through local temp agencies that
promised to deliver drivers with their own vehicles.
Unfortunately, 25 drivers did not show up, leaving some 500
orders for Valentine’s Day flowers undelivered. KaBloom did
not have a written binding contract with the temp agencies,
and the agency that failed to deliver was later removed from
KaBloom’s vendor list.All that was left to do was to “put the
fire out,” explained Hartstein.
He sprang into action, contacting the logical delivery
source—FedEx, which wanted to charge a fee of $50 per
delivery. His immediate response was “There was no way in
hell I was going to pay $25,000 for those deliveries!” The
press response was brutal. The 11:00 P.M. news featured
KaBloom as destroying people’s Valentine’s Day.“Every single
news outlet in the area featured a story of our missed deliv-
eries.This was very bad PR for us.”
Eventually, Hartstein refunded all 500 orders, then deliv-
ered 500 bouquets the next day to make up for the missing
Valentine’s Day flowers and delivered complimentary tulips
to each of the recipients of the missing orders on April 15.
His decision to forego the FedEx delivery because of its
$25,000 price tag ended up costing him $45,000 instead.
Huge Turnover and Too Much Payroll
Under the existing circumstances, it became difficult to moti-
vate store personnel to put in the long hours needed to sus-
tain the business. In the interest of efficiency, Hartstein
opened the Design Center in Woburn to centralize design
and distribution.This created morale issues since it took away
the one thing employees liked to do most—design the
flower arrangements. In addition, if a customer complained
about the design, the employee, who hadn’t created the
design, still had to respond to the customer’s complaint.
Employees became frustrated by this situation.
High turnover and a demoralized staff created a situation
in which corporate payroll became astronomical.As less qual-
ified store personnel were hired, additional district managers
were needed to supervise them. Gross profit from the stores
could not sustain corporate overhead. More than half of the
stores’ income was devoted to marketing, some of which
paid back very limited returns. In order to cover costs, the
average store needed sales of $375,000 (see Table 5).
In addition, the turnover at the store level had an impact
on store sales and on the community ties upon which
KaBloom counted for its everyday sales. Even shrinkage
(anticipated losses due to flower perishability) was affected.
According to KaBloom’s business plan, “An industry rule of
thumb is that inventory shrink averages 10%.” The shrinkage
rate was dependent, in large part on the temperature and
hydration of the flowers during transport and, as new
employees were in constant need of training, the care with
which flowers were handled in the stores became variable
and shrinkage increased.
Decision to Franchise
Nearly three years and one recession later KaBloom failed to
live up to Hartstein’s forecast, with just 34 locations. That
number decreased to 30 when the unprofitable stores were
closed. Sales hit only $8 million in 2000, but grew to $15 mil-
lion by 2001.
Hartstein decided to investigate franchising as a way to
ensure KaBloom’s success and to take the business in a new
direction (see Table 6). Franchising would provide risk mini-
mization for both the franchisor and franchisee.The success
rate for new franchise businesses was much higher than
other types of new businesses because franchises operated
within a proven system.That system included an established
concept, sound business plan, support for getting started
(i.e., training materials, store design, sources for goods), and
marketing support.
The franchisor could expand the business and increase
brand awareness rapidly with little risk and a smaller invest-
ment than other business models required. Incremental
financial risks were transferred to the franchisee, who paid
the franchisor royalties on gross sales.Royalties in franchising
systems were payable regardless of profitability, transferring
the major risk to the franchisee. The risk for the franchisor
was primarily the loss of control of an individual location,
possibly resulting in lower quality stores that had an adverse
impact on the brand of the franchise overall.
The franchising idea seemed to make sense—risk was lim-
ited and the income potential for the franchisor seemed
boundless, as long as the right people bought the franchises.
However, Hartstein’s initial investors were opposed to fran-
chising because franchising would not return as much imme-
diate profit as company-owned stores. Hartstein had original-
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Table 5. Estimated Annual Costs per Store 
Fixed costs
Labor (payroll, benefits, and taxes) $100,000
Rent and utilities $50,000
Other expenses (administration, insurance, etc.) $30,000
Variable costs based on sales revenue
Cost of goods 44% of Sales
Royalties 
5.5% to 4.5% depending on gross sales 5% of Sales
Source: D. Hartstein.
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ly raised more than $15 million in venture capital (Forbes
Online, 2000), and these investors had to be served. The
founder and former CEO of Dunkin’ Donuts, the internation-
ally renowned coffee and doughnut store, advised Hartstein
to move toward franchising because his own success with
the strategy was well known. Hartstein was amenable, but
the investors remained uninterested. Sales were stagnant and
problems continued to grow.
In late 2001, Hartstein made the decision to change the
business model to one based on franchising. Tension
between the investors’ goal of return on investment and
Hartstein’s goal of ongoing royalties created conflict but
Hartstein was adamant. In February 2002, he assumed voting
control of KaBloom and the company underwent a signifi-
cant reorganization through capital restructuring.
A Happy Story of Growth
KaBloom Franchising Corp, established for the purpose of
selling KaBloom franchises, offered its first franchises on
October 30, 2001.The initial step in this process was to put
together a Uniform Franchise Offering Circular (UFOC), a
legal document in which the franchisor disclosed all informa-
tion that the franchisee needed to make an informed deci-
sion on investing in that franchise.The contents and disclo-
sures in the UFOC were governed by the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC).A UFOC contained 23 categories of infor-
mation including the franchisor’s and franchisee’s obliga-
tions, specific territory in question, and initial and ongoing
fees. Many states also had additional state-specific require-
ments.The franchisor was required to give each prospective
franchisee the UFOC at least 10 business days prior to sign-
ing the Franchise Agreement.
KaBloom developed a national UFOC and then produced
a set of revised state-specific documents.The estimated cost
of setting up a new franchise store was $250,000 including
the initial franchise fee. This investment was significantly
higher than to open an independent florist shop.The cost did
not deter prospective franchisees.The initial aim was to have
each store generate $600,000 of revenue (Reidy, 1998).
A franchisee could open a single store or purchase a terri-
tory to open several stores or other flower outlets.The fran-
chisee cost per additional store was significantly less than the
franchise fee for the first store. If someone wanted to open
three stores, he or she paid $30,000 for the first store and
$5,000 as a down payment on each of the other stores.When
the time came to open the second store, the cost was a total
of $25,000 (less the original $5,000 down payment), and the
cost for the third store was a total of $20,000. Multiple outlet
franchisees were encouraged.
In addition to the initial franchise fee, the franchisee was
required to pay the franchisor monthly fees. Royalty pay-
ments were a percentage of gross revenues on a graduated
basis (i.e., 5.5% of the first $350,000, 5.0% from
$350,000–$550,000, and 4.5% over $550,000). Additionally,
franchisees were required to contribute to the advertising
fund (3% of sales) and e-commerce fund (2% of sales).
Hartstein was named a finalist for the New England
Entrepreneur of the Year award in 2001 by Ernst & Young.
Once franchising became the operational strategy, the busi-
ness took off in a period of euphoric growth. KaBloom sold
franchises directly as well as through franchise brokers.The
first franchisee bought the Andover, Massachusetts (formerly
company owned) store in March 2002. By the end of 2002,
KaBloom reduced the number of company-owned stores to
12 and had 31 stores operating with 15 franchisees operat-
ing 19 stores across two states. By the end of 2004, KaBloom
had tripled the total number of stores to about 100 stores
including 88 franchised stores across 29 states. This was
exceptional growth in only three years of franchising.There
were 120 active franchisees and many more stores in the
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Table 6. Comparison of Risk/Reward 
for Franchising and Owner-Operated Stores
Franchising Own and Operate
Capital Investment
Required
Low High
Control Medium High
Speed of Expansion High High
Profit Potential High High
Risk Potential Low High
Return on
Investment
High Low
Source:A composite of information from http://www.francorp.com/
howto/why.asp, http://www.nationalfranchise.com/whyfranch.html, and
http://www.referenceforbusiness.com/small/Eq-Inc/Franchising.html.
According to Seid and Ainsley (http://www.msaworldwide.com
/upload/The%20Relationship%20between%20Franchisor%20and%
20Franchisee.pdf), “. . . franchisors want their franchisees to suc-
ceed and most work hard to provide their franchisees with tools
and coaching they need  to be successful” but one needs to
remember that “a franchisor is not the franchisee’s parent and the
franchisee is not the franchisor’s child.”As a franchisor, KaBloom
provided its franchisees with the following significant support:
• Site location and lease negotiation assistance
• Training (5 weeks headquarters and 3-4 days franchise location)
• Initial store (including base flower assortment and other prod-
ucts) and field support services
• Ongoing operational guidance including inventory control assis-
tance, lower cost of merchandise through group buying, and
centralized distribution and logistics
• Regional and national meetings
• 800 telephone hotline
The level of support provided by KaBloom exceeded what most
franchisors provided and what was required by law.
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pipeline (see Table 7).
In addition to stores, some franchisees opened kiosks
(LaVallee, 2005). Franchisee,Tom Hardy, opened 13 kiosks in
southeastern Massachusetts between mid-2003 and the end
of 2005 and had plans to open several more. Two to three
times per week, two employees from his Pembroke store
replenished the kiosks.These kiosks were located at gas sta-
tions, mini-marts, health centers, and other locations—novel
outlets for selling flowers. KaBloom’s rapid growth was a
result both of stores and other innovative flower retailing
options. In 2002, KaBloom was selling flowers at some Au
Bon Pain cafes and at eleven BJ’s stores (Reidy, 2002).
Au Bon Pain and BJ’s Warehouse Clubs
KaBloom’s operations at other businesses began in 2002 and
were marketed as “KaBloom Too.” KaBloom franchisees
resented the use of “KaBloom” for sales of lower cost flowers
at non-KaBloom store outlets, and many franchisees were
reluctant to service these locations despite their income-pro-
ducing potential. KaBloom’s first relationship was with Au
Bon Pain, a bakery and restaurant with a European flair, and
was short-lived and not profitable.Hartstein had been contact-
ed by Frank Guidara, CEO of Au Bon Pain. Guidara wanted to
have flowers in his stores, both to enhance the European feel
and also as an additional product to sell.They initiated their
partnership at the Children’s Hospital location in Boston, then
expanded to Boylston Street (also Boston). Flowers were
attractively displayed in a spiral fashion on a pole.This opera-
tion was labor intensive and required cleaning of the flower
buckets once or twice a day to prevent infestation by fruit
flies.They soon disbanded the relationship.
At a European flower show, Hartstein saw a unique, attrac-
tive cooler with a waterfall that could display flowers and
eliminate the need to clean the flower buckets. His vision of
selling flowers in every retail location governed his next
moves.He contacted BJ’s Wholesale Club,which had a flower
department already, and suggested a new way to display the
flowers. BJ’s was intrigued and assigned a representative to
work with KaBloom to develop the new system. Hartstein
purchased 80 coolers, had them converted to 110 voltage
from the European 220, committed to maintain them, and
placed them in BJ’s stores. In 2002, KaBloom began servicing
BJ’s warehouse clubs in Massachusetts and New Hampshire.
The Woburn, Massachusetts, distribution center easily sup-
ported these stores. KaBloom received 90 percent of BJ’s
flower sales, with 10 percent going to BJ’s.
Customers were enthusiastic and BJ’s asked KaBloom to
expand operations beyond New England to eight or nine
other states, including New York, New Jersey, and
Pennsylvania.These locations could not be supplied and sup-
ported from the Woburn center and required local distribu-
tors, delivery arrangements, and other personnel. The large
overhead that was required made these non-New England
operations nonprofitable. In 2004, on $3.5 million of sales,
KaBloom netted $5,000 profit from their operations at BJ’s.
At the end of 2004, KaBloom subcontracted the BJ’s business
to a grower who paid royalties to KaBloom,generating a con-
siderably higher return.The grower ultimately purchased the
BJ’s business and continued to operate it independently.
Trying Mobile Commerce
In 2004, KaBloom began mobile commerce (m-commerce)
with MobileLime (MobileLime.com). M-commerce included
transactions (i.e., buying merchandise, making payments)
using a mobile phone.The floral industry had been involved
in web-based flower ordering, an example of business-to-con-
sumer (B2C) e-commerce, but m-commerce was unique to
KaBloom. With the implementation of the MobileLime tech-
nology, only KaBloom could communicate with their flower
customers in real-time to remind them of upcoming events,
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Table 7. Store Growth
Total Number
of Stores
Number of
Company-
owned Stores
Number of
Franchise
Stores
Number of
Franchisees
Number of
States with
Franchises
End 2001 34 34
End 2002 31 12 19 15 2
End 2003 53 11 42 69 14
End 2004 98 10 88 120 29
March 2006 117 7 110 138 N/A
End 2006 85 5 80 N/A N/A
March 2008 
Prior to 
Reacquisition
52 3 49 49 18
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holidays and monthly specials, and offer reward programs.
“MobileLime’s technology appeals to the life-style of our busy
customers.As a European-modeled retailer,we strive to offer a
savvy, convenient shopping experience and be one step
ahead of other flower markets. Allowing customers to pre-
approve their transaction before shopping is exactly the
mobility our commuter customers at South Station are look-
ing for,” David Hartstein explained.“This unique and conven-
ient process, will allow more customers to enjoy fresh flow-
ers every day.We are looking forward to utilizing MobileLime’s
technology to simplify shopping for our customers”
(www.seapointventures.com/pr/pr14331220041104.doc).
From 2004–2006, store growth slowed (see Table 7). In
early 2006, there were 117 stores, a 19 percent increase from
the end of 2004 with an accompanying 25 percent increase
in the number of franchisees to 138. This increase was fol-
lowed by increased revenues for KaBloom corporate.
However, problems with franchisees created cash-flow
issues.
A Fading Franchise Operation
The decision of KaBloom management to implement a fran-
chise system and to adopt a decentralized business model
required several managerial changes. Both the size of the
company and the size of the management team increased sig-
nificantly.A hierarchical corporate structure was put in place
to support the franchisees (see Figure 1). For every 10 fran-
chisees, a business consultant was hired. KaBloom later hired
experienced individuals at the vice president level to run the
functional areas (i.e., information technology, marketing,
logistics, and franchising).The vice presidents built organiza-
tions at KaBloom similar in size and cost to the ones at their
former large-company employers, thus creating higher over-
head than the fledgling organization could sustain.The added
managers and supporting teams hired to administer the
expansion created higher corporate payroll demands.A new
distribution system was implemented as a result of the
change in business model.The franchise business consultants
were requiring more cash output than what was coming in.
Committed to his philosophy of local ownership,
Hartstein intended for the franchisees to be owner-operators;
that is, that the franchisees would love flowers and would
work in the stores. He anticipated that they would share his
passion for a nontraditional approach to flower selling, and
that they would be willing to eat, sleep, and drink flowers.
His vision of the perfect franchisee went beyond simply the
ability to pay the fees and royalties. The ideal franchisee
would be part of the community, would participate in com-
munity life, and would, most importantly, love flowers and
share Hartstein’s vision. He expected that the owner-opera-
tors would be happy to work in their stores and would
understand that profits were made one stem at a time.
Additionally, these franchisees should be willing to maintain
the garden environment in their stores and absorb the 10
percent shrinkage required for flower volume, variety, and
quality. But not all franchisees buying KaBloom franchises
were ideal.
When franchising began, KaBloom stores were only locat-
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ed in two states. By the end of 2004, KaBloom stores were in
29 states throughout the United States.Franchises in such dis-
tant (from the Massachusetts headquarters) locations as
Idaho and Texas resulted in extra shipping costs and a
decline in delivered flower quality (see Table 8 store loca-
tions). Hartstein had ideas about how to solve the distribu-
tion issue, but these ideas took additional cash to develop.
When franchisees did not pay their royalties, legal fees to pur-
sue the debt often exceeded the money that was eventually
collected. Some franchisees were not paying for their orders
on time. Because cash inflow was running lower than it
should, the organization took on more debt, and debt service
became an issue.
Franchises were scattered all over the country, from
Pennsylvania on the east coast to California on the west
coast. KaBloom assumed control of ordering flowers for all
its franchisees requiring many small-volume shipments.This
resulted in a major problem for KaBloom since many small
volume orders experienced delivery delays or sometimes
were completely lost by the carriers. As a result of these
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Table 8. Locations of
KaBloom Franchises
(2006)
AZ 4
CA 6
CO 2
CT 3
DC 1
FL 13
GA 2
IA 1
ID 1
IL 10
IN 2
KS 1
LA 1
MA 34
MD 4
MI 2
MN 2
MO 3
NC 3
NH 1
NJ 9
NV 2
NY 2
OH 5
PA 2
RI 4
TX 3
WA 1
WI 1
Sweet Factory is a one-of-a-kind retail environment that combines entertainment with space-age
design to provide a state-of-the-art candy and candy-related merchandising concept. Sweet
Factory, as you see it now, was started in the United States on July 12, 1991. Sweet Candy LLC,
was founded in 2002 when it purchased the Sweet Factory candy store chain from the Archibald
Company. Shortly after the purchase of the Sweet Factory chain, Signature Distribution (former-
ly CandyWorkS distribution) was created to provide the logistical and distribution support that
a nationwide chain of specialty candy stores would need. Sweet Factory takes great pride in its
people and in its products. Customer service and quality products are the foundation on which
Sweet Factory is built. Our goal is to build a major national company that will position itself as
a leader in the marketplace, setting the standard for quality products, people and presentation.
CinnaWorkS, LLC, was founded in 2004 when it purchased 83 previously owned Cinnabon
stores. The Support Center for CinnaWorkS is located in Anaheim, California. Cinnabon is the
worldwide leader in the cinnamon roll store category. Founded in Seattle,Washington, in 1985,
Cinnabon opened its first store on December 4, 1985, at SeaTac Mall. Cinnabon stores are tradi-
tionally located in high-traffic venues such as shopping malls, airports, universities, casinos,
amusement parks, military bases, train stations, and travel plazas.The brand has grown dramati-
cally since then. As of December 28, 2003, the company operated and franchised 626 stores
worldwide.These stores are located in 43 states, Puerto Rico, and 26 other countries, leading to
exceptional brand awareness around the world. CinnaWorkS acquired the company-owned and
operated Cinnabon stores on November 22, 2004. CinnaWorkS has an aggressive business
growth plan in place over the next few years.CinnaWorkS stores have built a reputation for serv-
ing fresh, aromatic cinnamon rolls made with premium Indonesian cinnamon and topped with
a sweet, rich, cream cheese-based frosting. Each Cinnabon product is served hot out of the oven
and baked fresh before our guest’s eyes. CinnaWorkS’ commitment to premium ingredients and
quality has paid off.
KaBloom was started in 1998. Our stores are designed to be warm, inviting, modern, and fun
with a large selection of flowers and plants so extensive our customers feel like they are walk-
ing through a European flower market. Our goal is to prove that the future of flower retailing is
called KaBloom. One of KaBloom’s objectives is to increase consumers’ flower-buying habits as
is the case in other countries.We believe flowers should be enjoyed everyday, not just on spe-
cial occasions. So,we make it convenient to shop for flowers—our stores are located in high-vis-
ibility, easily accessible shopping areas; our hours are longer than traditional florists; our staff is
knowledgeable and helpful. Customers are welcomed and invited to enter the walk-in cooler
and choose from a selection of up to 200 fresh cut stems and bouquets (4 times the variety avail-
able from traditional florists).
Figure 2. Excerpt from KaBloom’s Employee Handbook 
(describing the three companies owned by Caliber in 2006)
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delays, the quality of the flowers suffered. In addition, the
price of flowers increased because of the loss in economies
of scale with small volume shipments. Company revenue
decreased dramatically. The new operations model created
new challenges for the company.
The problems with the franchisees seemed never to stop.
As Hartstein resolved one issue, another would crop up.“This
is how you get yourself in trouble with decentralization,”
Hartstein said.KaBloom was buying flowers and selling them
to the franchisees, laying out the money up front to the grow-
er.Once the franchisee ran into trouble paying,KaBloom was
left holding the bag. Because the corporate structure was
decentralized, Hartstein was not aware of every such situa-
tion.“When you are decentralized, many decisions can back-
fire because of the lack of personal responsibility.”
However, there was little room for error when the fee to
the franchisees for flowers was cost plus 10 percent.When
the franchisees did not pay on time and KaBloom had to pay
bills to the grower, lateness created problems all around.The
franchisees who paid on time did not understand why
KaBloom was having trouble paying its bills and demanding
faster payment, and the franchisees who were delaying their
payments continued to have a free ride. By the end of 2005,
between 10 and 12 percent of the franchisees were in
default.
The pressures created by high overhead and low royalty
returns, coupled with nonpayment and late payments result-
ed in a business that simply was not fun anymore for
Hartstein.He decided to cut his losses and sell the enterprise.
KaBloom Wilted in the Shadow of the
Caliber Group
The Caliber Group 
In March 2006, Caliber Capital Group, an equity market
investment group based in Anaheim, California, finalized its
purchase of KaBloom Franchising Corp., creating two enti-
ties, KaBloom Flowers LLC and KaBloom Flower Franchise
LLC. The Caliber Group specialized in acquiring troubled
companies and turning them around. The president of the
investment group and new president of KaBloom, James
Walker, said that the franchise owners would retain their
storefronts, and KaBloom headquarters would move to
Anaheim (SAF, 2006). At the time it acquired KaBloom, the
Caliber Group also owned Sweet Factory, Inc. and
CinnaWorkS, the parent company of Cinnabon. Six months
later, Caliber purchased the Baja Fresh Mexican Grill for $31
million from Wendy’s, which had paid $275 million for it in
2002. (See Figure 2 for a description of KaBloom’s place in
the Caliber Group companies.)
Caliber Capital Group’s experience was both as franchisor
and as franchisee in a wide variety of fast-food businesses.
They had no experience with flowers nor did they develop
an extensive management team for the KaBloom stores
(operating only with a director of Marketing, a rebuyer, and a
director of Franchising), but they did have the capital to
infuse into KaBloom’s bleeding bottom line, and Hartstein
had high hopes for the future success of the company he had
founded. Although differences in approach and philosophy
truncated the working relationship that had been part of the
transition plan shortly after the completion of the sale,
nonetheless Hartstein remained in contact with the Caliber
Group and watched as his creation became its neglected
stepchild.
Unexpected Challenges of Franchising
Even before Caliber Capital Group took over the business,
KaBloom franchising had been a challenge to both the fran-
chisor and the franchisees. When KaBloom began offering
franchises, it did so with prior experience only in the fast-
food world and in an established organization. No one had
experience with “start-up” franchising, so any early missteps
were exaggerated as the company grew.The expectations on
the part of KaBloom and on the part of the franchisees were
unclear despite the extensive due diligence and information
provided in the UFOC. Some franchisees had grandiose
expectations and set up complex internal organizations even
when they had little ability to sustain them financially.
KaBloom’s decentralized organization kept some information
from reaching the right people in headquarters prior to its
acquisition by the Caliber Group, creating serious operating
difficulties and exacerbating KaBloom’s problems.
The franchisees had been hoping for improvement in the
general management of the KaBloom organization once the
Caliber Group had taken over (SAF, 2006), but instead they
were shocked as one corporate support after another was
pulled by the new owners—no more business consultants,
no marketing campaigns in magazines, no special assistance
from headquarters. The business consultants that had been
provided by Hartstein’s organization had been pulled by the
new owners, and the franchisees were essentially on their
own. Fewer and fewer of them were meeting their obliga-
tions to the parent company, and the parent company
responded by pulling back as many services as it could.
The Decline of KaBloom
One of the first actions the Caliber Group took after closing
the deal with Hartstein was to clean house,keeping only two
of KaBloom’s existing employees—the Franchise sales direc-
tor and the general assistant.These two staff members were
responsible for keeping the organization running, from the
legal end through the ordering of flowers. Shortly after the
acquisition, Hartstein’s formal involvement in KaBloom
ended, as did his influence over events.
During the first half of 2006, the Caliber Group poured
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money into its new company. They put together a new ad
campaign originating in the Anaheim and Irvine, California,
communities.The campaign was edgy and expensive, focus-
ing on special effects, high-priced models, and slick staging.
The franchisees hated it—they wanted the emphasis to be on
the flowers, not on the environments. They refused to pay
into the advertising and promotion fund, and the ads were
not redone.
Next, the Caliber Group had the idea to create edible
arrangements that would expand the store offerings.
However, special food handling licenses were required, and
this was too complex to do nationwide.Then, they thought
about including wine in the offerings. Again, the issue of
licensing came up, along with restrictions about shipping
alcoholic beverages across state lines.
Eventually, the Caliber Group’s priorities changed as they
had purchased Baja Fresh in August 2006 and tied up their
financial resources in that company, and their interest in
developing KaBloom waned.
David and the Moses Miracle™
David’s Passion 
Hartstein had started in the flower business in 1998 with a
passion to reinvent the U.S. floral industry along the
European model, in which Europeans purchased flowers at
any time for personal pleasure. In his words “I became pas-
sionate about the business of flowers. I fell in love with it.”
His hard-won experience through the ups and downs of
the business had taught him a valuable lesson—that the
impact of distribution on the quality of flowers was critical.
He had come to realize that the logistics of the flower distri-
bution business were broken and he wanted to fix it. He
wanted to simplify distribution channels and streamline the
entire process.
Preparing Flowers for Shipping
Ninety percent of all flowers sold in the United States were
imported from foreign growers and shipped dry to the United
States. An estimated 77 percent of Americans did not buy 
fresh cut flowers for personal consumption (http://
www.s ie r ra f lower f inder.com/ar t i c le s /mra_e .pd f
Consumption). According to Hartstein, this was principally
because they did not trust that the flowers would last more
than three days in their homes due to the flower distribution
system.The amount of time cut flowers spent in distribution
could vary from 7 to 12 days or perhaps longer.The process
was as follows:Harvest Date (HD)—At most farms around the
world, flowers were typically cut in the morning.They were
transported from the greenhouses to the postharvest cooler
where they were“conditioned”in a solution of citric acid and
hypochlorite sodium.These additives were employed to fight
the constant battle against bacteria as well as promote hydra-
tion in the flower.This conditioning to the flowers was per-
formed in preparation for the long journey to come. Like
camels, the flowers were filling up before they departed.The
conditioning parameters required a minimum of 12 hours of
hydration with this solution to optimize vase-life perform-
ance.
Once the conditioning was complete, which typically
meant the next day (harvest date + 1), the flowers were grad-
ed (quality, length, and cut stage), bunched (arranged and
wrapped), cut again (as the bunch), and placed back into a
cooler where they were hydrated in the same solution for an
additional 4 to 6 hours. They needed this extra hydration
because they were out of water while they were being
processed. At the very end of the processing, they were cut
one last time to remove the section of stem that was drawing
“air”into the bottom of the stem.This condition was called “air
lock” and prevented water from being drawn up the stem.
At this point, the flowers were ready for packing.While in
the cooler, they were removed from the solution and allowed
to ship dry.This typically took 15 to 30 minutes.The flowers
were then packed in corrugated boxes, labeled and staged
for shipment.
The U.S. Distribution Model
In response to the terrorists’ attacks on September 11, 2001,
the U.S. government imposed the "Wheels Up Rule," a
requirement to have cargo documentation submitted to U.S.
Customs 12 hours prior to departure. This requirement
placed responsibility and some degree of “time-sensitive”
pressure on the farm to execute orders that were submitted.
Typically, product left the farm on HD+2. Flights left in the
middle of the night, arriving in Miami in the early morning.
On HD+3 the flowers were processed through USDA
inspection at the "Smoke House" (an older building with a
nonfunctioning smoke stack—the name stuck).The flowers
then departed USDA and were shipped to the various ware-
house distribution centers in the Miami area. Inventory rota-
tion (First-In-First-Out FIFO) often resulted in older flowers
being shipped first and the new arrivals rotated into the cool-
er. Every situation was different. In the best case scenario, the
flowers left in a refrigerated tractor trailer heading some-
where within the United States on the evening of HD+3.
Transit time to a northeast distribution center was two
days, so the flowers arrived on the evening of HD+5 or the
morning of HD+6, where they were subjected to the same
forces of inventory rotation (FIFO). For locations in the Great
Lakes region,distribution transit time was up to three days, for
the west coast it was four. By the time they got to the mass
retail in the northeast, it was HD+6-to-7. For florists, the time
line could be extended further as wholesale distribution prac-
tices varied by company (see Figure 3).The end game for the
wholesale distributor was to offer the freshest product in a
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wide offering while keeping an eye on shrink. Flowers could
“look”good while in a cooler for nearly two weeks. However,
once they were exposed to room temperature, they faded
very quickly.
The Dutch Distribution Model
In stark contrast, Holland had been among the top five in per
capita consumption of fresh cut flowers for many years
(International Labour Organization). A closer examination
revealed three critical variables in the Dutch system that
were absent in the U.S. equation:
• Time was not an issue. Flowers in Holland arrived at the
retail location with 72 hours of harvest, providing supe-
rior freshness (see Figure 4).
• In Holland, from the time flowers were cut, and all the
way through distribution to the retail store, they were
constantly hydrated.
• The Dutch enjoyed a much wider mass market product
offering of fresh cut flowers as delicate varieties were
sold in much higher volumes due to the flower friendly
distribution system.
The Dutch flower distribution system inspired Hartstein’s
vision for what a revamped flower distribution system could
accomplish for the U.S. market.
Innovation in Hydration—the Moses
Miracle™
As early as 2005, Hartstein had been focused on new meth-
ods of keeping flowers fresh longer, and he knew that hydra-
tion was the key. He introduced a prototype, later greatly
improved, of a hydration system before he sold KaBloom to
Caliber, but the product was not yet perfected. Once
KaBloom was sold and franchisees no longer had to purchase
their flowers from specific growers, the Moses Miracle™
could serve no purpose. Hartstein sought to change the rules
governing fresh cut flowers by:
• providing hydration from the time of harvest to the con-
sumer’s home;
• offering the only hydration system that was leak-proof
regardless of the package orientation and therefore
could be express-shipped and could sustain the rigorous
handling requirement of a third-party logistics company
(e.g., FedEx);
• eliminating the distribution risks of delicate varieties to
retail; and 
• shipping more flowers in one box, making it more eco-
nomical in an express shipping venue (third-party logis-
tics).
The Moses Miracle™ was a hydration process that insert-
ed stems into a balloon-like container, tightly closed at the
neck, in order to keep the flowers hydrated during shipping
and before sale.A special foam within the balloon prevented
the water from leaking. In contrast to the inefficiencies of the
existing system, the Moses Miracle™ revolutionized the
industry in the following ways:
• Flowers are harvested in the morning, transported to the
postharvest cooler, and conditioned in a solution of cit-
ric acid and hypo-chloride sodium for a minimum of 12
hours.
• Postharvest pack-out began at 11:00 P.M.when the flow-
ers were graded and packed in the Moses Miracle™,
boxed, and labeled.A similar conditioning solution was
used inside the Moses Miracle™ bladders.
• Flowers were transported the next morning to the
FedEx ramp by 12:00 noon, en route to the FedEx hub
in Memphis,Tennessee.
• Planes departed for Memphis in the late afternoon/early
evening (approximately 6:00 P.M.) and arrived in the
Memphis hub at night (approximately 11:00 p.m.).
• The USDA inspection was conducted at the FedEx
Memphis hub and boxes enter the FedEx “matrix” (gen-
eral distribution system) for sorting and rerouting.
• The flowers were delivered anywhere in the United
States by 10:30 in the morning (within 48 hours of har-
vest).
Unlike flowers from other growers, importers, or distribu-
tors, the flowers shipped with the Moses Miracle™ were
packaged in water and were constantly hydrated regardless
of the position of the bouquet, lying down or standing up.
The Moses Miracle created a competitive advantage because
flowers can be shipped in water coast-to-coast overnight, via
a more extensive and less expensive transportation network
such as UPS, DHL, and FedEx, instead of needing to be trans-
ported via refrigerated trucks (see Table 9).The flowers did
not need to be freshened up after their journey thanks to the
Moses Miracle™. (Visit http://www.3dmedianetwork.com/
projects/kabloom/mm-video/html-designs/home-2-
sides.html for a video of the way the Moses Miracle™
worked.)
Hartstein noted that “We are part of an industry-changing
method of getting the freshest product in the marketplace, in
water and economically shipped.”
Opportunity to Repurchase at Bargain Price
Potential for Success
Hartstein was considering repurchasing the company.He had
a vision of what he could accomplish based on what he had
learned from his prior experience. His vision included three
different opportunities.
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First, he imagined  a better e-business model—an on-line
website just for his franchisees, company stores, and suppli-
ers,where the franchisees could order their flowers from the
suppliers and where Hartstein could monitor the purchases
and immediately receive his cut of the transaction. This
would eliminate the serious problem he had previously
encountered in which he was paying the growers/suppliers
upfront for the flowers and then trying to collect payment
from the franchisees, who had already received the flowers.
This often resulted in getting his money from the franchisees
only after a long delay or, even more often, never receiving
his money at all. He was convinced that a direct sell-through
model would work better.
Second, he had conceived of an idea he called “The Moses
Miracle Flower Wall™,” a refrigerated floral cooler specifical-
ly designed for the Moses Miracle system.The cooler was an
open-faced merchandising system to be placed at or near the
checkout aisles.Since flowers were often an impulse buy, this
location would facilitate the last-minute impulse buying of
flowers.
Third, the Moses Miracle Flower Wall™, coupled with the
Moses Miracle, would allow retailers to sell very fresh flow-
ers because the flowers would arrive at the store within
72–96 hours of harvest.This meant that the quality of flow-
ers would increase dramatically, the life span of the flowers
would expand, and retailers who had given up on the idea of
selling flowers because they did not remain fresh very long,
such as drugstores and gas stations, could now sell fresh
flowers.The Moses Miracle™ would even serve as a package
in which the flowers could be transported from the store to
the customer’s home in their own hydration system.
Consumers would no longer have to rush home to put their
newly purchased flowers in water.
Hartstein felt the future would be his, if the price and the
deal were right.
Fighting the Miami Cabal  
For the unique system to succeed, several issues had to be
resolved, including the delivery system and the traditional
grower power structure. The vast majority of flowers from
South America came through Miami.The Miami flower con-
sortium was comprised of wholesalers with exclusive rela-
tionships with growers. Growers did not sell flowers directly
to individuals, only to wholesalers. This arrangement meant
that KaBloom either had to pay the high overhead for flowers
through the wholesalers or find a different way altogether.
Hartstein chose the second option. He convinced a major
grower, Elite Flower Limitada, C.I., to partner with him and
adapt logistics to the new model. This alliance provided
KaBloom with the protection it needed to bypass the tradi-
tional route. Flower costs could thus be decreased by elimi-
nating the middleman (the wholesaler).
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Doing Without an Organization
Because the weight of his complex organization had played
a large role in KaBloom’s initial failure, Hartstein was deter-
mined not to repeat that error. If he decided to repurchase,
this time he would keep his organization small, outsourcing
every possible function.“This time,”he vowed,“I will remem-
ber how to make money. If I outsource, I can get the best peo-
ple who will give me the best service in the best way.This
depressed economy can only help me by making the best
people available.” He would limit his total staff to himself, his
partner (an attorney), and a few store personnel. He would
operate out of the main company store in Brookline, without
a formal office.As long as he had his cell phone, he could be
in business.
He thought he could outsource all accounting functions,
along with payroll and IT. He could hire a programmer on
contract to redesign the website and to handle all the techni-
cal issues so he could devote himself to the business and to
rebuilding his diminished customer database. He could out-
source marketing for improved quality.And, he could depend
on third-party logistics to move the flowers.
“I listened to the wrong advice the first time around,”
Hartstein said. “I know how to make money—you buy for
one dollar, you sell for two dollars, you look around you with
your two eyes and you know how you’re doing. You don’t
need an organization to do business that way. If you build a
huge organization because you have money to spend, one
day soon the money will run out and you won’t be able to
make the organization run.”
The Decision
As of February 2008, Hartstein had begun seriously to evalu-
ate his options, weighing his emotions versus the practicali-
ties of a repurchase. If he repurchased KaBloom, he would
have a lot of work to do.The database needed to be rebuilt.
E-commerce sales had dropped from $4 million to less than
$100K. The franchisees were unhappy and many were in
default.The website was not functioning well.He would have
to go up against the floral establishment in Miami and he
would have to get the growers on his side. He would have to
establish iron-clad agreements with the third-party logistics
companies, and he would have to rethink his franchising
strategy. Moreover, he would have to do this without benefit
of an extensive and experienced organization.
But Hartstein was not afraid of work.“Hard work is what I
grew up with,” he said.“I started as a baby in retail, sleeping
on my little bench in the butcher shop until my parents were
ready to go home.When you’re in retail, every day you start
the business again; this will be no different.”
The Moses Miracle™ could truly revolutionize the flower
business, making flowers accessible to American consumers
at every level, Hartstein believed.This would fulfill his vision
and would confirm his belief that the business was about
logistics, not about flowers.
KaBloom Logistics 2008
In accord with Hartstein’s new lean organization,distribution
and logistics were outsourced to international shipping and
logistics companies, FedEx and UPS. He introduced two dif-
ferent paths for delivering flowers from the growers to the
store: Columbian flowers were shipped via FedEx while UPS
handled flowers from Ecuador. In both locations, flowers
were prepared for shipment using the Moses Miracle™.
Due to the unstable cost of fuel in 2008, both UPS and
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Table 9. Comparison of Distribution Systems
KaBloom (No Moses Miracle) Dutch KaBloom with Moses Miracle
Harvest Day (HD) Harvest at farm Harvest at farm and hydrate Harvest at farm Hydrated 12 hours
HD+1 Flower conditioning Hydrated and transfer Prepared with Moses Miracle and
depart for Memphis airport
HD+2 Arrive local airport and flown to Miami Hydrated and transfer Arrive Memphis
HD+3 USDA inspection at Miami Arrive at retail stores USDA inspection at Memphis and
entered into FedEx distribution system
HD+4 Leave by truck to distribution centers (DC) Arrive at stores and customers
HD+5 Arrive NE DC
HD+6 Depart NE DC for stores Arrive Great Lakes DC
HD+7 Depart for  Midwest stores Arrive West Coast DC
HD+8 Depart for West Coast stores
75
et al.: New England Journal of Entrepreneurship, Spring 2011
Published by DigitalCommons@SHU, 2011
FedEx set their delivery rate on a monthly basis instead of
their earlier protocol of setting prices annually. Flowers ship-
ping from Colombia left the farm and arrived at the Bogota
airport within one day after harvest (HD), and were then
transported to Miami via Tampa Cargo SA under contract
with FedEx. At the Miami airport, flowers were precooled
and inspected by the USDA. In the evening of HD+2, flowers
were shipped in refrigerated trucks by FedEx to Memphis
(the FedEx hub), arriving the morning of HD+4. Normal
FedEx distribution channels delivered the flowers to stores
and customers.
Flowers shipping from Ecuador arrived at the Quito airport
within HD+1 and shipped to Miami via UPS planes.There was
no cold chain in effect on this route. In Miami, the flowers
were inspected but not cooled. UPS planes transported the
flowers from Miami to Louisville, Kentucky (UPS hub), and
then to stores or customers.The UPS nonrefrigeration model
delivered the flowers two days faster than the FedEx refriger-
ated one with no discernable degradation of flower quality.
Reacquisition
In March 2008, two years after his sale of KaBloom to the
Caliber Group, Hartstein reacquired the company. The
Caliber Group admitted it had made a huge mistake in buy-
ing KaBloom in the first place, and lost a significant amount
of money during the two years it held the flower enterprise.
It was little more than an annoyance to them, “a tick on a
dog,” as the Caliber Group phrased it.
But a tick on a dog can make a lot of trouble for the dog.
Hartstein reentered the flower business with a vengeance,
meeting with the franchisees and listening to their concerns.
Some of them felt betrayed,others were angry because of the
size of the shrink that he insisted on.Franchisees wanted 1 to
2 percent shrink, while Hartstein insisted that they had to
plan on 10 percent in order to provide the garden-like envi-
ronment that was so critical to the KaBloom image. He
offered reduced royalties to the franchisees who paid their
outstanding bills. He took a hard-nosed approach to the busi-
ness, determined not to be the “nice guy” who gets stuck
with bills. He designed a new mass market strategy and
began negotiations with new outlets and new markets.He set
up agreements with several growers. He moved fast, focusing
more on B2B sales (developing new retail opportunities
instead of building stores) than on B2C sales.The B2B com-
ponent of the industry comprised about 15 to 20 percent of
a retail florist’s business. This included sales to restaurants,
meeting facilities, hotels, corporate functions, and business
client gifts (SAF, 2006).
At this point, Hartstein had to consider multiple strategic
questions:What would be the most effective way to grow the
business? What criteria should he use to choose the best fran-
chisees for his revamped business? What assumptions had he
made in the past that may have contributed to his problems?
What blind spots did he have that he should watch out for in
future decision making? What aspects of the fast-food indus-
try’s approach to logistics and distribution were transferable
to the flower business, if any? How could he make money
from the flower business?
“It’s about logistics and distribution, not just flowers,”
Hartstein reminded himself three months later as he watched
the price of oil escalate to more than $135 a barrel and the
economy fall apart.“Isn’t it? Or have I made a terrible mistake?”
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Scandia, Inc., is a commercial vessel managementcompany located in the New York Metropolitan areaand is part of a family of firms including Scandia
Technical; International Tankers, Ltd.; Global Tankers, Ltd.;
Sun Maritime S.A.;Adger Tankers AS; Leeward Tankers, Inc.;
Manhattan Tankers, Ltd.; and Liu’s Tankers, S.A.The compa-
ny’s current market niche is the commercial management
of chemical tankers serving the transatlantic market with
a focus on the east and gulf coast of the United States and
Northern Europe. This three-part case describes the com-
mercial shipping industry as well as several mishaps that
the company and its President, Chris Haas, have had to
deal with including withdrawal of financial support by
creditors, intercorporate firm conflict, and employee reten-
tion. Part A, which was published in the Fall 2010 issue,
presented an overview of the commercial vessel industry
and set the stage for Parts B and C where the firm’s opera-
tion is discussed.
Keywords: shipping industry, macro environmental analysis,
industry analysis, market structure, competitor analysis, case
study
Scandia, Inc. (SI) is a commercial vessel management compa-
ny located in the New York Metropolitan area.The company’s
current market niche is the commercial management of
chemical tankers serving the transatlantic market with a
focus on the east and gulf coast of the United States and
Northern Europe (see Figure 1).
Since 1983, SI has commercially managed a fleet of chem-
ical tankers operating in shipping markets of the world. Over
the years SI’s fleet size, ship types, and markets served have
changed as the company and the overall chemical industry
has evolved. During these years SI has seen both success and
failure, where significant money has been made and consid-
erable money has been lost. As the industry evolved, so did
the company, which started out as a three-person operation
and peaking with a total of nine people in New York in 1999.
Part B
Chris Haas founded Scandia, Inc. in 1983.At its inception the
company was run out of a small office in mid-town
Manhattan and managed two time-chartered ships with a
total of three employees including Chris. Utilizing contacts
that he had developed during his previous years in the ship
management and commodities trading industries,Chris led SI
to early success. By the end of the 1980s, the company was
on solid footing with six full-time employees and was com-
mercially managing a fleet of four time-chartered ships.All of
the vessels being managed during this period, were time
chartered by companies in which Chris personally had a
large ownership stake.
Company Mission and Management
Philosophy
Mission Statement
SI’s mission statement is “to serve our customers in a profes-
sional, ethical and transparent manner by incorporating and
retaining value based systems in technology and human
resources,with trustworthy expertise in shipping and related
fields.”
Management
SI’s management team is comprised of qualified and experi-
enced professionals in the fields of ship owning/manage-
ment/operation/agency/charter broking, thus blending
expertise from various allied/related disciplines.
The company’s management philosophy “is qualitative,
personalized service to their principals and their customers.
This translates into transparency of information; enabling
principals to make the right decisions (cost conscious yet
safe measures) with honesty and integrity in safeguarding
principals’ interests and prompt remittance of principals’ sur-
plus funds.” (“Mission Statement”).1
A “Family” of Firms 
In 1991, Chris restarted his family’s shipping company under
the name Scandia Technical (ST). ST’s function was to pro-
vide technical management services for ships including
supervision and management of repair and maintenance and
the crewing of vessels.With the startup of ST, SI maintained
its primary function, the commercial management of the
ships. Chris and a small group of investors formed Global
Tankers, Ltd., a Liberian company, which purchased the ship
Case Study
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Herbert Sherman
Barry Armandi (deceased)
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Laura from Asian interests. Global Tankers, Ltd. then hired SI
to be the commercial managers of the vessel and hired ST to
be the technical managers. In 1992, Chris and another small
group of investors formed International Tankers, Ltd., a
Liberian company, and purchased the Mindy, the sister ship
of the Laura, from Asian interests. Like Global Tankers, Ltd.,
International Tankers,Ltd.hired both SI and ST.SI had former-
ly commercially managed both the Laura and the Mindy
while they were under time charter. Figure 2 illustrates the
basic relationship between the companies and the ships.
The Relationship between SI and ST
From the beginning, ST was never run as an independent
company. It has always been treated and considered by the
employees of both organizations to be a satellite office of SI.
From the first days of the new structure, technical work and
crewing was being performed and managed out of SI while
Chris managed ST from his desk at SI in New York. Over the
years, this structure lead to friction between the two compa-
nies. Often there was an obvious feeling of “us versus them”
among the employees working at ST. In conversations with
former employees, they often stated that it was very frustrat-
ing to feel as if they were continually being second-guessed
by the New York office.
During the first two years of the total management of the
Mindy and Laura, some of the technical work was subcon-
tracted to a third party.This arrangement quickly failed due to
poor service on the part of the subcontractors and late pay-
ments on behalf of the vessels’ owners. By 1994, it was decid-
ed that all management work for the Mindy and Laura was
to be at either SI or ST and subcontractors would no longer
be used.
SI was located in a cramped office in New York City from
1983 until 1997.Those who worked in the office described it
as filled with paperwork and files where people practically
sat on top of one another.With the shipping industry chang-
ing, and many shipping companies fleeing Manhattan for the
suburbs of New Jersey and Southwestern Connecticut, it was
decided, after much debate, to move the company out to
Long Island where a majority of the employees lived. Despite
the office being 40 miles outside of Midtown Manhattan, the
office’s original feel and dress code were maintained. Even
though the new office was at least three times as large as the
office in New York City, the employees still sat on top of one
another.Chris wanted it this way,as he stated it ensured good
communication between all parties.
A History of Miscues—A Ship of Fools?
SI Goes Off Course
In 1996, SI suffered a major setback when two vessels they
were managing for a French bank went bankrupt.The bank
had foreclosed on the previous owners of the vessels, and
then hired SI and ST to operate the vessels on the bank’s
behalf until the bank felt the market was right to sell the ves-
sels and recoup some of their investment. When the bank
itself had financial difficulties, it was taken over by a rival
bank.After initially indicating support for SI’s management of
the ships, the new bank decided to withdraw its support for
the project and stopped all payments. As the vessels’ debts
piled up around the world, the two ships were seized. The
ships remained stagnant for many weeks, fuel and food ran
out, and the crew went without pay.After a long legal battle
the crew was paid and released and the vessels were sold as
part of a court-run auction.When the situation was resolved
in the courts, many suppliers received little, if any, money
from the debts incurred by the vessels. Most of these suppli-
ers looked to SI to recoup their losses. However, due to the
management arrangement, SI was not liable for any of the
debts incurred by the two vessels. Legally, SI was protected.
Its reputation in the industry,however,was severely damaged
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Figure 1. Trade Map of Scandia, Inc.
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with some vendors.The entire fiasco cost SI a large sum of
money as well as its reputation, and made doing business in
the years that followed (in this relatively small industry) very
difficult.
SI Runs Aground—The Kari
In the mid 1990s SI began managing three newly construct-
ed chemical tankers that were time chartered from Asian
interests.The three vessels were time chartered by three sep-
arate Liberian companies under the control of Chris Haas.
Two of the vessels, sister ships the Sheena and Suzy Q were
time chartered from the same company.The third vessel, the
Kari, was time chartered from a second organization. The
time charter terms were for five years.
Almost immediately, the relationship between the owners
of the Kari and SI fell apart.The relationship was strained by
initial poor performance of the Kari and its crew.The hard-
line, uncompromising approach taken by SI on behalf of the
time charterers only exacerbated the problems. The vessel
quickly turned out to be ill suited to the evolving Trans-
Atlantic market, making it difficult and uneconomical to
operate.Almost the entire contract term was a study in mis-
trust and lack of cooperation, which resulted in disappoint-
ing returns for all involved.At the end of the contract in April
1999, the time charterers had accumulated significant debts
from the operation of the Kari but had no funds to pay them
and no source of additional income. Immediately upon hear-
ing of the Kari’s redelivery to the Asian owners, the vendors
and agents called on SI for settlement of all outstanding
debts. Many of those owed money did not receive funds for
many months, if at all.Those who were owed money looked
to SI as the source of the problem as they saw right past the
facade of the separate time charter company. This situation
further eroded SI’s reputation.
Another Disaster—The Sheena and 
the Suzy Q
The Sheena and Suzy Q were brought into the SI-managed
fleet in 1994 and 1995, respectfully.At this time the market
was at peak and the cost per day for the time charter reflect-
ed the market’s position as they were fairly high.The ships
were well designed and the Korean crews who worked on
the vessels were quite competent.This combination resulted
in a fairly good and consistent level of performance. As the
market dropped toward the end of 1995, it became very dif-
ficult to meet the financial demands of the time charter con-
tract. By end of 1997, both ships owed back hire to the own-
ers.The ships were being well operated but the freight levels
in the market could not meet the daily costs of the contract.
Chris Haas met with the owners several times to discuss low-
ering the contract rate. From these meetings small deduc-
tions were accomplish but more importantly Chris had con-
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Chris Haas
Director
Scandia, Inc. (SI)
Commercial Management
Quality & Safety
Management
Scandia Technical (ST)
Technical Management
Fully Managed Ships
Mindy – International Tankers, Ltd.
Suzy Q – Liu Tankers, S.A.Time Chartered Ships*
Sheena – Sun Maritime, S.A
Figure 2. Basic Relationship between Companies and Ships.
* The companies listed adjacent to the time-chartered ships are not the actual owners of the ships. Sun Maritime and Liu
Tankers are the owners of the time charters only. As these vessels are time chartered the technical management is controlled
by the owners of the actual vessel.
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vinced the owners that the market would be improving and
they would receive the money owed to them. It is not clear
whether the owners left the vessels under SI’s management
because they believed the market would get better and they
would eventually see their money or because they had no
better options for the vessels. The financial situation never
really got better and the ships were returned to the owner’s
control in the spring of 2001. At the time of redelivery more
than $1 million was outstanding to the owners and a signifi-
cant amount of money was owed to vendors throughout
Europe, the United States,and Central America on the vessels’
accounts. Again the vendors turned to SI for answers and
more importantly money.
Riding Out the Storm
Over the years of operations, the cash flow of the fleet was
used as a common pool of funds such that funds earned by
the Sheena were sometimes used to pay a current bill for the
Mindy.After the Kari, Sheena, and Suzy Q were returned to
their owners, the burden of paying off the outstanding bills
fell on the Mindy and Laura. These ships were also strug-
gling in the down market. However, without settling the bills
it would continue to become more and more difficult to
operate the ships as vendors denied service or took legal
action to try to recoup their money.
The poor financial performance of the vessels during the
mid to late nineties took its toll on the companies’ perform-
ance and morale. From the companies’ founding Chris Haas
had maintained a tight control on cash flow.The basic pay-
ment philosophy of the company has been to pay the bills
only when they absolutely must be paid which is when one
of three things might happen: (1) legal action was threat-
ened, (2) legal action was taken, or (3) when something was
needed from the vendor.The limited cash flow made every
process difficult. Many vendors had placed all vessels associ-
ated with SI on a cash-in-advance basis, making prompt or
emergency purchases nearly impossible. In many instances,
the operational efficiency was negatively affected due to the
restraints of cash flow and outstanding balances with ven-
dors.
Trying to Find Calm Waters
By the end of 2000, the market showed signs of improvement
with the vessels’ voyage revenues improving. However, a
great deal of damage was done to the firms’ reputations with
vendors and rebuilding was required. All the available cash
flow for the significant future was to be applied to outstand-
ing debts until they were completely settled. Until the time
the debts were settled and the companies’ reputations were
restored, the vessels would never operate to their full poten-
tial and efficiency.
Financial Structure, Operation, and
Performance: 1997–2001
SI, Inc. and its associated companies including ST, Global
Tankers, Ltd., International Tankers, Ltd., Shin Maritime, S.A.,
Shin Tankers, S.A., Adger Tankers AS, Leeward Tankers, Inc.,
and Manhattan Tankers, Ltd. are all privately held organiza-
tions. Little information concerning any of the companies’
finances was made available to employees or anyone outside
the organization. Often, the decision was made to do busi-
ness on a “cash in advance” basis rather than divulge any
financial information about the various companies in order
to make purchases on credit. This policy was based on the
direction of Chris Haas.
For tax reasons, SI, Inc. and its sister company, ST, were
structured to make little or no profit. As SI, Inc. was a U.S.
company and ST was incorporated in Norway, corporate
taxes were significant when compared to those imposed on
the ship-owning companies that were typically incorporated
in Liberia or Panama. Therefore, the goal of both SI and ST
was to make the ships they manage run as profitable as pos-
sible while making no profits themselves.
SI, Inc. made money via a combination of yearly manage-
ment fees paid by the ship-owning companies and commis-
sions on various monetary transactions carried out on behalf
of the managed vessels including freight payments received
and cash sent to the ships that the captain then used to pay
crew members.The management fee was the key to control-
ling SI revenues. The size of the management fee was not
definitively spelled out in the management agreement
between the ship-owning companies and SI, Inc.The agree-
ment gave a range for the fees that was dependent on “mar-
ket conditions.”These terms allowed the fees to be sized in
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Table 1. Profit/Loss 1997–2000 with 2001
Projections
Vessel 2001
Projections
based on
1st 6
months
2000 1999 1998 1997
Mindy $711,124 $705,297 ($753,871) ($53,426) ($381,029)
Laura $53,641 $66,195 ($398,958) ($50,476) $1,091,161
Sheena N/A N/A $319,432 ($785,337) ($52,782)
Suzy Q N/A N/A ($457,708) ($851,105) ($230,093)
Total $764,765 $771,492 ($1,291,105) ($1,740,344) $452,257
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such a way that SI lost money or basically broke even every
year.
ST made money solely on management fees paid by the
ship-owning companies through a third party, Manhattan
Tankers, Ltd. The purpose of this structure was to further
insulate ST, SI, and the ship-owning companies from one
another for liability reasons.The structure may have also pro-
vided some economic benefits but this is not clear.The fees
were fixed on a yearly basis and were dependent on the
expected costs associated with running the ST office and
paying its employees.
The true measure of the company’s financial success was
the combined financial performance of all the vessels under
SI commercial management (see Table 1). Therefore, a year
when the market was up and the ships were well managed
and performed well, was considered a good year for SI; a year
when the market was down and/or the ships were not oper-
ated to the fullest potential due to technical or operational
problems was considered a bad year for SI. In both cases the
revenue that SI generated remained right around the compa-
ny’s breakeven point.This does not mean that SI’s revenues
were basically constant. It means that in the good years the
company bought new equipment and spent more on travel,
personnel, etc.While in the bad years, the company cut back
on all expenses including hiring, computer purchases, travel,
etc.
The results of the last four and a half years can be traced
to a number of factors.
• The chemical tanker market was falling substantially
since the Sheena and Suzy Q were time chartered into
the fleet in 1994 and 1995, respectfully. It was very diffi-
cult to support the high monthly charter hire payments
based on the prevailing market conditions.
• The Mindy and Laura were 15 and 16 years old, respec-
tively, in 2001. At this age, the vessels required more
maintenance and spare parts, more extensive dry dock-
ings, and equipment failures became more common.
These factors drove up the operating cost while reduc-
ing efficiency and increasing downtime.
• New regulations affected chemical tanker operation and
management and have greatly impacted the bottom line
by increasing overall operating costs at all levels. The
increased costs were not rolled into the market prices
for transporting chemicals in the current market.
• The cumulative effect of successive poor financial per-
formance put a squeeze on the companies’ cash flows,
which interrupted the proper management and opera-
tion of the vessels resulting in further poor performance
that negatively affected the bottom line.
Part C
Abandoning the Ship: The “Rats” Exit, Stage
Right
“Chris do you have a minute? I would like to speak with you
in private please.”
It was summer 2001 and Chris Haas looked up at the clock
on the wall across the room, and thought to himself that
things should be pretty quiet for the rest of the day. He spot-
ted Mike Walles, Head of Operations, and replied,“Sure, Mike,
just let me finish up this Email.” Mike switched off his moni-
tor,got up from his desk,and walked past Chris into the small
conference room and took a seat across from the door.He felt
himself start to get nervous as his stomach began to churn as
it always does when his anxiety level is high.Three months
of holding it in did not make the task any easier.
“So, Mike, what is on your mind?”asked Chris as he closed
the door behind him.
“Well, Chris, I’ve decided to leave the company.” Chris’s
face went blank as the smile dissolved from his face. He
thought that the rats had finally abandoned the sinking ship.
Leif Sets Sail
It was back in November 2000 when Mike Walles walked into
the office and realized that something was wrong. Dan
Chance, Director of Marine Operations, looked too tired and
too flustered for this early in the morning. When Mike
reached his desk, he dropped his brief case next to his desk
and started his computer. Dan didn’t even look up.
“Morning, Dan.”
Dan replied with an unintelligible mumble, never looking
up from his computer and the list of emails and faxes that
had come in overnight.
The phone barely rang once before Dan snatched the
receiver from the cradle. It was a call from Chris and the
mood was tense, but other than that Mike could not discern
what was going on.
Dan hung up the phone and muttered,“Damn,” as he got
up out of his chair and headed for the men’s room.
“Is there a problem?” asked Mike as Dan walked by.
“Yeah,Leif just quit. I don’t know what the hell happened,
but he is gone.”
Mike thought that it should not have come as a surprise
that Leif Borg, Superintendent (ST) quit but it could not have
come at a worse time. In less than a week the Laura was
going into dry dock in Spain and Leif was running the whole
project.
As of late, there had been a lot of quarreling about the dry
docking between New York and Norway, especially between
Chris and Leif, but to quit was just unprofessional.To leave at
such a crucial time for a company when you were running
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the program is just not right.Things must have been worse
than anyone imagined. This situation had been building for
months. Leif was continually complaining that he felt New
York tied his hands. He felt it took forever to get things
accomplished. If it wasn’t a problem with the cash flow, it
was being second-guessed by Chris, sitting 3000+ miles away.
The blizzard of paperwork and numerous spreadsheets and
reports consumed way too much time. Leif truly resented
being told how to do his job day in and day out when he had
been doing this type of work for the last thirty years.
Chris was always uncomfortable with what Leif was
doing. He knew that Leif was uncomfortable writing in
English but he wanted and needed reports so that he knew
what Leif was up to.To try to lower the level of tension,Chris
would often have Mike or Dan Chance send his messages and
request information. Chris felt he just could not get through
to the guy. He concluded, Leif was just not listening.
As Mike thought about how this docking could be sal-
vaged, he could not keep from smiling when he thought of
the irony of the situation. It was just under a year ago when
Leif started his first day on the job aboard the Mindy in the
shipyard in Fredrecia, Denmark, after the previous superin-
tendent left ST.
Dan’s Departure
It was July 9, 2001 and another “ship” was about to disem-
bark.
“Hi Chris.What can I do for you?”
“I just wanted to call and let you know that Dan will be
leaving the company. I think it’s best for the organization.We
all know he hasn’t been happy here and that’s just not a
healthy situation. Now I have been making some calls and
working out how we can handle this change and I think that
this should work out ok. I really think this is good for the
organization.We will be better off in the long run.You know
he was just too rigid and really holding back our progress.“
“Well,Mike, just think about this.What do you feel we may
need to do? We will discuss it when I return to New York.
Ok?”
Mike could not quite believe what he was hearing. Chris
was known for always trying to put a positive spin on bad
things but he was really going too far now.“Just one thing,
Chris.When will he be leaving?”
“July 27.”
“Should I reschedule my trip to China? Otherwise, there
will only be one more day when the three of us are in the
office together and that’s the day he’s leaving. I’m leaving on
Sunday, you’re back on Monday, and then I return that
Thursday.That leaves us with Friday.There’s a lot to go over
in one day.”
“Don’t worry about it. You still go to China as planned.
There won’t be that much to go over. Ok? Well, unless there
is anything else I have to go. Ok”
“Ok, bye.” Mike couldn’t believe what he just heard. Not
that much to go over? The guy’s been working at the compa-
ny for more than ten years, making over $120,000 a year, and
it’s no big deal that he is leaving and there is nothing to pass
over. It’s not like there is anything written down in the office
with the exception of the ships’ manuals. No one knows
what the 401K plan is much less what Dan does all day. He is
in the office 11+ hours a day; he must be doing something.
Every attempt to begin to write procedures manuals had died
as soon as the meeting was over. It never was a priority.
Mike shook his head. His job was never really defined and
now he would be doing the majority of Leif’s job, as there
still wasn’t a real replacement for him, and now Dan’s job.
And Chris thinks this is a good thing for the company, proba-
bly because payroll will be more $200,000 lower than this
time last year. Mike reflected on the stories he heard from
Gina.With Dan leaving, he would be at least the tenth opera-
tions person to leave the company since it was founded 18
years ago.That only rivals the five superintendents in seven
years.
It was no surprise to Mike that Dan was leaving. For the
three plus years that Mike had been with the company, he
had seen Dan get more and more unhappy with each day. He
definitely was not enjoying his job.He hated dealing with the
whole money thing. He never understood why Chris refused
to pay people until it was an emergency.The only thing he
hated more than the constant calls from vendors and agents
looking for money, was lying to people for the company.To
Chris everything was a shade of gray and this just did not fit
Dan’s personality. He prided himself on being a straight
shooter and that was one thing you could not be if you stayed
at SI for too long. Mike thought to himself,“It’s amazing he
lasted nearly 11 years here.”
Mina’s Swan Song 
September 19, 2001 
“Hey Mike, you got a minute?”
“Sure Mina, what’s up?”
“I just wanted to let you know I’m leaving ST. I’m sure you
already knew but I figured I should tell you myself.”
“I did not know. I had some suspicions based on some of
the emails that I have seen.When did you let Chris know and
when is your last day?”
“I can’t believe you did not know. I told Chris on
September 3rd and my last day will be Friday the 28th.”
“Well, congratulations Mina. I’m definitely going to miss
you. You were the only person in this company with some
organization and who was not always passing work over this
way. Do you know what the plan is for your work?”
“Well the way I understand it, you’re taking the requisi-
tions, and Nina and Margaret will be taking over the crew-
ing.”
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“Great, more work. I was getting kind of bored lately. Nina
and Margaret crewing, that should be interesting. What are
they doing with the office in Arendal?”
“I guess they will just shut it down.”
“Well listen, Mina, I have another call on the line that I
have to take. I will give you a call back later to talk about this
some more.Take care. Bye.”
“This just keeps getting better,” Mike thought to himself.
This was the third crewing person in three and a half years.
Definitely understandable in this case. How can you leave
one person in an office all by herself all day? Then to have to
deal with all the vendors all day demanding money.“Good for
her. Me next,” he thought.
On December 2, 2001, Mike told Chris he was leaving the
company.
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Appendix 1. Backgrounds of Individuals
Chris Haas – President, SI, Inc.
Chris was born in Norway in 1943 and was raised in the
small shipping town of Arendal. His family’s shipping busi-
ness was successful and offered him a comfortable life.After
completing high school, he joined a ship management com-
pany in Oslo, Norway. He worked in Oslo for a year before
being rotated to the company’s offices in London and New
York. By age 25 he was the Chartering Manager for chemical
marketing for that same company in its New York office. Five
years later he moved to a trading company in New York and
became the Vice President of Transportation and Shipping. In
1983 he opened his own ship management company, SI, Inc.
and began taking part in the time chartering of vessels,which
SI, Inc. was to run. In 1991, he reopened his family’s shipping
company in Norway technically to support his purchase of
two chemical tankers.
Margaret Haas, Comptroller
Margaret is Chris’s American wife and is about the same age
as Chris. She was originally a schoolteacher who over time
has become more and more involved in the running of the
organization. She started out coming in one day a week and
has been working full time SI since 1995. She acts as the
comptroller and office manager. She is well educated with a
degree in economics and psychology.
Gina House, Director of Chartering
Gina is a native of New York who has worked in the marine
and chemical industries her entire career. She started work-
ing for a shipowner in Manhattan after she graduated college
with a degree in English and Sociology in 1973. By 1982 she
advanced to Assistant to the Operations Manager. In 1984,she
joined a chemical trading company where she worked for
five years and advanced to Transportation Manager. In 1989
she joined the Chartering Department of SI.
Dan Chance, Director of Marine Operations
Dan joined SI in 1990, after sailing on U.S.-flagged ships for
12 years. For five of those years he sailed as Captain. Dan
grew up in New Jersey and now lives on Long Island. He
graduated from the United States Merchant Marine Academy
in 1978 with a degree in Marine Transportation.
Nina Dorata, Administrative Assistant
Nina is a recent college graduate from Long Island, who was
hired to help with administrative tasks after Dan left SI. She
has a degree in computer systems and no real work experi-
ence.
Mike Walles, Operations
Mike joined the operations department of SI in the spring of
1998. Since 1995 he had been working as a Naval Architect
for a private shipyard in Connecticut building nuclear sub-
marines for the U.S. Navy. Mike was born and raised on Long
Island where his family still lives. Mike has an undergraduate
degree in naval architecture and marine engineering and a
graduate degree in ocean technology and commerce.
Mina Edwards, Crewing Manager (ST)
Mina joined ST in 1999 and had no previous experience in
the shipping industry. Mina was born in Norway where she
lived until nine years of age. Her family then moved to the
United States where she grew up and was educated. Mina
received an Associate’s degree in accounting and held sever-
al accounting-related jobs in the United States. In 1998, she
moved back to Norway, to live permanently.
Leif Borg, Superintendent (ST)
Leif, a native of Norway, joined ST in November of 1999. He
has more than 30 years of experience in the marine industry.
He sailed on ships as an engineer and has worked as an
owner’s representative for new shipbuilding and ship repair
projects in the Far East and Europe. Leif has also work for a
large Norwegian marine equipment manufacturer.
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Appendix 2. Organizational Structure
This appendix presents the organization charts for Scandia for November 2000 and October 2001
November, 2000
Maritime Technical & Quality Operations
Leif Borg, Superintendent
Mina Edwards, Crewing Manager
Board of Directors
Scandia Technical
Project development
Chris Haas
Mike Walles
Finance/Administration
Buddy Shantz, Accounting Manager
Margaret Haas, Comptroller
Cargo Operations
Dan Chance, Director
Mike Walles, Manager
Chartering
Carl Haas
Gina House, Director
Chris Haas
President
Board of Directors
October, 2001
Maritime Technical & Quality Operations
Bjorn Andreas, Superintendent
Board of Directors
Scandia Technical
Project development
Chris Haas
Mike Walles
Finance/Administration
Buddy Shantz, Accounting Manager
Margaret Haas, Comptroller
Nina Dorata, Adm. Asst.
Cargo Operations
Mike Walles, Manager
Richard Bodkin, Asst. Manager
Chartering
Carl Haas
Gina House, Director
Chris Haas
President
Board of Directors
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Note
1. In order to maintain the firm’s anonymity, this mission statement is a facsimile of a statement from a comparable firm.
Reference
“Mission Statement.” Retrieved from http://www. merchantshpg. com/our-mission.html#management, 2/1/08).
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Colette Henry, editor, Entrepreneurship in the Creative
Industries: An International Perspective, Cheltenham,
UK and Northampton,MA:Edward Elgar Publishing,2007,
224 pages, $115.00.
A creative endeavor in the 21st century is a concept influx.As quickly as technology alters the face of bothlife and industry, so also does the nature of what is
known to be the entrepreneurial “creative”sector change and
morph into new definitions of creativity, cultural economics,
and intellectual property. Initially comprising areas, such as
designer fashion, arts and crafts, film, and theater, the “cre-
ative industries” began in the 21st century to branch out to
include industries, such as architectural design, publishing,
broadcast media, and music recording, not to mention more
recent industry developments,such as software development
and digital media communications.
This new “creative economy” has been a huge boon to the
21st-century global economy; however, the ever-changing
face of what defines a creative industry has also been a chal-
lenge to the more slowly changing governmental and institu-
tional support systems that may still label creative industries
under more rigid or traditional classifications. The resulting
uneven fault between funding and funded has been a source
of frustration on the side of both the entrepreneur and those
who would seek to support potentially viable and lucrative
industries or to boost the economy by replacing defunct and
stale businesses with those clearly boasting entrepreneurial
energy and creativity.
In her book, Entrepreneurship in the Creative Industries:
An International Perspective, Colette Henry attempts to
introduce the reader to the current issues facing the creative
industries as we progress into the 21st century. Addressed to
academics, entrepreneurs, support agencies, and policymak-
ers, Henry collects a series of essays that reflect both nation-
al and international economic concerns, that investigate both
quantitative and qualitative methodologies, and that examine
the nature of entrepreneurship across varying industries,
economies, and geographies. Her goal seems to be to encour-
age a healthy reevaluation of what defines the creative indus-
tries, what kinds of support they will need in order to maxi-
mize their potential within the global economy,and how fun-
ders and funded can work together to create new spaces for
entrepreneurial energy within various economic and indus-
try settings in a fast-changing digital age.
The book is divided into two primary sections. Part I
spends five chapters, along with an introduction by Henry,
describing the nature of creative entrepreneurship in areas
such as East and Southeast Asia, Scandinavia, the UK, Ireland,
New Zealand,and Russia.Part II consists of another five chap-
ters and conclusion evaluating the support for the creative
industries in the UK, in arts education in general, in Russia,
within human language technology,and within higher educa-
tion.
In Chapter 2, Desmond Hui describes the redefinition of
cultural and creative industries in Japan, South Korea,
Singapore,Taiwan, and Hong Kong, and describes new frame-
works for support. Hui notes the overall shift from a mecha-
nization economy to a creative digital/tech (i.e., informa-
tion/organic) economy, and he identifies what industries
these Asian countries have currently included in their evalu-
ation of cultural and creative industries. Hui also identifies
“entertainment” as the main staple of wealth in the 21st-cen-
tury economic system. He notes interestingly that in
Singapore, the definition of these types of industries has been
broadened to an evaluation of them in light of the “four Es”—
Expert, Enrichment, Embedded, and Everywhere—and notes
extreme potential for Asia to capitalize on its creative poten-
tial and to boost/revitalize its economy through creative
entrepreneurial endeavors. Hui predicts that the way China,
in particular, will promote and develop its cultural and cre-
ative industries will impact the world economy (27).
In Chapter 3, Maria Aggestam discusses art entrepreneur-
ship in the Scandinavian music industry, quoting
Scandinavia’s richness in this area due to groups such as
ABBA and the Olson Brothers. She also discusses venturing
and the industry’s double nature as both a domestic and
export industry. In order to look at how venturing has assist-
ed in supporting these industries, Aggestam provides short
case studies of Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden.
Book Review
Entrepreneurship in the Creative Industries: An International
Perspective
Lori Wagner
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Aggestam would seem to indicate that the Scandinavian
music industry continues to hold a leadership position in
funding this type of industry and offers generous support to
those art entrepreneurs who would follow this entrepreneur-
ial path.
In Chapter 4, David Rae discusses the creative industries
in the United Kingdom, and urges policymakers to rethink
discontinuities between support for new creative economies
in the UK.This very well-written article takes the perspective
of creative entrepreneurs, policymakers, educators, main-
stream businesses, and the community in order to display the
complexity in current discontinuities and the dialogue neces-
sary in order to overcome disparate definitions. Rae encour-
ages the UK to “think outside the box” (70) so that it can
move beyond current industries and embrace the lucrative
changes offered through the consumption of new creative
products.
In Chapter 5, Barra O’Cinneide and Colette Henry discuss
the Irish music and dance sector, citing the importance of
this sector in Ireland’s economic growth potential.
Frustrations with traditional investors and opportunities for
new synergies between supporters and performers make up
the primary discussion within the case studies presented.
Once again, without the inhibitions of training and funding,
the creative industries could potentially be a powerful eco-
nomic and social force within the economy, according to
O’Cinneide and Henry.
In Chapter 6,Anne de Bruin discusses the film industry in
New Zealand, noting its global power and international
attraction. De Bruin also leads an interesting discussion on
Schumpeter’s distinction between entrepreneur and inven-
tor, which can illuminate differences between a creative
entrepreneur and an artist (94). She notes that the capacity
for making a profit in this type of industry is dependent on
entrepreneurial skills and that potential industries should be
evaluated accordingly.
In Section II, Chapter 7 by Tom Fleming investigates fund-
ing for creative enterprises in the UK. Fleming discusses five
intervention dilemmas for the public sector and calls for
approaches that can respond to the distinctive business pro-
files of the creative industries (120).The article is detail-spe-
cific with good, practical guidelines for establishing funding.
In Chapter 8, Ralph Brown notes the ways in which arts
education in the UK is working to promote entrepreneurship
among its students. He points out that artists are not neces-
sarily skilled in entrepreneurial innovation, and that educa-
tion needs to assist them in providing basics for success in
these types of industries, including how to find appropriate
support.An excellent article, Brown outlines how a mentor-
ing relationship can assist students in learning the necessary
skills in order to move into entrepreneurial relationships.
In Chapter 9, Linda Moss explores the problem of restric-
tive legislation and weak infrastructure on creative enterpris-
es in Russia. She particularly notes problems in transplanting
Western formulas and strategies into an Eastern-mentality
country, and she notes the need for new ideas and funding
alternatives within this developing market economy.A well-
researched and thought-out article, Moss gives several good
examples of entrepreneurial options within Russia and some
different perspectives on how the creative enterprises will
have to work with government agencies and consumers to
create a more viable creative economy (157).
In Chapter 10, Brian Kenny and Julia Meaton discuss
human language technologies and entrepreneurship in
Finland in a marginalized economy. Kenny and Meaton see
this area to be one of potential strength, as support is given
to these new, innovative industries.
In Chapter 11, Calvin Taylor talks about the importance of
developing relationships between higher education, enter-
prise, and innovation within the creative industries and
examines the types of business models within which they
best operate.Taylor suggests that universities consider their
processes of knowledge production for these industries, that
various industries learn to engage with universities in sup-
portive relationships, and that public policy needs to consid-
er more specifically the characteristics of innovation and
social dynamics for the creative industries.
Finally, Henry concludes Chapter 12 by encouraging con-
tinued dialogue and reevaluation between supporting agen-
cies and entrepreneurial creative industries. She strongly
believes that the industries have the potential for significant
growth if the barriers facing creative entrepreneurs are
removed, particularly regarding marketing and funding.
Finally, she calls for better relationships between educational
institutions and creative industries, as well as between gov-
ernment institutions and entrepreneurs, in order to help sup-
port and drive digital technology-driven entertainment and
creative sectors.
I found the book to contain good examples of the state of
research in the field of entrepreneurship within the creative
sector.Although the goals of the volume are not complex nor
aggressive, the book can provide a jumping-off point for
scholars and businesspeople to inform themselves on the
issues facing these potential industries in a 21st-century envi-
ronment, which will continue to change and grow. If any-
thing, the book is a wake-up call to provide awareness to
those needing to recognize the immense economic potential
of new and developing sectors, especially for struggling
economies.
Although technically divided, Parts I and II seem to blend
into one another, and it is hard for the reader to distinguish
defining the industries from discussions of their support.Due
to the necessary interconnectedness of definition and sup-
port systems, it may have been more reasonable to divide the
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book according to region, rather than definition and funding.
Additionally, the book’s “international” perspective is limited
primarily to either studies of the United Kingdom or its rela-
tionship to other countries or regions, such as Asia, Russia, or
China.
The book could have been used as a significant tool or
impetus for change; however, the academic nature of the
essays seemed to draw away from the book’s own “entrepre-
neurial” creativity and power, making it instead more of a
“safe”sourcebook for further investigation into the definition
and economic complexities of the creative industries. Sadly,
this may be a symbolic representation of its own theme of
disempowerment.
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